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
**THE LEADERSHIP EVALUATION AND
ANALYSIS PROGRAM (LEAP)
CONTEMPORARY MARINE CORPS
LEADERSHIP ISSUES**

Final Report 1979

Thomas D. Affourtit

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Prepared for:
U.S. Department of the Navy
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Code: MPH)
Washington, D.C. 20380



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Command equality	Training evaluation
Perceptual/attitudinal measurement	Unit efficiency
Survey-guided intervention	Decision-making criteria

20 cont'd.

This report represents a prototype application of the LEAP Network Monitor System, an information storage and retrieval data bank designed to function on a voluntary and an anonymous basis for use as an executive decision-making resource by both company level commanders and senior organizations.

The results presented in this report are a summary of the data collected from a representative sample of Marines (5,546) and Marine Corps commands (68 companies, battalions, squadrons) that applied the LEAP during 1978. The results are presented according to several critical areas of interest, viz., total command analysis, senior-subordinate relations, perceptions of equality, training program evaluation, and career orientation.

Chapter 8, LEAP Overview, provides a review of the program during the implementation stage and lists several recommendations for future use and expansion. Finally, Appendix A includes the verbatim comments by Marines toward a variety of Marine Corps conditions that lend interpretative meaning to the data contained in the report.

Technical Report 79-10


August 1979

THE LEADERSHIP EVALUATION
AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM (LEAP)

Contemporary Marine Corps
Leadership Issues

Final Report 1979

Thomas D. Affourtit



Prepared for:
U.S. Department of the Navy
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Code: MPH)
Washington, D.C. 20380

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Leadership Evaluation and Analysis Program (LEAP) is a decentralized, self-applied organizational development program designed for the small unit commander. Commanders are provided the techniques and procedure by which they can assess leadership concerns, determine the level of unit combat readiness, and evaluate the effectiveness of the decision-making process. The LEAP procedure involves the measurement of leadership based on operationally defined performance criteria and assessment of command motivation.

The LEAP was implemented in 1978 when the manual (NAVMC 2670) and materials for application were supplied to Marine commanders, and an ADP system was installed at all Automated Services Centers for access by those desiring to score the results of the motivational survey.

As a result of voluntary application and submission of results by Marine Corps units, a data bank has been established. Through this system it is possible to store and process vital information with wide application while maintaining input unit anonymity.

This report summarizes the data collected from a representative sample of Marine Corps commands that applied the LEAP during 1978. The purpose of this report is to present the findings for various critical categories. This information can be utilized as a resource for executive decision-making.

The results of this study are based on a representative sample of 68 company, battery, and squadron level commands and 5,546 Marines. The results are presented according to the following areas of interest:

TOTAL COMMAND ANALYSIS

- Conditions of Command Efficiency were judged to be the most critical of the principal areas assessed by the total Marine Corps sample.
- While Marines generally claimed that they were well trained and encouraged to do their best, they did not feel well informed and were somewhat confused concerning their mission. Job satisfaction and morale were also considered to be low by the Marines.

- Concerning issues of Command Cohesion, most Marines displayed respect for authority and saw SNCOS as somewhat supportive. However, they also indicated that esteem between Marines in their command, confidence in leadership, understanding of subordinates, and examples provided by seniors were areas where improvement was most desired.
- Measures of Command Cohesion were directly related to unit absenteeism (UA) and first term reenlistment rates. A separate report (TR 79-8) revealed that as perceptions of cohesion increased, unit UA rates significantly decreased and reenlistment rates significantly increased.
- Overall results lend support to a distinction that can be made between combat readiness, using traditional standards (training goals accomplished), and combat effectiveness in terms of a desire to function as a cohesive unit with confidence in the hierarchy of command, and dedication to the mission.

SENIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONS

- Measuring differences in command perceptions between senior (E-6 and above) and subordinate (E-5 and below) Marines, it was possible to identify primary points of contention that influence unit solidarity.
- Job satisfaction of subordinate Marines and issues of communication were among the most critical Command Preparedness conditions separating the two rank groups. Other points of contention involved the senior's understanding of subordinates and responsiveness to the personal problems and needs of junior Marines. Marines E-6 and above see these conditions in a much more positive vein than do their subordinates.
- On the Justice factor there was disagreement between the rank groups over the equality of justice administered, the distribution of work details, and the fairness of criteria used for promotion.
- A Disparity Index (DI) was derived for use as a measure of unity between senior and subordinate

Marines in each command. Where disparity over conditions in the command was highest, UA was also highest and vice versa (TR 79-8).

- The range of DI scores between commands in the sample showed wide variation. While knowledge of personnel is a princ'pal leadership trait, senior Marines in some commands significantly misjudged the position of junior members. Other commands, however, functioned with considerable consonance, i.e., almost total agreement between unit members.

PERCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY

- Concerning measures of discrimination, White Marines and minorities other than Black see conditions as being generally positive. Black Marines, however, while somewhat positive on the discrimination issues, consider major problem areas to be injustice in terms of equality of punishment and discipline, distribution of work details, and response to complaints about discrimination.
- The findings suggest that claims of reverse discrimination by majority members may, to some extent, be accounted for by their rejection of minority discrimination as a legitimate issue for which compensatory policy is justified.
- Intergroup climate or tension between minority and majority Marines shows the greatest improvement since previously studied in 1976 (TR 77-4).
- A significant relationship was found between unit UA rates and negative judgments on the Minority Discrimination and overall Equality scales. In addition, perceptions of Justice was a significant predictor of first-term reenlistment rates (TR 79-8).
- An Equality Disparity Index (DI), developed as a measure of polarity between minority and majority members of a unit, was significantly associated with reenlistment rates on three of the five Equality scales (TR 79-8).
- There was a wide range among commands on both Equality scale scores and disparity measures, indicating that while conditions of discrimination are not as pervasive as in the past, equality issues remain critical for some commands.

PROGRAM EVALUATION

- Ratings by participants and impact on command conditions were used as criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program.
- The combined rating of the program on an absolute scale (0 to 100) was 47.5 revealing a generally negative judgment. However, this rating represents an improvement in acceptance of the program over a previous study conducted in 1976 (TR 77-2) and presumably reflects a modification in format and emphasis of instruction. Black Marines were most favorable toward the program, while Marines with either college training or less than 8th grade education gave the lowest ratings.
- Another positive change from the 1976 study was apparent when analyzing the judgments by level of participation in the program. Previous results showed that the highest ratings were given by Marines that had not yet participated in the training. The present data reveals that Marines with 20 hours of participation gave the most positive rating, indicating that program expectations had been realized, at least in the initial stage. After 20 hours of participation, however, there was a downward trend in program acceptance, reaching the lowest point with 60 hours of training participation.
- Measures of Leadership (Human Relations) Program impact on actual command conditions revealed almost no relationship between hours of participation and unit motivation/performance. However, five percent of the total variance between levels of participation was accounted for by improved perceptions of Minority Discrimination. While this relationship is small, the trend again represents an improvement over the 1976 results.

CAREER ORIENTATION

- Only 5.7% of the enlisted Marines in their 1st term intend to reenlist, while 33.2% were undecided, and 61.1% have decided not to remain beyond their present tour. Of those enlisted Marines that are completing at least a second tour, 41.9% intend to reenlist again, while 30.2% and 27% respectively are undecided or have no

intention of remaining in the Marine Corps. Fifty percent of the company grade officers in the sample desire to remain in the Corps.

- The 1st term Marines intending to reenlist are somewhat less educated and represent more minority members than the undecided or non career oriented Marines. However, 2nd term enlisted Marines who desire to remain in the Corps are more educated than either the undecided or non career oriented groups. The 2nd term career oriented group is comprised of 71.3% White and 28.7% designated minority Marines.
- Marines just out of recruit training (3 months or less) have a high opinion of conditions in the Corps and express a very positive outlook, but such expectations are not reinforced by their initial experience.
- Concerning military experience and motivation, Marines with less than one year in service are as motivated as the 6 to 10 year group. The lowest level of functioning occurs during the third and fourth years of service.
- Motivational measures distinguished between the career, undecided, and non career oriented groups. In addition, scale scores for individual commands correlated significantly with career intentions.
- Perceived inadequate conditions within a command resulted in a significant number of Marines in all enlistment groups (1st term, 2nd term, company grade officers) rejecting the Marine Corps as a career choice, while more favorable conditions made a Marine Corps career more attractive as one of several possible alternatives.
- Item analyses revealed specific issues associated with career intention for each enlistment group. For 1st term Marines, career orientation was a function of several fundamental issues of Command Efficiency, Cohesion, and Justice. In contrast, 2nd term Marines were primarily motivated by all issues of Justice and also considered support for personal problems and communication critical for remaining in the Corps.

WOMEN MARINES

- Published as a separate report (TR 78-7), perceptions of Women Marines in leadership roles was studied by focusing on results obtained in 1975 and 1978. As women Marines assumed more of the duties historically accomplished by men, there was a decline (more negative) in judgment of their capability over the issues measured.
- Generally, contemporary Marines believe that women cannot lead as well as male Marines, although women do not necessarily make poor leaders. According to the current sample, Marines are opposed to being under the command of women Marines, but women do have a place in the Marine Corps, and they are entitled to the same respect and privileges as male Marines.
- There is some evidence that while male leaders are judged on the basis of individual merit, experience with a woman leader tends to produce a generalized or stereotypical impression of women Marines. A proficient woman leader will effect more favorable judgments of all women Marines, while a poor leader produces the opposite effect.

LEAP OVERVIEW

- As a voluntary, decentralized, organizational development process with minimal administrative support and field representation, the LEAP has received wide acceptance and application throughout the Marine Corps during the first year of implementation.
- The scientific validity of LEAP techniques and the practical utility of the program for unit commanders have consistently been demonstrated throughout the development and implementation period (TR 77-3; TR 78-3; TR 78-10; TR 79-3).
- The results of an economic feasibility study reveal that the LEAP is a sound investment that can be used to improve command efficiency and increase unit combat readiness (TR 79-8). The data showed that LEAP intervention by unit commanders can be translated into such cost-beneficial outcomes as higher reenlistments, lower absenteeism, and greater command production rates.

- Data produced by the LEAP reveal that unit performance can be improved through recognition of command conditions by leaders. The issues measured deal primarily with concerns internal to the command situation. Leaders learn that unit combat readiness can be effected through modification of perceptual judgments and by influencing agreement between unit members over critical motivational issues. While external variables beyond the control of the small unit commander do have an effect on the unit, the individual leader can have a significant impact on the motivational conditions measured by the LEAP.
- The LEAP has considerable potential value to the Marine Corps, but the program requires adequate support and maintenance by a proficient governing agency. Several recommendations for future implementation and expansion of the program are provided.

VERBATIM COMMENTS

- Many of the items in the survey evoked qualifying comments by Marines desiring to express their situation further. These comments provide a variety of particular examples with reference to individual items in the LEAP survey or to the Marine Corps in general, and lend interpretative meaning to the data contained in this report.

This report represents a prototype application of the LEAP Network Monitor System, an information storage and retrieval data bank designed to function on a voluntary and an anonymous basis for use by company level commanders and senior organizations. The information presented in this report establishes an historical record of events, issues, and conditions in the Marine Corps during the period covered.

LEAP Network Monitor System reports, by virtue of the method used to collect the data, overcome many of the problems associated with formal, mandatory readiness reports, and provide motivational information to support or balance inferences drawn from demographic and other status accounts.

DISCLAIMER

The analyses and interpretation of the data contained in this document represent the professional judgment of the author and therefore should not be considered as an official Marine Corps statement. The author assumes full responsibility for the content and accuracy of this document.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Background

The Leadership Evaluation and Analysis Program (LEAP) is designed to provide small-unit commanders with the techniques and procedure by which they can assess leadership concerns, determine the level of unit combat readiness, and evaluate the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Decision-making feedback, through periodic application of the LEAP, aids the leader in developing the flexibility necessary to control and influence various groups under a variety of situations and mission requirements. The expertise and confidence acquired from this process during the preparation stage of military activity enable the leader to function more effectively during a time of crisis.

The LEAP is founded on the principles of organizational/management theory and behavioral science methodology. However, unlike other programs of this type, the LEAP offers a decentralized, self-development strategy. The program is designed for use solely at the company, battery, and squadron level. Command control and confidentiality are maintained, since the entire program is self-applied, and there is no need for professional assistance to conduct the program or to interpret the results. Moreover, program application is voluntary, thereby eliminating report requirements and other administrative burdens.

The LEAP procedure involves the measurement of leadership based on operationally defined performance criteria and assessment of command motivation. Two principal techniques are used:

- The Leadership Analysis Form (LAF). A recording process that generates a quantitative measure of standard leadership performance. The LAF is also adaptable to command-specific performance requirements.
- The Interaction Inventory. Personnel survey instruments that yield command motivational profiles in terms of a number of leadership issues and conditions.

As an intelligence-gathering method, the data produced by command motivational assessment identify the causes for performance conditions. This information is translated into leadership/management objectives and used to establish command priorities. The commander takes decisive action to improve specific conditions that have a direct bearing on unit performance. The effectiveness of corrective actions taken is then evaluated through subsequent change in the performance indicators.

Further, by using the two LEAP techniques in conjunction, through a systematic inductive-deductive process, the leader learns to predict an event and intervene to prevent a potentially negative outcome as well as to reinforce those conditions that promote positive performance. Several levels of program application are available to the unit commander.

The LEAP is presented in a programmed manual for individual command use that features a sequential, step-by-step procedure for the application of the techniques and explicit guidelines for the scoring, recording, and interpretation of results. Since the LEAP is designed for diagnostic computer systems support, and no formal recording is required, the program makes minimal demands on the commander's time.

In essence, the LEAP is a practical method for dealing with realistic leadership concerns and for generating concrete solutions for the benefit of all Marines. The goal of the LEAP is to enhance the decision-making process and aid unit commanders in understanding, predicting, and controlling events that influence leadership conditions in an effort to maintain an optimal combat-readiness status.

Concurrent and predictive validity estimates have been conducted establishing the relationship between LEAP motivational data and such criteria as unit absenteeism, reinlistment figures, and material maintenance/production rates (Affourtit 1977d, 1978a, 1979c). In addition, recently developed motivational assessment material, designed as an adjunct to the Interaction Inventory, showed significant relationships between the issues measured and reinlistment intentions, drug and alcohol abuse, and theft within participating commands (Affourtit, 1979c).

Implementation

In October 1977 the LEAP was implemented in the Marine Corps. The LEAP Manual (NAMC 2670), along with reproducible materials for use in data gathering was sent to all Marine Corps commands via distribution A. In May 1978, an automatic data processing (ADP) system (MAFORM) for scoring Interaction Inventory results was installed at all Marine Corps automated services centers for access by local commanders. Essential documentation for ADP specialists and Information Systems Management Officers (ISMO) was also supplied at this time (Affourtit 1978a, 1978b).

Data Bank

As a result of voluntary application and submission of the LEAP results by Marine Corps units, a data bank has been established. This data bank represents the results of a cross-section of Marine Corps commands that have applied the LEAP since implementation. Since no command in the sample can be identified, the data can be accessed to provide motivational analyses for a number of Marine Corps issues and concerns without violation of the confidentiality of the individual commands that provided the information.


The information contained in the data bank advances beyond the demographic tabulations usually generated to develop trends, support policy decisions, and project personnel figures. For the first time, Marine Corps commanders and policy makers have access to motivational information that has a direct bearing on unit combat readiness.

Not only does the LEAP function as a guide that directs the small unit commander's attention to certain unit conditions requiring intervention, but combined data can be systematically processed to provide vital information to senior level commands. Furthermore, the combined data can be supplied to user units to provide standards by which commanders can judge levels of functioning and establish unit priorities and objectives.

Voluntary submission and analysis of anonymous command motivational and performance data overcomes the principal drawback of a completely decentralized organizational development model such as the LEAP, i.e., inability to systematically collect and process large scale evaluation data. Through voluntary submission of command data, it is possible to store and process vital information with wide application while maintaining unit anonymity.

The LEAP Network Monitor Monitor System (LNMS) (Affourtit, 1979b), a process for utilizing command data, was designed to function on a voluntary and anonymous basis as an information storage and retrieval data bank for field commanders. Information input, recommendations, and solutions discovered can be analyzed, and data feedback can be presented in consideration of any number of influencing conditions, such as unit composition, mission, unit status, location, or effective strength. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the LNMS will operate.

Figure 1.1



As data is accumulated, the LNMS can be used as a resource center to monitor the effects of actual environmental and internal command conditions that influence unit combat readiness, and to transmit common solutions to common Marine Corps problems. Such results, based on actual conditions, will also be beneficial in training new commanders to make the most appropriate and effective decisions prior to command assignment.

It is possible, through this system, to produce division, wing, and group level profiles, again without threat to the small unit commander. Such reports, based on representative samples, can be used as a feedback

mechanism for LEAP users, providing a cross-section standard. Commanders can estimate their position with regard to conditions discovered on a large scale, and unit priorities and objectives based on levels actually achieved within the command can be established.

Division level reports also provide input to senior commanders allowing them to deal with some of the problems that have an impact on company level performance, but that go beyond the small unit leader's realm of responsibility. To date a Marine Barracks and two division reports have been produced.

Comparison with other OD Programs

Table 1.1 provides a synopsis of the LEAP compared to organizational development (OD) programs utilized by the other military services.

Table 1.1
Organizational Development
Program Comparison

Standard OD Approach	LEAP
• Centralized Control	• Complete Decentralization
• Professional Assistance Required	• Self-Applied
• Schedules of Application	• Complete Autonomy, Quick Reaction Capability
• Open Data	• Command Confidential Results
• Oriented Toward Large Scale Policy Development	• Small Unit Self-Development with Large Scale Input Capability
• Based on General Industrial Theory/Sample	• Organization Specific, Marine Corps Standardized
• High Budgetary Requirement	• Minimal Financial Support

Purpose

This report summarizes the data collected from a representative sample of Marine Corps field units that applied the LEAP during the year 1978. The purpose of this report is to present the findings for various critical categories and provide a motivational profile of the Marine Corps that can be utilized as a resource for executive decision-making. As such, this report represents a prototype application of the LEAP Network Monitor System.

The information presented in this report establishes an historical record of events, issues, and conditions in the Marine Corps during the period covered. Annual LEAP Network Monitor System reports, by virtue of the method used to collect the data, overcome many of the problems associated with formal, mandatory readiness reports, and provide motivational information to support or balance inferences drawn from demographic or other status reports. Moreover, verbatim comments collected during command surveys add considerable interpretative meaning to quantitative data and offer additional causative criteria for consideration.

The information produced by the Network Monitor System can be used by Marine Corps Headquarters Agencies, staff elements, senior levels of command, and by small unit field commanders as a decision-making resource. Never before has motivational data been systematically collected on such a large scale from a single methodology.

Report Format

The results of the Marine Corps sample are presented in the following chapters:

- Chapter 2. Demographic Information. Provides sample population data for 11 demographic categories. This information is used to judge the representativeness of the sample and to determine the validity of inferences and generalizations drawn from the sample to the target population.
- Chapter 3. Total Command Analysis. Presents the overall results of the motivational assessment for the cross-section commands including the range of scale scores for the primary categories measured.
- Chapter 4. Senior-Subordinate Relations. Motivational analysis for various rank groups are presented along with measures of disparity between senior and subordinate Marines.
- Chapter 5. Perceptions of Equality. Motivational scores are presented for minority and majority member Marines to analyze the principal concerns and conflicts that exist between various ethnic/racial groups.
- Chapter 6. Program Evaluation. Participant ratings and measures of command conditions are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program.
- Chapter 7. Career Motivation. Career intention is analyzed from the standpoint of various demographic categories and motivational levels. Conditions and issues associated with initial and career reinlistment are also described.

- Chapter 8. LEAP Review. An overall review of LEAP application during the initial year of implementation is presented along with an outline of the problems encountered and recommendations for policy modification and future development.
- Appendix A. Verbatim Comments. The actual comments recorded by respondents concerning the issues and conditions measured by the Interaction Inventory are presented. The comments are categorized according to pertinent areas of Marine Corps concern.

CHAPTER TWO
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

CHAPTER TWO
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The first step in analyzing research data is to determine the representativeness of the sample to the target population, in this case, the Marine Corps. The degree to which the sample population sufficiently and accurately reflects the Marine Corps is a measure of the adequacy with which inferences and generalizations can be drawn from the data obtained.

Mission

The data for this report represents 68 commands at the company, battery, Marine Barracks, and squadron levels. Table 2.1 presents a breakdown of the commands by type of mission. Several USMCR commands that were processed were not included in the sample used for the main analysis.

Table 2.1
Command Representation

Type of Unit	No.
Infantry	41
Aviation	15
Marine Barracks	10
Miscellaneous Commands	2

These commands supplied their data for analyses during the period January 1978 through December 1978.

Table 2.2 shows the age representation of the sample population.

Table 2.2
Age Representation
of the Sample Population

Age Group	No.	Percent
17-20 years	2350	42.4
21-25 years	2373	42.8
26-30 years	380	8.7
31-35 years	164	3.0
Over 35 years	130	2.3
No Response	49	.9

Sex

The sex of the sample is given in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3
Sex Representation
of the Sample Population

Sex	No.	Percent
Male	5350	96.4
Female	140	2.5
No Response	56	1.0

Educational Level

The educational level in terms of grade ranges is presented in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4
Educational Level
of the Sample Population

Category	No.	Percent
8th grade or less	86	1.6
9th to 11th grades	1110	20.0
High School Grad	3479	62.7
1 to 3 years college	638	11.5
College Graduate	184	3.3
No Response	49	.9

Marital Status and Location

Table 2.5 depicts the marital status and location or living quarters of the survey group.

Table 2.5
Marital Status and Location
of the Sample Population

Category	No.	Percent
Not married/On Base	2984	53.8
Not married/Off Base	546	9.8
Married/On Base	773	13.9
Married/Off Base	1183	21.3
No Response	60	1.1

Rank/Grade Level

The rank representation from E-1 through O4 is presented in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6

Rank Representation
of the Sample Population

Rank Category	No.	Percent
E-1/E-2	1225	22.1
E-3	1821	32.8
E-4	1125	20.3
E-5	685	12.3
E-6/E-7	374	6.7
E-8/E-9	71	1.3
W-1 to W-4	16	.3
O1/O2	102	1.8
O3/O4	72	1.3
No Response	55	1.0

Military Experience

Several categories of military experience for the sample Marine group are presented in Table 2.7.

Time in Unit

An important category for diagnosing command motivation over time, the time in unit of each Marine, was determined as shown in Table 2.8.

Career Intention

Used both as a criterion measure and an analytical estimate, the career intention of the sample population is given in Table 2.9.

Table 2.7

Military Experience
of the Sample Population

Experience Category	No.	Percent
Less than 1 year	846	15.3
1 to 2 years	1348	24.3
2 to 3 years	1433	25.8
3 to 4 years	846	15.3
4 to 6 years	392	7.1
6 to 10 years	334	6.0
10 to 15 years	145	2.6
Over 15 years	140	2.5
No Response	62	1.1

Table 2.8

Time in Unit
of the Sample Population

Experience Category	No.	Percent
Less than 3 months	896	16.2
3 mos. to 1 year	2076	37.4
1 to 2 years	1653	29.8
2 to 3 years	683	12.3
Over 3 years	181	3.3
No Response	57	1.0

Table 2.9
Career Intention
of the Sample Population

Career Intention	No.	Percent
Yes	822	14.8
No	2864	51.6
Undecided	1783	32.1
No Response	77	1.4

End of Active Service (EAS)

The EAS for each Marine was also considered in the Analysis. Table 2.10 shows the Marine group's EAS according to several periods.

Table 2.10
EAS
of the Sample Population

Term	No.	Percent
Less than 1 year	1633	29.4
1 to 2 years	2043	36.8
2 to 4 years	1600	28.8
More than 4 years	181	3.3
No Response	89	1.6

Racial/Ethnic Category

The racial/ethnic composition of the sample population was determined using DOD required categorization as shown in Table 2.11.

The total population on which statistical analyses were conducted is 5546 Marines. Only 41 respondents (.7%) were eliminated by the rejection criteria due to erroneous or incomplete responses.¹

¹The rejection criteria used was five or more errors (blanks or multiple responses) within the Command Perception section of the Interaction Inventory.

Table 2.11
Racial/Ethnic Representation
of the Sample Population

Category	No.	Frequency
White American	3525	63.5
Black American	865	15.6
Puerto Rican	95	1.7
Mexican American	408	7.4
Spanish American	81	1.5
Cuban	11	.2
American Indian	100	1.8
Chinese American	10	0.2
Philipine	27	0.5
Japanese	9	0.2
Korean	1	0.0
Eskimo	6	0.1
Asian American	10	0.2
Aleutian	2	0.0
Other	175	3.2
None/Unknown	75	1.4
No Response	146	2.7

CHAPTER THREE
TOTAL COMMAND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER THREE TOTAL COMMAND ANALYSIS

Unit commanders who use the LEAP are urged to review the results of the motivational survey in progressive stages, beginning with a general examination and proceeding to the more particular findings in a deductive manner. The first step in understanding and interpreting the results, therefore, is to produce a total motivational profile of the command from which various hypotheses or questions are generated. These questions serve as logical guideposts for further, more definitive analyses. This procedure helps the commander organize the data into meaningful segments which may require more critical scrutiny, and which have a plausible relationship to the findings of the total command. In addition, the total review enables a commander to quickly determine whether outcomes satisfy preestablished motivational goals.


Motivational Scale Profile

Analysis of the total sample of Marines begins with the scale profile as recorded on the Motivational Analysis Form (MAF) in Figure 3.1. The scores recorded on the MAF represent the responses by the group to the items of the Interaction Inventory converted into single score values. The scores for each scale of measurement are given in terms of a percentile, ranging from 0 to 100. Scale scores are fixed along an absolute continuum, with the 50th percentile representing the point below which responses are generally negative or above which responses are generally positive.²

The two primary scales, Command Preparedness and Command Equality, are actually combined scales with scores derived by averaging the subscale scores which comprise each. Similarly, the Motivational LQ (LQ_m) is an aggregate of all the scale scores. Since the two primary scales measure distinct dimensions within the domain of leadership, the LQ_m is a quantitative summary that facilitates overall interpretation, as well as comparisons over time.

²The difference between an absolute standard and a percentile norm is that the latter is an adjustment of actual scores to a population sample mean making the 50th percentile on the scale represent the mean score.

Figure 3.1
Total Command Motivational Profile



As Figure 3.1 reveals, the total scale score for Command Preparedness is 47.5. This score reflects a lower Command Efficiency score (44.4) and a higher Command Cohesion score (50.6).

By comparison, considerably higher scores were obtained for the Command Equality scales, all of which are above the 50th percentile. However, the Total Command scores may obscure individual differences in perception that exist between various groups, since some of the items represent perceptions of discrimination by distinct groups that have much less representation in the total sample, namely, minority member

Marines. Final judgment of the situation, therefore, should be reserved until the data are analyzed from the standpoint of separate subgroups (see Chapter 5).

Command Preparedness Scales

While the Motivational Scale Profile yields a general picture of the Marine Corps sample, Part II of the MAF, the Item Summary, allows for analysis of specific areas within each dimension. As shown in Figure 3.2, the response to each item in each subscale is given in terms of Percent Response and individual Item Score. The four levels of response choice offered in the questionnaire are combined into two categories, Agree and Disagree, for ease of interpretation. For the same reason, the middle or neutral category of response is not included.³


The scores for each item are derived in the same manner as for the overall percentile scores. Regardless of the negative or positive orientation (wording) of an item (indicated by + or -), scale scores signify a point along the continuum ranging from 0 to 100, 100 reflecting the best possible condition and 0 indicating the worst. The Item Scores are used to identify the command's strong and weak points by noting the issues which correspond to high and low scale scores.

Efficiency

Focusing on the Command Efficiency items, the results given in Figure 3.2 reveal that while Marines generally feel their commands are well trained (item 20), there is a considerable lack of morale and spirit within units (item 21), job satisfaction is low (item 12), and about 50.5% of the Marines surveyed would rather serve in another command (item 23). Further, while the consensus of the Marines (40.9%) see their commands as efficient (item 15), most indicated that troops are not well informed (item 13) and are confused much of the time (item 18).

³Actual responses given by Marines were in the usual five-category Likert scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). The Percent Agree in the Item Summary combines the Strongly Agree and Agree categories, while the Percent Disagree combines Strongly Disagree and Disagree responses. The remaining percent (totaling 100%) which is not recorded represents the Neither Agree nor Disagree responses.

Figure 3.2
**Item Response Summary
for Command Preparedness Scales**



Cohesion

Regarding the Command Cohesion factor, low motivational areas are associated with a considerable lack of respect between unit members (item 22); only 23.4% of the Marines

agreed that respect was sufficient. According to the sample, lack of understanding by SNCO's and failure to set a good example for troops are other low areas of cohesiveness (items 24 and 16).

On the positive side, the majority of the Marines indicated that there is some respect for authority (item 17), troops are encouraged to do their best (item 30), and commands generally promote educational development (item 11). The latter item may represent a dilemma for members of some commands, since a number of Marines surveyed complained that the desire to obtain advanced education is thwarted by duty commitments (see the Education section in Appendix A).

Range of Command Preparedness Scores


When analyzing a large command consisting of a variety of small, relatively autonomous units with different mission orientations, it is important to determine the range of motivational levels between units. The range is a measure of variance within the total command sample that reveals the degree to which total command scores reflect the motivational level of each unit separately. The range also locates the low-functioning command and reveals the highest level reached by a command in the sample.

Figure 3.3 shows the range of scores for the Command Preparedness scales for the 68 commands in the sample. The highest functioning command reached a score of 67.2 for Command Preparedness, while the lowest score recorded is 36.6.⁴

The ultimate goal of the LEAP is to identify those conditions which promote the highly motivated and effectively functioning command and determine whether the same conditions or techniques of leadership used to produce this level of performance can be applied to other commands for the benefit of all Marines. Notwithstanding the fact that a number of environmental and other factors have an impact on individual unit motivation and performance, a range of differences separating the high from the low commands still exists when these factors are controlled for experimentally. Furthermore, some units are able to overcome the most debilitating conditions and are able to function beyond the level of commands with more favorable external assets. It is these units and their leaders that hold the key to upgrading the combat readiness of the Marine Corps.

⁴If these scores were used to generate a percentile norm, the highest score would represent the 99th percentile, while the lowest would reflect the 1st percentile.

Figure 3.3
Range of Command Preparedness Scores



Command Equality Scales

Most of the Item Scores of the Command Equality Scales are above the 50th percentile as shown in Figure 3.4.

Minority/Majority Discrimination

The highest subscale scores of the Equality Scales are recorded for the Minority and Majority Discrimination items, all of which range between 60 and 70. A strong majority of the Marines, therefore, reject (disagree with) the negatively worded statements of these scales, indicating that these conditions are perceived as being somewhat favorable. Again, final judgment concerning the meaning of these scores must be reserved until perceptions of groups within the total sample are reviewed.

Figure 3.4

Item Response Summary
for Command Equality Scales

MAP PART II B. ITEM SUMMARY			
COMMAND EQUALITY	PERCENT RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE
	Agree	Disagree	
-34. Minority troops have less chance of getting good training opportunities in this command.	12.1	68.3	70.4
-41. Minority troops are not treated fairly in this command.	16.0	61.7	66.0
-43. In this command minority troops get punished more severely than others for the same offense.	13.2	63.3	67.9
-46. In this command minority troops get the worst jobs and details.	12.3	67.3	68.9
MINORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL	68.3
-32. In this command minority personnel get better treatment than majority troops.	19.2	51.6	61.5
-37. Minority troops get special privileges in this command.	12.7	64.2	68.0
-43. Majority troops are discriminated against in this command.	11.9	62.0	66.3
-47. In this command minority troops get away with breaking rules others are punished for.	18.3	58.8	63.7
MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL	64.9
-35. Work details are equally distributed in this command.	43.4	37.3	49.2
-36. Justice is administered equally in this command.	39.6	36.5	48.6
-40. The troops in this command are judged by their character, not by their color or background.	56.8	19.7	61.3
-42. Promotions are based on an individual's ability in this command.	44.3	37.8	50.0
-46. Complaints about discrimination are treated fairly in this command.	36.0	16.7	55.1
-45. All Marines are treated as equals in this command.	43.0	34.0	51.6
-47. Everyone in this command has an equal opportunity for a training assignment.	52.9	25.1	58.0
-41. Punishment and discipline in this command are handled fairly.	44.5	29.8	53.1
JUSTICE		TOTAL	53.4
-33. Race relations in this command are very good.	52.0	19.4	60.0
-43. Minority and majority Marines get along well in this command.	58.7	15.0	61.4
-31. There are many complaints about discrimination and prejudice in this command.	27.5	50.1	57.2
-35. There is a lot of tension between racial and ethnic groups in this command.	17.6	56.8	62.7
DISCOURSE CLIMATE		TOTAL	60.8

Justice

Item scores on the Justice factor show some weak as well as some strong areas. Marines generally feel that work details are not equally distributed (item 35) and justice is not equally administered (item 36). These conditions, according to many Marines, are not necessarily a function of race or ethnic background (see Appendix A). Many Marines have indicated that, individual or group differences notwithstanding, favoritism is shown toward some Marines thereby representing injustice to others.

On the positive side, judgments made on the basis of character rather than color or background appear to be the high point of justice (item 40). And, only 25.1% of the Marines felt that opportunity for training assignment was not equal (item 47).

Intergroup Climate

From the point of view of the total number of Marines surveyed, the climate of racial/ethnic relations in the Marine Corps is on the positive side. This scale is the most important indicator of potential group confrontation. Scores indicate whether personnel hostility, due perhaps to the conditions measured by the other subscales, is directed toward peer groups, nonexistent, or oriented toward institutional structures.


Range of Command Equality Scores

Figure 3.5 reveals the variance or range of the Command Equality scale scores. Again, the range is an important indicator of the relative effectiveness with which individual commands are functioning.

The largest scale score deviation is found on the Intergroup Climate scale with 43 percentile points separating the high and low functioning commands. The existence of racial/ethnic tension is a valid assumption to make when characterizing the low functioning command on this factor. The command with the severely low score in this case was the victim of a serious confrontation between unit members.

Again, the ultimate goal of the LEAP is to determine the conditions which bring about tension as well as intergroup harmony and understanding. Once causation for such differences between commands can be determined, corrective recommendations and procedures can be initiated to improve the status of all Marines.

Figure 3.5
Range of Command Equality Scores



CHAPTER FOUR
SENIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONS

CHAPTER FOUR SENIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONS

In order for a unit to function effectively during a combat or training situation, the relationship between senior Marines and their subordinates must be sound. Junior Marines must be prepared for quick transition into positions of leadership during a military crisis. Therefore, senior Marines are required not only to provide technical guidance to others, they must also present a proper role model for subordinate Marines to emulate. How Marines of different ranks interact with respect to unit goals is a fundamental concern of the commander when assessing unit motivation.

Since the Command Preparedness scales cover conditions which are primarily related to leader-follower interaction, analysis of these data from the point of view of specific rank groups is a reasonable way to review the results.


Command Preparedness and Rank

Figure 4.1 shows the scale scores for the two rank groups, non rated/NCO's (E-5 and below) representing one point of view and staff NCO's/officers (E-6 and above) representing the other. All the score differences between the groups are statistically significant ($p = .001$).⁵ SNCO's and officers view conditions of efficiency and cohesion in a much more favorable light than do their subordinates.

Reviewing the individual item scores which comprise each of the Command Preparedness subscales, as shown in Figure 4.2, it is possible to determine the specific points of contention or concurrence which characterize these rank groups.

⁵The usual levels of significance set by convention are .01 and .05 indicating that score differences are of such magnitude that they have a chance probability of occurring only one or five times in a hundred, respectively. The probability statement $p = .001$ indicates that the difference found between scores would happen by chance only once in a thousand times.

Figure 4.1
Command Preparedness Scores
For Two Rank Groups



Efficiency

Job satisfaction of junior Marines (item 12) seems to be the strongest point separating the two groups. While knowledge of personnel and their condition is a primary leadership trait, on this issue at least, the leaders lack considerable insight into the situation as perceived by junior Marines.

Concerning issues of communication, there is wide disagreement between the ranks also. Forty-five percent of the SNCO's and officers feel the troops are well informed, while only 27% of the junior personnel agree (item 13). Similarly, 49% of the E-5 and below group believe that the troops are confused much of the time, while only 30% of the staff and officers believe such is the case (item 18). Finally, the highest recorded score is also the point of most agreement. The majority of Marines of all ranks believe that their commands are well trained (item 20).

Figure 4.2
Item Summary For Two Rank Groups

SHP PART II A. ITEM SUMMARY		ES+/ES+		
COMMAND PREPARATION	ITEM	PERCENT RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE
		Agree	Disagree	
+13.	The troops in this command are well informed.	27/46	52/36	40/53
+15.	This command is efficient.	40/52	32/27	51/57
+21.	Morale and spirit are high in this command.	22/37	54/35	37/49
+25.	Most of the Marines are proud to be in this command.	23/36	44/28	42/52
+30.	This command is well organized.	26/40	46/33	41/51
-12.	Most of the troops in this command are dissatisfied with their job.	54/29	21/46	36/54
-15.	The troops in this command are confused much of the time.	49/30	28/49	42/55
-16.	The troops in this command are not well trained.	22/20	57/63	62/64
-41.	Most of the troops would rather serve in another command.	53/34	22/37	37/50
-47.	The troops in this command are not motivated.	46/31	30/50	44/55
COMMAND EFFICIENCY		TOTAL		43/54
+11.	This command encourages educational development.	54/71	24/14	60/70
+16.	A good example is set for the troops to follow in this command.	30/50	42/27	45/57
+17.	The troops in this command get a lot of help with their personal problems.	34/62	38/16	47/65
+22.	There is a lot of respect between all Marines in this command.	22/35	52/33	39/50
+24.	Staff NCO's have a good understanding of the troops in this command.	28/50	42/22	44/58
+25.	The troops of this command have confidence in their leaders.	30/49	39/20	46/58
+29.	The leaders of this command are responsive to the needs of the troops.	34/58	38/20	47/62
-14.	Staff NCO's do not take the time to help the junior men in this command.	32/23	41/59	52/62
-17.	The troops of this command have no respect for authority.	33/23	43/60	52/61
-30.	The troops of this command are not encouraged to do their best.	22/15	56/72	62/71
COMMAND COMMERCE		TOTAL		49/61

Cohesion

On the Cohesion scale the primary points of contention between the ranks concern the understanding of subordinates by SNCO's (item 24) and the responsiveness of leaders to the personal problems and needs of the troops (items 19, 29). While senior Marines generally believe they have good understanding of their troops and are responsive to them, junior Marines disagree somewhat with their seniors over these issues.

Other areas of disagreement also show a divergence of opinion between senior and subordinate Marines. Only 30% of the Marines E-5 and below feel that a good example is set for troops to follow (item 16) and 30% stated that they have confidence in their leaders (item 26). Marines E-6 and above, however, see these conditions in a much more positive vein.

Agreement between the ranks is seen over the issue of encouragement given troops for doing their best and for developing educationally.

Many of the items that focused on senior-subordinate relations evoked qualifying comments by Marines desiring to express their situation further. These comments, listed in Appendix A, provide a wide variety of particular examples and give interpretative meaning to the items in the questionnaire.

Justice and Rank

Normally, the Command Preparedness scales are the primary focus for analyzing differences between rank. However, one of the Command Equality scales, viz., Justice has become an important aspect of senior-subordinate relations, since considerable divergence has been discovered over the issues measured between ranks, notwithstanding racial/ethnic considerations. Figure 4.3 shows the results of response to the Justice scale for three rank groups, E-5 and below, E-6 through E-9, and officers (W-1 to O-3).

The largest gap between ranks that range from the generally negative to the positive side of the continuum are found for the issues of equality of justice administered (item 36) and the promotion criteria used by the command (item 42). Only 36% of the Marines E-5 and below believe that justice is administered equally while the SNCO's and

officers, those who are largely responsible for administering much of the justice, are to varying degrees, much more positive on this issue. Concerning promotions, all three rank groups have divergent opinions as to the awarding of rank.

Figure 4.3

Justice Item Scores For
Three Rank Groups

COMMAND EQUALITY Item	PROMOTION RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE
	Agree	Disagree	
#35. Work details are equally distributed in this command.	40/67/73	40/17/10	47/66/71
#36. Justice is administered equally in this command.	36/73/78	39/17/7	46/65/76
#39. The troops in this command are judged by their character, not by their color or background.	55/71/82	21/10/4	60/70/77
#42. Promotions are based on an individual's ability in this command.	41/64/80	41/19/12	48/65/74
#44. Complaints about discrimination are treated fairly in this command.	33/59/63	18/6/2	53/67/70
#45. All Marines are treated as equals in this command.	40/62/78	37/14/10	50/66/74
#47. Everyone in this command has an equal opportunity for a training assignment.	50/71/79	27/14/7	56/69/74
#51. Punishment and discipline in this command are handled fairly.	41/65/79	32/13/7	51/67/75
JUSTICE	TOTAL		51/67/74

Favoritism is a chief complaint lodged against commands by enlisted members and the subject of a considerable number of verbatim comments. These results point to either a need for more standardization of promotion and disciplinary procedures and/or more clarification of the procedures for Marines of all ranks.

Rank Disparity

By taking each command separately and measuring the degree of perceptual difference or disagreement between senior and subordinate Marines, it was possible to derive a Disparity Index (DI). Computing the DI for a command is a method of generating another dimension of leadership with which to study unit motivation and combat readiness.

The measurement of rank disparity between the leaders and followers of a command may be as important, if not more important, an indicator of command motivation as the combined rank scale scores. A Disparity Index is actually a measure of unity or disunity within a command. If there is little disparity between rank groups but low scale scores, then all Marines recognize that conditions are not good, but they are bound by the fact that all are involved in the situation together, and that deficiencies can be improved through collective effort.

If, however, there is wide disparity between groups over conditions within a unit, there is more discord and less opportunity for a collective approach toward improvement. The commander's first task with a command displaying high disparity is to get all rank groups understanding or perceiving unit problems in the same manner.

Figure 4.4 shows the range of rank DI found within the sample of commands for the Command Preparedness scales. The single index (score) represents the overall degree of perceptual difference measured between the two rank groups of a command (E-5 and below vs. E-6 and above). The command with the Low DI represents the unit with the most senior-subordinate solidarity, i.e., rank groups are most compatible. The High DI command shown in Figure 4.4 reflects the unit with the greater amount of disparity found for all the commands in the sample. The Mean DI for all the commands is also given in Figure 4.4.⁶


Rank and Motivation

To obtain a more definitive picture of where in the rank structure the most motivational problems lie, Command Preparedness scores were calculated for nine separate rank groups as shown in Figure 4.5.

As Figure 4.5 reveals, the E-1 through E-2 grades are as motivated as the E-5 group of Marines. However, conditions of efficiency and cohesion deteriorate for the young enlisted Marines as rank is acquired reaching a low point at the E-3 to E-4 level, the least motivated group.

⁶Rank DI measures were found to be significant indicators of command performance in terms of absenteeism and reenlistment rates (see Affourtit, 1979e).


Figure 4.4
Rank Disparity Index Range



There is a considerable difference between the officers' perception of conditions compared to the enlisted ranks. This finding generates a number of corollary questions. Are the officers more accurate in their judgment of command conditions? That is, is it possible to predict actual command performance more accurately by motivational assessment made by officers or by enlisted judgments? If the majority of those who must perform believe that these motivational conditions in the command are insufficient, will their behavior be influenced accordingly and thereby make their judgments more accurate predictions of performance?

The results of a LEAP validation study reveal that unit perceptions, made primarily by enlisted members, accurately reflect unit performance measures (Affourtit, 1977b, 1977d and 1979e). Marines will function according to their perceptual judgment of command conditions. The commander who can raise the perceptual judgment of a command closer to his/her level produces a more combat ready unit. How this is accomplished is a matter of personal leadership style and knowledge of the particular motivational conditions involved -- the substance of the LEAP.

Figure 4.5
**Rank and Command
Preparedness Scores**



CHAPTER FIVE
PERCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY

CHAPTER FIVE PERCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY

The Command Equality scales measure conditions within the Marine Corps that have caused considerable strife among Marines of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. The issues of discrimination, justice, and intergroup climate are catalysts that drive Marines apart when unity is needed to maintain a readiness status.

It is essential for commanders to keep abreast of Equality issues from the standpoint of various groups within the unit in order to identify and diffuse motivational trends that potentially may lead to interracial strife. While these issues are not as pervasive in the Marine Corps as they once were several years ago, there are commands with severe racial/ethnic problems as the results of the present sample reveal.

Part of the problem lies perhaps in vague policy and guidelines concerning equal opportunity which promote confusion and misunderstanding by both officers and enlisted men concerning what constitutes discrimination and inequality. For example, a well meaning unit leader's attempt to respond to affirmative action guidelines may be viewed as reverse discrimination by some Marines. And, favoritism toward any individual may easily be judged as a racially oriented act.

A careful analysis of the Equality issues by the unit commander will reveal some of the perceptual (motivational) difficulties that cause disharmony between Marines of different race and ethnic background.


Command Equality and Racial/Ethnic Groups

The Command Equality scale scores for minority groups and majority group Marines are given in Figure 5.1.⁷

⁷The reader is referred to Appendix A, Racial/Ethnic Relations for a general overview of the nature of current Equality issues based on verbatim Marine comments.

⁸In the Interaction Inventory, minority Marines were defined according to the categories listed in the Department of Defense race and ethnic codes of minorities (MCO P1080.20).

Figure 5.1
Command Equality Scores For
White, Black, and Other Groups



Minority Discrimination

The greatest point of opposition between the three groups occurs over the issue of Minority Discrimination. Minority Marines perceive discrimination toward minorities to be much more critical compared to White and Other categorized Marines. While Other minority Marines see minority discrimination to be in a generally positive state, White Marines strongly reject any such notion of discrimination.

Majority Discrimination

Concerning the issue of Majority Discrimination however, White Marines see themselves more discriminated against than do the Black and Other groups, although all groups view Majority Discrimination in a somewhat positive vein. This finding suggests that reaction by majority member groups, claiming reverse discrimination may, to some extent, be accounted for by their rejection of Minority Discrimination as a legitimate issue for which compensatory policy is justified.

Justice

On the Justice factor, Black Marines see conditions in a generally negative state, while Other and White Marines again perceive the situation in a progressively more favorable light respectively. Justice for all groups is considered to be the most crucial of the Equality issues.⁹

Intergroup Climate

Intergroup Climate is the series of issues that is most related to actual or potential strife between ethnic/racial groups in a command. Figure 5.1 reveals that there is considerable disagreement between Black Marines and the other two groups over the degree of tension perceived.

Figure 5.2 provides a more definitive picture of the division between groups over the Equality issues.

Equality Scales and Racial/Ethnic Disparity

In an effort to provide a single measure of polarity between groups within a command, a Disparity Index (DI) for Minority versus Majority groups was computed for the 68 commands in the sample. As Figure 5.3 indicates, the disparity range is large. The Low command (low disparity) reflects almost total unity between Majority and Minority groups over the Equality issues, while the High command shows considerable disparity between members of different racial/ethnic groups.

The fact that some commands are able to function with more unity concerning equality matters is as important, if not more important, in the study of leadership as the actual level of equality perceived in the commands. A low DI means a more united group of Marines regardless of conditions that may favor one group over the other. Again, the primary questions to investigate are. . .

⁹The Justice factor was also analyzed from a senior-subordinate point of view. Chapter 4, page 38, presents these results.

Figure 5.2
**Equality Scale Item Scores For
Black, White, and Other Groups**


COMMAND EQUALITY		PERCENT RESPONSE		SCALE SCORE		
Item	Agree	Disagree	Total	White	Black	Other
-14. Minority troops have less chance of getting good training opportunities in this command.	77/29/19	77/45/58			77/54/63	
-15. Minority troops are not treated fairly in this command.	71/33/21	71/39/50			72/51/50	
-16. In this command minority troops get punished more severely than others for the same offense.	77/32/18	74/32/52			75/49/62	
-17. In this command minority troops get the worst jobs and details.	77/28/18	77/41/56			75/51/63	
MINORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL		74/52/62		
-18. In this command minority personnel get better treatment than majority troops.	49/17/18	49/60/57			60/78/64	
-19. Minority troops get special privileges in this command.	62/13/13	62/71/67			67/73/69	
-20. Majority troops are discriminated against in this command.	65/17/14	65/58/57			67/65/64	
-21. In this command minority troops get away with breaking rules others are punished for.	57/14/17	57/67/60			62/70/65	
MAJORITY DISCRIMINATION		TOTAL		64/69/66		
-22. Work details are equally distributed in this command.	36/39/41	36/38/41			51/47/48	
-23. Justice is administered equally in this command.	34/30/39	34/45/36			51/42/49	
-24. The troops in this command are judged by their character, not by their color or background.	16/43/53	16/31/22			64/52/59	
-25. Promotions are based on an individual's ability in this command.	39/40/48	39/36/34			49/50/53	
-26. Complaints about discrimination are treated fairly in this command.	12/25/34	12/31/20			58/46/54	
-27. All Marines are treated as equals in this command.	31/29/41	31/44/33			54/43/51	
-28. Everyone in this command has an equal opportunity for a training assignment.	22/43/47	22/33/29			60/52/55	
-29. Punishments and discipline in this command are handled fairly.	28/34/45	28/36/29			55/48/54	
JUSTICE		TOTAL		55/48/53		
-30. Race relations in this command are very good.	17/41/51	17/28/21			62/53/60	
-31. Minority and majority Marines get along well in this command.	12/47/56	12/24/18			66/57/62	
-32. There are many complaints about discrimination and prejudice in this command.	56/46/30	56/30/48			62/41/56	
-33. There is a lot of tension between racial and ethnic groups in this command.	62/43/52	14/30/20			66/53/61	
INTERGROUP CONFLICT		TOTAL		64/51/60		

- If strong unity among racial/ethnic groups can be attained in some commands, what are the conditions that produce this condition?

and

- Can a higher level of unity (minimal disparity) be achieved by other commands provided similar leadership factors?

Figure 5.3
Minority/Majority Disparity Index Range



Experimental Perceptual and Attitudinal Measures

Several items are included in the Interaction Inventory questionnaire for measuring experimental perceptions and general attitudes.¹⁰ Since the issues measured by these items are beyond the direct responsibility of the unit commander, they are used on an optional basis, no scores are given, and results are not tabulated as part of a motivational LQ.

The items which fall into this category cover issues of Ethnic Alliance, Pride, and Affiliation. These issues were systematically selected by a Marine sample as representing some of the more critical issues under the topic of intergroup relations. The information gained by these items may be useful to the commander in determining the influence that certain environmental and attitudinal dispositions have on perceptions of command conditions.

Moreover, through a better understanding of a unit's orientation toward a particular issue, a commander may be able to predict the impact of potential counteractive measures designed to overcome command problems. For example, a decision made to enforce integration would be accepted as a positive step by groups who possess a positive attitude about the policy of integration. However, such a policy may be far too expedient if implemented in a command where members harbor the opposite attitude. The commander, then, can gauge the gravity of certain corrective decisions where

¹⁰A distinction is made in the LEAP Manual between perceptual and attitudinal measurement. Operationally defined command perceptions imply direct experience with an issue or condition being assessed. Command perceptual items are prefaced by or include the phrase "in this command" and reflect those conditions which fall under the direct responsibility of the unit commander. Attitudinal statements, on the other hand, concern conditions not necessarily experienced, fall more within the realm of opinion, and are considered outside the direct responsibility of the unit commander.

Experimental perceptions are distinguished from both command perceptions and attitudes by (a) the condition perceived is directly experienced as occurring in the command, but (b) the commander is not directly responsible for the condition perceived.

such complex and arbitrary issues as racial/ethnic relations are concerned, and thereby avoid creating a more volatile situation.

Table 5.1 lists the responses made by Black, Other and White categorized Marines to the experimental perception and attitudinal items in the questionnaire.

As Table 5.1 shows, the groups hold similar perceptions about minority and majority Marines in their commands aligning with their own group members on and off duty (items 39 and 52). However, while the groups are also in general agreement over the positive value of integration, many minority Marines (33.9% and 33.5%) are more inclined to agree that avoiding integration is the best way to stay out of trouble. Collectively Marines of all ethnic/racial groups are positively disposed toward more affiliation, but a high percentage may be inhibited by the belief that such a movement would threaten the status quo. It may be that change toward more intergroup involvement is made difficult by the threat imposed by militant members of all groups who are opposed to integrating Marines of divergent backgrounds.

Concerning the expression of ethnic/racial pride, all groups are in almost total agreement that people should express pride in their ethnic heritage (item 56). However, there is some disagreement over the effect of such symbols (item 59) and the motives of those groups who use symbols (item 61).

These findings suggest that one of the impediments to intergroup harmony is the belief on the part of many white Marines that certain ethnic symbols represent a hostile act. Since few minority Marines see aggression in such symbolism, an underlying cause for polarity may be the misunderstanding of a cultural norm for self-expression. The issue is not whether expression of ethnic pride is proper; confrontation occurs over the manner in which expression is made.

Table 5.1

Black, White and Other Group
Responses to Experimental Perceptual
and Attitudinal Items

Factor/Item Statement	Percent Response					
	Agree			Disagree		
	B	O	W	B	O	W
<u>Ethnic Alliance (Experimental Perceptions):</u>						
39. Most minority troops stick to themselves in this command.	42.5	38.0	37.7	30.5	33.6	34.8
52. After duty hours, the troops in this command stick together in groups of their own race and ethnic background.	42.1	37.0	43.6	31.7	36.5	29.4
<u>Ethnic Affiliation (Attitudes):</u>						
55. Integration or mixing between racial and ethnic groups does more harm than good.	19.7	19.0	17.7	54.3	53.7	57.0
58. It's better when racial groups don't mix.	19.6	18.3	18.2	52.4	52.7	53.8
62. It is better for minority and majority troops to hang around together after duty hours.	32.4	38.3	37.7	22.8	18.3	17.2
54. In order to stay out of trouble it is best to avoid those with different background and values from my own.	33.9	33.5	27.8	41.9	40.6	47.4

Table 5.1 (Cont'd)

Factor/Item Statement	<u>Percent Response</u>					
	Agree			Disagree		
B	O	W	B	O	W	
<u>Ethnic Pride (Attitudes)</u>						
56. People should show pride in their race and ethnic background.	84.4	77.8	75.5	6.3	8.5	6.3
59. Racial and ethnic symbols make people proud of their background.	56.1	48.9	35.3	15.7	19.0	24.5
61. Groups who use symbols to show off their race are really trying to start trouble.	15.8	23.5	29.4	61.3	46.4	33.1

CHAPTER SIX
PROGRAM EVALUATION

CHAPTER SIX PROGRAM EVALUATION

Participant Ratings

The Program Evaluation section of the Interaction Inventory is designed to elicit the judgments of the command toward any formalized program of training. The section was primarily intended to evaluate the effectiveness of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program at the local command level. This program has a semi-structured format and is required for annual participation by all Marines. However, since the Leadership (Human Relations) Program was undergoing change and its future was in doubt during the construction of the questionnaire, the title of the program being evaluated was left blank on the questionnaire to be identified by the Inventory Administrator during application. This approach also allowed flexibility at the user level.

While a number of individual programs were evaluated by the sample commands, the majority of units used this section to evaluate the effectiveness of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program. Therefore, the analysis described here focuses on the required Marine Corps program. Only those commands with Answer Forms that clearly stated "Leadership" or "Leadership (Human Relations) Program" were included in this analysis. Forty-six commands satisfied this criteria.

It is important to differentiate between direct perceptions of program effectiveness by participants and measures of motivational change which occur in a command as a result of training. The Program Evaluation scale of the survey instrument measures the degree to which the program under evaluation is perceived by Marines to produce the effects claimed by program developers. The Marine indicates whether or not experience as a participant had a direct beneficial effect on individual behavior and on performance in his or her command. The rationale for this approach is that participants represent the most authentic judges of the effectiveness of any program designed to produce a change in their performance. Motivational or performance criteria, on the other hand, measure the actual changes in unit conditions produced by program implementation.

Scale Score

Since the combination of individual items of the Program Evaluation scale represent a single construct, responses to each item are converted to a single scale value. The score represents the overall numerical value of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program as judged by the Marines surveyed.

The overall rating score given by the Marines that participated in the program is 47.5, revealing a generally negative judgment of the program. This score depicts a point along a continuum from 0 to 100 like the other scale scores in the Interaction Inventory. The general dissatisfaction and perceived ineffectiveness of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program is based on total group response to inquiries regarding the fundamental value of the program and its effectiveness in producing change in leadership performance and unity within the rater's command.

The mandatory program also did not fare well when compared to commands that evaluated programs other than the Leadership (Human Relations) Program. A score of 54.5 was derived by combining the scores of all the other programs listed in the Program Evaluation section. However, the program titles of the comparison group were quite divergent, ranging from "PFT" to the "Platoon System".

When the data are analyzed by specified groups, some differences within the sample emerged. Black Marines, the only group to rate the Leadership (Human Relations) Program above the 50th percentile (51.29), are more favorably disposed toward the training than "White" (46.2) or "Other" (47.7) ethnically categorized Marines. Marines with less than 8th grade of formal schooling rated the program lower (44.5) than Marines with some high school education (47.4). The rating given by Marines with college experience, however, also declined (44.9). Ratings by educational level have changed somewhat since the Leadership (Human Relations) Program was last evaluated (Affourtit, 1977a). At that time Marines with less than an 8th grade education rated the program more positively than any other educational group. Therefore, changes in program content/format are reflected by differences in acceptance by educational groups rather than overall acceptance.

Concerning rank level, the highest rating was given by E-5 and below Marines (47.55) and officers (47.34), while grades E-6 to E-9 gave the program a 45.38 rating.

Item Analysis


Continuing the evaluation toward more definitive analysis, the response frequencies for each item contained in the Program Evaluation scale were tabulated. Table 6.1 shows the responses by participants in the Leadership (Human Relations) Program.

Table 6.1
Response to Program Evaluation
Items by Participants

Item	Percent		Scale Score
	Agree	Disagree	
67. The Leadership (Human Relations) Program training helps Marines perform their duties better.	36.2	31.7	49.7
65. The Leadership (Human Relations) Program makes Marines better leaders.	34.5	31.8	49.6
64. The Leadership (Human Relations) Program does <u>not</u> change behavior.	47.6	22.2	41.4
66. The Leadership (Human Relations) Program is a waste of time.	30.6	39.6	51.3
63. Morale and spirit in this command have improved because of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program.	23.2	39.1	43.8
	Total Score		47.5

Another important change from the 1976 evaluation of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program becomes apparent when analyzing the ratings by level of participation. The earlier study showed a marked decline in judgment of the program with increased participation; the highest rating was given by those Marines that had not participated in the program (Affourtit, 1977a). The present data however, as shown in Figure 6.1 reveals that while the non participants still rate the program among the highest of the groups, those Marines with 20 hours of participation rate the program slightly higher, indicating that program expectations have been realized, at least in the initial stage. However, after 20 hours of participation there is a downward trend in overall rating reaching a low point with 60 hours of training participation.

Figure 6.1
Rating of the Leadership (Human Relations)
Program by Level of Participation



As the data of Table 6.1 show, Marines generally feel the program does not change behavior and command morale and spirit did not improve because of the program. However, a majority of the participants also do not believe the program is a waste of time, and they believe that some benefit is derived from the training.

In view of the variation of these judgments and the range of overall ratings, a full evaluation is needed of the program content as well as the context in which the training is imparted. The next step in evaluation is to identify and study those commands that produced the highest and lowest ratings to identify the conditions that produced each outcome.

Measures of Command Conditions

The second criteria for measuring Leadership (Human Relations) Program effectiveness was to determine the impact of training participation on a number of actual command conditions. Concerning the influence of the training on the command, the LEAP Interaction Inventory provides an assessment of a number of leadership issues which were empirically validated against actual command performance measures (Affourtit, 1979d, 1979e). A program of training designed to improve leadership capability and combat performance should therefore positively influence the conditions measured by the LEAP Interaction Inventory.

Table 6.2 presents the Pearson r correlation coefficients obtained by assessing the relationship between Leadership (Human Relations) Program participation and LEAP scale scores. The correlations were conducted between scale scores and both total hours of participation in the program (item 69) and total hours of participation while in the present command (item 70) of the sample population.

As Table 6.2 reveals, with the exception of total participation and the Minority Discrimination subscale, there is almost no relationship between hours of participation in the Leadership (Human Relations) Program and unit motivation albeit performance. The Minority Discrimination subscale increase with total participation accounts for only 5% of the total variance. While this relationship is minor, the results support the relatively higher rating of the Leadership (Human Relations) Program by Black Marines. Moreover, this trend again represents an improvement over the 1976 results which showed no relationship on any of the measures used.

Table 6.2
Correlations between LEAP
Scales and Leadership (Human Relations) Training

Scale	Total Participation (Item 69) Pearson r	Unit Participation (Item 70) Pearson r
Command Preparedness	.038	.004
Command Efficiency	.028	.011
Command Cohesion	.044	.006
Command Equality	.075	.055
Minority Discrimination	.104	.024
Majority Discrimination	.026	.049
Intergroup Climate	.041	-.059
Justice	.046	-.033
Motivational IQ	.063	.032
Woman Marines	-.016	-.030
Program Evaluation	-.093	.018

Summarizing these findings, participation in the Leadership (Human Relations) Program to more than 60 hours of training had generally no effect on unit motivation as measured by the LEAP scales. The slight relationship between participation and the Minority Discrimination scale must be evaluated on the basis of cost-benefit outcomes and alternative approaches toward producing the same or greater results.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CAREER ORIENTATION

CHAPTER SEVEN CAREER ORIENTATION

The nature of the all-volunteer force and the declining reenlistment rates within certain career fields and among Marines with more than one term completed is a primary concern of the Marine Corps. Not only is there interest in the number of Marines remaining in the Corps, but emphasis is also placed on the type of Marine required for the technological demands of the future. Can the Marine Corps attract and retain those who are willing and able to learn sophisticated weaponry? Will the future Marine be more able to withstand the physical and mental pressure of a highly mobile, constantly ready status, and, will junior leadership be capable of controlling the subordinate characteristics produced by a renewal of the draft system? The retention of junior leadership is essential to provide continuity under conditions of constant personnel turmoil.

Additional points of concern among officials are the ethnic composition and specialty orientation of groups in the future Marine Corps. Policy makers are most sensitive to the double-barrel issue of potentially high ethnic loss during combat and public response to an increasing minority military.

Respondents to the Interaction Inventory recorded their intentions with regard to remaining in the Corps as part of the demographic section. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they have decided to remain in the Marine Corps after their present enlistment expires or if they are presently undecided. This chapter covers some of the demographic characteristics and motivational responses of each career category.

Career Demographic Profile

Dealing first with the demography of the Marines who indicated their intention to remain in the Corps, the respondents were grouped according to the following criteria:

- 1st Term. Enlisted Marines in grade levels E-5 and below with one to two years of service, or two to three years service and

less than two years to EAS,
or three to four years of
service and less than one year
to EAS.


- 2nd Term. Enlisted Marines
not categorized according to
1st term criteria.
- Officers. Officers in grade
levels W-1 to O-3.

Career Intention and Enlistment Group

Concerning 1st Term, 2nd Term, and officer reenlistment projections, Figure 7.1 shows the percentage of Marines in each group who decided Yes to make the Marine Corps a career, were Undecided about remaining in the Corps, or who responded No to the question of career intention.

Figure 7.1

Career Intention and Enlistment Group



Only 5.7% of the 1st Term sample recorded positive intentions to remain in the Marine Corps, while 33.2%

were undecided and 61.1% indicated that they definitely did not desire to remain in the Corps beyond their present enlistment.

Of the 2nd Term group of Marines, 41.9% intend to reenlist while 30.2% and 27.9% respectively are undecided or have no intention of remaining in the Corps. The projections for the 2nd Term group show a considerable divergence from the figures obtained for the 2nd Marine Division in 1976 (Affourtit, 1977d). In that study 73.9% of the 2nd Termers (E-6 through E-9) intended to reenlist while only 7.2% were inclined to leave the Corps after their present enlistment terminated.

The career intention of company grade officers however, has increased somewhat since the 1976 study. Almost 50% of the present sample intend to remain in the Corps. The Yes category in 1976 was 41.2% for the 2nd Marine Division.

All the enlistment groups have a substantial segment in the Undecided category. This group of Marines, while not committed to either leaving or remaining in the Corps, can be persuaded to accept or reject a Marine Corps career depending on their future experiences and conditions, the context in which they will make a final decision.

Referring again to the 1976 study, 31.0% of the 1st Term Marines were undecided about reenlisting, while 8.4% claimed they would reenlist. The 2nd Marine Division eventually reenlisted approximately 8% of their 1st Term Marines.

Career Intention and Educational Level

Concerning the educational composition of the career intention groups, Table 7.1 provides a breakdown for several educational levels within each intention category.

For the 1st Term enlisted Marines, the Yes group is somewhat less educated than the No, and Undecided groups. Attention therefore should be focused on the motivational incentives that will most likely attract the more educated Undecided group toward reenlistment.

Table 7.1
Career Intention and Percent Educational Level
for 1st Term and 2nd Term Enlisted
Marines

Category	Percent Educational Level			
	8th	9-11	H.S.	Col.
<u>Yes</u>				
1st Term (n=233)	8.6	29.6	51.1	10.7
2nd Term (n=488)	1.0	9.6	68.6	20.7
<u>No</u>				
1st Term (n=2504)	1.3	22.4	66.3	10.1
2nd Term (n=324)	2.2	19.4	60.2	18.2
<u>Undecided</u>				
1st Term (n=1359)	0.8	23.4	66.4	9.4
2nd Term (n=349)	1.4	13.5	68.5	16.6

Note. The percentage for each response category Yes, No, and Undecided is recorded across respective rows to total 100%.

Career Intention and Racial/Ethnic Group

Regarding the racial/ethnic composition of those Marines intending to reenlist, Table 7.2 shows that 42.3% of the 1st Termers will be minority member Marines while 28.6% of the 2nd Term reenlistees will be members of a designated minority. The projected officer group will be comprised of only 5.1% minority members.

Viewing the career orientation racial/ethnic profile from a different perspective, Table 7.3 reveals that Black Marines are somewhat more inclined to reenlist after their initial tour than are minorities other than Black or Hispanic. Other and Hispanic minorities are most undecided about reenlisting after two or more tours in the Marine Corps.

Table 7.2
Career Intention and Percent Racial/Ethnic
Composition for 1st Term, 2nd Term,
and Officer Groups

Intention Category	Racial/Ethnic Groups			
	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Yes				
1st Term (n=220)	57.7	23.2	12.7	6.4
2nd Term (n=471)	71.3	14.6	8.5	5.5
Officers (n=98)	94.9	3.1	2.0	0.0
No				
1st Term (n=2428)	66.4	16.6	10.5	6.5
2nd Term (n=313)	70.6	14.7	8.0	6.7
Officers (n=32)	81.3	12.5	0.0	6.3
Undecided				
1st Term (n=1320)	61.4	17.1	15.2	6.4
2nd Term (n=345)	64.1	16.5	10.1	9.3
Officers (n=66)	86.4	1.5	7.6	4.5

Note. The percentages recorded total 100% across each row.

For the officer group, White Marines are most likely to reenlist while the Hispanic and Other minority groups are considerably undecided about making the Marine Corps their career.

Career Motivational Profile

Using the items and scales of the LEAP Interaction Inventory as criteria, it was possible to assess the motivational character of each career intention category. This data provides some insight into the nature as well as the causes for decisions made to accept or reject a career in the Marine Corps.

Table 7.3

Career Intention and Percent Racial/Ethnic Composition for 1st Term, 2nd Term and Officer Groups

Racial/Ethnic Group	1st Term			2nd Term			Officers		
	Yes (220)	No (2428)	Und (1320)	Yes (471)	No (313)	Und (345)	Yes (98)	No (32)	Und (66)
White	5.0	63.3	31.8	43.2	29.4	28.4	52.8	14.8	32.4
Black	7.5	59.3	33.2	40.1	25.7	33.1	37.5	50.0	12.5
Hispanic	5.8	52.8	41.4	40.0	25.0	35.0	28.6	0.0	71.4
Other	5.5	61.6	32.9	32.9	26.6	49.5	0.0	40.0	60.0


Note. The percentages total 100% across each row for each enlistment group (1st Term, 2nd Term, and Officers).

Career Orientation and Motivational Level

Figure 7.2 shows the motivational levels of each career category for the Command Preparedness scales. The motivational scale scores in each scale actually increase from a low for the No group to a mid-range for the Undecided group to a very positive motivational level for the Yes group.

Figure 7.2

Career Intention and Motivational Level for Command Preparedness Scales



The same motivational pattern is evident for the Command Equality scales as shown in Figure 7.3.


These findings not only add considerable validity to the LEAP scales, but the data also makes it possible to analyze career orientation in terms of both individual issues and command conditions that can be addressed in order to retain the Yes group of Marines and motivate the Undecided and No groups toward reenlistment.

Focusing on the 68 commands in the sample, a correlation analysis was performed between the percent Yes, No, and Undecided and the LEAP Scale Scores for each

command. As Table 7.4 reveals there is a significant relationship between many of the motivational scores and reenlistment intentions.

Figure 7.3

Career Intention and Motivational Level for Command Equality Scales



Greater significance was found between the No category and individual command motivational scores, indicating that in commands where conditions are considered inadequate (relative to the higher functioning commands as measured by the LEAP scales) Marines are significantly more likely to reject a career in the Marine Corps. However, in commands where conditions are judged more satisfactory, Marines are somewhat more likely to be either undecided or committed to a career in the Marine Corps. In other words, perceived inadequate conditions will result in a significant number rejecting the Marine Corps as a career choice, but perceived more favorable conditions will make a Marine Corps career more attractive as one of perhaps several alternatives available to the Marine as he or she considers the future.

The primary reason for focusing on these results is the fact that, as shown in previous chapters, commanders do have an impact on perceptual/motivational scores,

notwithstanding the external conditions under which the unit must operate. Once critical issues are identified, commanders can influence and control these motivational conditions to produce greater retention possibilities for all enlistment groups.

Table 7.4

Correlation Coefficients for Command
Motivational Scale Scores and
Reenlistment Intention

LEAP Scales	<u>Pearson (r) Correlation Coefficients</u>		
	Yes	Und	No
Command Preparedness	.17	.28**	-.37***
Command Efficiency	.16	.27**	-.34**
Command Cohesion	.19	.27**	-.38***
Command Equality	.27*	.17	-.39***
Minority Disc	.31**	.11	-.38***
Majority Disc	.17	.03	-.15
Intergroup Climate	.21*	.22*	-.37***
Justice	.25*	.22*	-.40***
Motivational LQ	.23*	.25*	-.40***

*p = .001 **p = .01 ***p = .05

Individual Issues and Career Orientation

By concentrating on particular motivational issues that discriminate between the career intention groups, it is possible to identify the most critical concerns that can be addressed at each enlistment level to effect greater reenlistment potential. Tables 7.5 through 7.7 list the 10 most significant (beyond chance variation) motivational conditions and issues that distinguish the Yes from the No and the Yes from the Undecided categories for each enlistment group.

As shown in Table 7.5 the 1st Term No and Undecided groups are quite consistent in their reasons for rejecting or accepting a career in the Marine Corps. Standard

conditions of command efficiency are desired such as a well organized, well informed command in which members have pride.

Table 7.5

Motivational Issues that Distinguish Between Career Intention Categories for 1st Term Enlisted Marines

<u>Career Category</u> Yes vs. No	<u>Career Category</u> Yes vs. Undecided
<u>Command Efficiency</u> ***28. Well organized command. ***15. Efficient command. ***13. Troops well informed. ***25. Marines are proud of command.	<u>Command Efficiency</u> **28. Well organized command. * 15. Efficient command. * 13. Troops well informed.
<u>Command Cohesion</u> ***22. Respect between Marines. ***26. Confidence in leaders. ***29. Leaders responsive to troops' needs.	<u>Command Cohesion</u> **22. Respect between Marines.
<u>Justice</u> ***51. Fair punishment and discipline. ***36. Equal justice. ***42. Promotions based on individual ability.	<u>Justice</u> ***51. Fair punishment and discipline. ** 36. Equal justice.

***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05

Cohesiveness in terms of respect between unit members, confidence in leaders, and leaders who are responsive to the needs of the troops are also among the critical career motivators. In terms of justice, fair and equal treatment and advancement based on individual ability are the most significant among all the factors measured by the LEAP motivational inventory.

The degree to which these conditions are perceived to be in the positive or negative range of functioning, regardless of the reality of the situation, will dictate whether or not the Marine will reenlist. The commander that can influence these perceptions toward a positive direction will promote higher reenlistments.¹¹

In contrast to the range of fundamental desires that separate the 1st Term career intention categories, 2nd Term enlisted Marines show primary concern for Justice factors as illustrated in Table 7.6.

While adequately informed troops and sufficient help with personal problems are strong points for the 2nd Termers, all of the Justice issues are critical indicators for remaining in the Marine Corps after the second enlistment. Apparently, the initially career oriented Marine begins to see injustice, inequality, discrimination, and lack of assistance with personal problems as primary issues of concern as he or she advances in the Corps. These are the primary reasons why 2nd Term Marines are leaving the Corps.

Perhaps the recent emphasis on quality of life for junior Marines has caused an imbalance of attention that produces some alienation on the part of the 2nd Termers. This conclusion was reached by several industrial studies conducted in the U.S. and abroad. A thorough review of the comments by Marines under Justice in Appendix A should clarify the issues highlighted here.

Table 7.7 shows the critical areas of career motivation for the company grade officers sample. The officers, much more abstract and differentiated in their concerns compared to the 2nd Term Marines, also focus on Justice factors and in particular several issues of direct discrimination toward Minority Marines. This unexpected finding requires more indepth analysis beyond the scope of this report before interpretive meaning can be gleaned from the results.

Focusing on the more traditional career incentives, the officer sample is primarily interested in job satisfaction, efficiency, confidence in leadership, good working relations with subordinates, and mutual respect within a command.

¹¹See Affourtit 1979e for a complete study of the relationship between LEAP motivational scale scores and actual reenlistment rates.

Table 7.6

Motivational Issues that Distinguish
Between Career Intention Categories for
2nd Term Enlisted Marines

<u>Career Category</u> Yes vs. No	<u>Career Category</u> Yes vs. Undecided
<u>Command Efficiency</u> ****13. Troops well informed.	<u>Command Efficiency</u> ****13. Troops well informed. ****21. High morale and spirit.
<u>Command Cohesion</u> ****19. Marines receive help for personal problems.	<u>Command Cohesion</u> ****24. Good understanding of troops by SNCO's.
<u>Justice</u> ****51. Fair punishment and discipline. ****36. Equal justice. ****45. Equal treatment. ****40. Marines judged by character not color or background. ****44. Complaints about discrimination handled fair. ****35. Work details equally distributed. ****47. Equal training assignments. ****42. Promotions based on individual ability.	<u>Justice</u> ****51. Fair punishment and discipline. ****36. Equal justice. ****45. Equal treatment. ****40. Marines judged by character not color or background. ****44. Complaints about discrimination handled fair. ****35. Work details equally distributed. ****42. Promotions based on individual ability.

****p < .001

Time in Corps and Command Motivation

Of interest to commanders and career planners alike is knowledge of what happens to Marines as they progress in the Corps in terms of motivation. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 provide a dramatic answer to the question of motivational level and time in service.

Table 7.7


Motivational Issues that Distinguish
Between Career Intention Categories for
Officers

<u>Career Category</u> Yes vs. No	<u>Career Category</u> Yes vs. Undecided
<u>Command Efficiency</u> ***15. Efficient Command. ***12. Satisfied with jobs. ** 21. Morale and spirit are high. ** 18. Marines are not confused. ** 23. Marines satisfied with command.	<u>Command Efficiency</u> **28. Well organized command. **21. Morale and spirit are high. * 25. Pride in unit. **23. Marines satisfied with command.
<u>Command Cohesion</u> ****26. Marines have confidence in their leaders. ** 29. Leaders responsive to needs of troops. ** 19. Marines get help with personal problems.	<u>Command Cohesion</u> **17. Marines have respect for authority. * 22. Respect between all Marines.
<u>Minority Discrimination</u> ****43. Equal punishment for minority Marines.	<u>Minority Discrimination</u> **41. Fair treatment of minority Marines.
<u>Justice</u> ** 51. Fair punishment and discipline.	<u>Justice</u> * 47. Equal opportunity for training assignment. * 44. Fair treatment of complaints about discrimination. * 50. Lack of tension between racial/ethnic groups.

***p = .001 **p = .01 *p = .05

Regarding the Command Preparedness scales, as shown in Figure 7.4, Marines with less than one year in service are as motivated than the six to ten year Marines and almost as motivated as the ten to fifteen year group. The lowest level of functioning occurs during the third and fourth years.

Figure 7.4
Command Preparedness
and Time in Corps




With the exception of perceptions of Minority Discrimination, a similar pattern is found for conditions of Command Equality as revealed by Figure 7.5.

These findings suggest that Marines just out of recruit training have a high opinion of the Corps and express a very positive outlook. But, such high expectations are not reinforced by experience. Marines grow progressively more dissatisfied during their first duty assignment, a condition that may be modified by a number of introductory and orientation programs designed to make expectations more realistic and improve the transition from boot camp to the real world of the Marine Corps.

With the information produced by the LEAP, the Marine Corps, career counselors and unit commanders may be better equipped to increase the present reenlistment rate and thereby be more selective in accepting Marines for a career in the Corps. Since the conditions measured

Figure 7.5
Command Equality
and Time in Corps



by the LEAP are perceptual albeit motivational, it is possible through leadership to control conditions within a command and to influence Marines to perceive issues in a more positive manner. The issues measured deal primarily with concerns internal to the command situation. While external variables, i.e. conditions beyond the control of the small unit commander do have an impact on the unit, the leader can have a significant effect on the motivational conditions measured by the LEAP even under the worst of external environmental influences.

CHAPTER EIGHT
LEAP OVERVIEW

CHAPTER EIGHT LEAP OVERVIEW

During the first year of its existence the LEAP has been subjected to considerable scrutiny, systematic evaluation, and institutional strain. The success of the program rested not only on the validity and applicability of the methodology, acceptance also depended upon the capability and industry of project managers, systems supervisors, and field representatives assigned to promote the product and to provide support to potential users.

Despite the standard problems associated with any fledgling program, the LEAP, as a voluntary, decentralized, and anonymous effort, was challenged to survive without the usual institutional dogmatism that forces compliance on subordinate members. Lack of essential guidelines, task descriptions, and requirements for LEAP intermediaries made successful implementation a function of the independent volitional responsibility and initiative of many Marines who occupied positions aligned to program endeavors.

This chapter will outline the initial attempt to implement the LEAP, report the response made by field commanders, and supporting personnel, and identify the problems associated with institutionalizing the LEAP. Finally, based on the findings of both scientific and subjective assessment, recommendations for future implementation will be presented.

Implementation Process

In 1978 several implementation visits were made to Marine Corps installations to accomplish the following tasks:

- Brief those commands designated as user units on the application of the LEAP, provide advice and assistance when requested, and collect information concerning command conditions for evaluation criteria.
- Inform senior level commands of the application and primary purpose of the LEAP and gain acceptance of

and official support for the voluntary application of the program and confidential nature of the results.

- Assure proper MAFORM installation and viability at local Automated Services Centers, provide advice and assistance to Information Systems Management Officers (TSMO) and those designated as LEAP liaison officers, and process test case data to affirm the necessary steps required for application and expeditious return of results.

The standard presentation focused on the general purpose and concept of the LEAP, as well as the techniques and method of application, the process involved, expected outcomes, potential uses, and basic benefits of the program.

WESTPAC

In May 1978 a WESTPAC implementation trip was conducted to accomplish the above mentioned objectives. Commanding generals, senior staff personnel, senior commanders, and company/battery/squadron level commanders were provided the initial LEAP brief. Automated Services Centers, supporting ADP personnel, and LEAP project officers were contacted and a review was made of their operational situation.

Command Briefings

At Kaneohe Bay and Camp Smith both senior and junior commanders voiced positive approval of the program and seemed aware of its value and potential benefits for small unit leaders. Senior commanders also recognized the need for and wisdom of voluntary and anonymous application. However, strong endorsement by senior commanders was interpreted by some company level officers as a directive to use the LEAP. Company grade officers feared forced application and considered command comparison of LEAP scores a real threat.

Several commanders at Camp Smith and Kaneohe Bay that had applied the survey technique and hand-scored the results, recommended the program to their peers.

Station, group, and squadron commanders at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan received the LEAP presentation positively, and at least one squadron in each group had or was in the process of administering the Interaction Inventory by the

end of the visit. Aviators were particularly interested in the information processing and data feedback mechanism for determining decision-making effectiveness.

Group and maintenance commanders discussed the possibility of using job aspects of various maintenance sections as criteria for determining the morale factors associated with performance in the aviation field. Interest in studying performance/morale differences between Marines with unsponsored dependents and those with no dependents was also expressed.

Okinawa commands briefed included units at MCB Camp Butler, Camp Courtney, Camp Zukeran, Onna Point, and Camp Schwab.

The program was positively received, especially by the 3rd MARDIV which reported eight companies administering the LEAP by the end of the first week. Most commanders seemed to appreciate the minimal amount of time required to apply the program. And, interest was expressed in identifying causes for local problems such as alcoholism and poor civilian/military relations.

While senior commanders were aware of the importance of voluntary application and anonymity of results for company level commanders, a need was expressed for more official assurance against misuse from senior level commands.

Although LEAP Manuals and materials for application were sent to all commands via distribution A, only about 30% to 40% of the commanders indicated that they had received any information on the LEAP. Some commanders claimed they received only part of the necessary material.

ADP Personnel

The actual processing of LEAF motivational survey results is a function of local Information Systems Management Officers (ISMO) and ADP personnel that support field units, and processing specialists that operate at installation Automated Services Centers (ASC).

The Kaneohe Bay ISMO had capability for keypunching Answer Forms but had to send data decks to ASC-6 (Camp Smith) for processing. Processed data, in print-out form, had to be returned to users either directly or through the ISMO. While ASC-6 had installed the system (MAFORM) for processing LEAP results, there was no guidance for receiving data from field units or for returning data once processed.

As a result of some confusion, Answer Forms submitted from Marine Barracks Hawaii were returned without processing.

ASC-6 estimated two to five days turn-around time from raw data to printout form once an acceptable procedure for submission and return was agreed upon.

The MAFORM was received and loaded at 6th FASC, Iwakuni, Japan, and FASC personnel were assembled to determine the steps required for processing LEAP data. It was decided that FASC keypunchers would be able to handle all squadron data. A meeting with all group ISMOs was planned to outline request procedures and develop a LEAP data access list.

Okinawa presented the most complex situation for data processing of LEAP results due to the various locations of commands and ISMOs/keypunch personnel, in relation to the 3rd FASC at Camp Butler. The Director 3rd FASC recommended that all input data, including keypunch and analysis request cards be completed by command personnel prior to submission for processing. This requirement made proper coordination between unit commanders, LEAP project officers, ISMOs, and keypunch personnel vital. A considerable amount of time was spent attempting to establish an appropriate SOP for processing LEAP results. There were six separate ISMOs on Okinawa, some of whom were civilians and others were in the process of rotating to CONUS.

Beyond the practical problems of coordination between various ADP personnel and LEAP users was the fact that some ASCs had not received the LEAP Computer Operation Manual and/or the LEAP User's Manual for ADP personnel. As a result, ADP personnel were not fully prepared to set-up data properly or to identify potential system errors. However, a command application data deck was processed at each installation to assure correct MAFORM installation.

LEAP Project Officers

Guidelines were not established for assignment of an officer or for description of duties to function as a liaison between user units and ADP personnel. Division/wing leadership officers were given the responsibility at some commands and S-3 representatives were assigned cognizance at others. A project officer for implementation visits was assigned, but a LEAP project officer with firm responsibilities was not fully established at any command.

The background, interest, and quality of those assigned tertiary duty to interface between LEAP user and computer processing personnel varied considerably. The 3rd Marine Division Human Development section assumed responsibility for the LEAP and assigned a highly capable officer to handle the program for users. As a result, sufficient support in terms of information, material, and data processing was provided 3rd MARDIV commands. Other commands left such duties generally unassigned.

East Coast

During August 1978 East Coast commands were visited. The same format was used to accomplish the implementation objectives.

Command Briefings

At Camp Lejeune, N.C. unit commanders and senior staff personnel from MCB and 2nd FSSG received the standard brief. Several MCB commanders, having applied the LEAP, endorsed the process. A number of 2nd FSSG commanders, however, revealed some administrative difficulties encountered while attempting to apply the program. Some commanders made repeated requests for questionnaires and/or reproduction support without success, and several officers were informed that data processing support was not available when they inquired about the program.

Overall response to the LEAP as a useful tool by 2nd MARDIV commanders was positive. Again, some commanders who applied the program voiced favorable comments. There was, however, a stated reluctance to and actual avoidance of submitting Answer Forms for data processing. Accordingly, a rumor was spread about a company whose results prompted a telephone call from HQ 2nd MARDIV. While the rumor proved unfounded, there was increased concern over the possibility of senior commanders reviewing results. Several officers admitted that this concern lead to their hand-scoring questionnaires rather than submitting the data for computer processing. Other commands indicated a lack of knowledge about the processing procedure.

Command briefings at Cherry Point and New River, N.C. were well organized. Both squadron commanders and senior officers were receptive, interested, and supportive of the program. Several officers who had been involved in pre-post applications expressed positive impressions of the effort. One commander volunteered his unit as a test case for the entire LEAP process and provided a favorable review for the PAO to be included in the base newspaper.

Force and station commanders at FMFLANT, Norfolk, VA were quite receptive to the LEAP presentation. FMF Commander Lt. Gen. E.J. Miller had a fundamental grasp of the program and expressed considerable interest in its acceptance. One commander applied the questionnaire as an intervention device to diffuse current racial unrest. However, a Marine Barracks company commander who had previously administered the program, stated he found no way to score the results.

ADP Personnel

While the MAFORM system was installed along with sufficient documentation at MCB and 2nd FASC (Camp Lejeune) installations, communication problems about available services were evident. The situation at 2nd FSSG was most confused in the absence of a Group ISMO. The 2nd Division ISMO, however, was receiving and processing LEAP requests expeditiously for those commands that were aware of this resource. Other commanders were unable to identify the correct processing agent.

The entire ADP situation at Cherry Point was ideal. The assigned LEAP Project Officer assumed full responsibility for communicating information to potential users concerning the concept and basic elements of the LEAP, and also for the administration and processing steps required for scoring results. This officer served as a central LEAP resource officer for Cherry Point, New River, and Beauford commands.

LEAP Project Officers

Again no official guidelines for LEAP Project Officers were available and duties were assigned on an ad hoc unofficial basis. Several Leadership Officers accepted the additional duty with reluctance, while others, particularly at 2nd MARDIV and Cherry Point, enthusiastically sought direction for their assignment.

It became obvious that the LEAP project officer was a key person and had to be the central figure in the communication-support-processing chain for the program to be properly administered.

West Coast

During October and November 1978 West Coast commands were visited for LEAP implementation purposes.

Command Briefings

Overall reception by 1st MARDIV, MCB, and 1st FSSG commands at Camp Pendleton was very positive. The LEAP received wide application at Camp Pendleton since a previous visit (November 1977) was followed by a Division bulletin to all commands concerning the LEAP.

The bulletin described the program, promised material support, and assured confidentiality for user units. As a result, over 1/3 of the 1st MARDIV commands submitted LEAP results to HQMC for processing prior to installation of the MAFORM at 1st FASC. 1st FSSG communication on the LEAP also produced heavy application.

However, while those officers who were previously involved with a LEAP application were willing to highlight the benefits, a considerable number of Officers were unfamiliar with the program, indicating a need for a recirculation of the bulletin or other form of communication medium.

Several complaints by users centered around processing (ADP) procedures. Some received word that processing support was difficult to obtain or non-existent. One commander experienced a two-month turnaround for ADP processing.

Keypunch availability was another problem expressed. Accordingly, Answer Forms must be sent to battalion for keypunching, or a unit clerk must be provided to prepare data decks. In the first instance commanders do not want outsiders viewing verbatim comments made by troops on Answer Forms. Secondly, some commanders felt they could not spare unit clerks. Since the Division ISMO requested that LEAP results be submitted on diskette for processing, users were generally concerned that too many hands and eyes had access to their data.

MCCAGTC, 29 Palms commanders were lively and generally receptive. Many officers were unaware of the LEAP, and some were unable to get basic information about the program such as interpreting score values, etc. from local or central Marine Corps sources. Again, while those familiar with the LEAP provided favorable comments, an information gap between LEAP principals and users was evident.

MCAS Yuma commanders were familiar with and receptive toward the program. One commander did complain that the motivational questionnaire was too racially oriented,

and another claimed that trained organizational development consultants should be available to commanders to help interpret results and advise on corrective procedures.

MCAS El Toro briefings revealed the highest number of commanders who were unaware of the program. The general officers and senior commanders were more informed about the LEAP than the prescribed users. However, one squadron commander, having been involved in several applications of the program, strongly endorsed the program and volunteered to field inquiries from other squadron commanders concerning the application process at El Toro.

ADP Personnel

Reenforcing complaints by users, 1st FASC support at Camp Pendleton was not well organized. No documentation on LEAP (User's Manual, NAVMC 2670, Computer Operator's Manual) was available on site. The 1st FASC offers key-punch support for base commands only, provided LEAP Answer Forms are modified to FASC specifications in the future. Processing support to all other units was provided for fully prepared processing packages only.

The 1st MARDIV ISMO agreed to develop a more amenable procedure for processing results to assure quality control and satisfy the need for confidentiality of user units. Again proper documentation was not available and supporting agents were generally unaware of the overall LEAP method and materials for ADP personnel.

29 Palms Base ASC processes results through 1st FASC and promises no keypunch support to users. Notice was received from 1st FASC to stop sending LEAP results until a system error was corrected. Accordingly, no notice to continue sending data was received.

The Base ISMO was unaware of the LEAP and had no materials for reference. However, he was enthusiastic about providing support to units once he became familiar with the program.

MCAS Yuma DPO also had no LEAP documentation and experienced the same problems as other installations that function on the 1st FASC line. As a result, LEAP Answer Forms have been sent to HQMC for data processing.

LEAP Project Officers

LEAP Liaison Officers again displayed a large variation in background, expertise, and interest concerning the duties required to assure proper interface between

users and processing agents. Even where processing difficulties were severe, efficiency and user satisfaction was primarily contingent upon the assumption of responsibility by an officer and the professional manner in which he (a) responded to processing requirements, (b) provided basic information to users, and (c) assured confidentiality of data.

Summary

LEAP implementation visits revealed that while some junior commanders were skeptical about the potential misuse of the program as a senior level evaluation device, many commands were using the program and endorsing the method. Other commanders, having become familiar with the LEAP, were interested in its potential value to them and were willing to apply the techniques. The principal shortcomings identified were the administrative functions and data processing activities involved in supporting LEAP users.

The conditions at all installations required efficient and reliable local cognizance and strong central direction from HQMC in order to establish proper guidance and support for LEAP field agents and users. This was especially important during the implementation stage when operational structure was vital to program survival.

Due to processing complexities, various operational possibilities, and skill levels of involved personnel, it was recommended that a HQMC directive be promulgated to provide the following elements of information:

- A concise outline of the basic nature of the LEAP, its practical validity, and various applications; stressing logical and legal sanctions against misuse.
- A description of the duties and requirements for LEAP Project Officers in providing adequate support and interface between user and data processing agents.

Assurance of sufficient supply and maintenance of essential materials and documents required by all ASCs, ISMOs, LEAP Project/Liaison Officers, and users was also recommended. Moreover, close communication and coordination between a qualified HQMC sponsor and all LEAP personnel, especially in those areas where local agents were dispersed, was considered vital for proper program implementation.

Follow-up Survey

A follow-up survey was conducted during the summer of 1979 to determine the current status of the LEAP, identify further problem areas, and record operational procedures used by the various supporting agents. The findings are presented below.

East Coast

At Camp Lejeune, 2nd MARDIV commanders obtain LEAP questionnaires and Answer Forms from the Division G-5 office. Once a LEAP survey is conducted, Answer Forms are taken directly to the office of the Division ISMO where keypunch machines are made available to LEAP users. ADP decks are prepared by the user unit clerk with the guidance of a DISMO representative. The completed data deck is then submitted to the 2nd FASC for processing by the ISMO. An expected one to two day turnaround produces a printout which is retained by the DISMO until the user unit collects the output. Confidentiality is maintained. Only the user company receives the results. 2nd FSSG commands are provided a similar service.

A complete preparation and processing service by a central source is offered to squadron commanders at Cherry Point and New River, N.C. The 2nd MAW/MCAS Joint Leadership Officer at Cherry Point not only has assumed responsibility for assisting LEAP users with all phases of LEAP application and processing, he has also produced a standard presentation to inform incoming commanders of the program and support available to them.

This officer was selected for the position on the basis of his background in management and systems development. The success of LEAP installation and application at Cherry Point/New River is directly related to the effectiveness of the officer in charge of the program.

There are only a few commands in the Headquarters FMFLANT, Norfolk area. While no central contact or LEAP project officer is available, the Data Processing Officer has provided support for users on request.

West Coast

1st Marine Division commands applying the LEAP bring their Answer Forms to the unit Maintenance Management Office

(MMO) for keypunching onto a diskette as before. Original Answer Forms are returned to commands when the diskette is complete. Diskettes are then submitted to the Division Leadership Officer who turns them over to the ISMO for processing. Within two working days the results are returned to the Leadership Officer who contacts the unit for retrieval. Commanders are assured that no one reviews the results and all data processing records are returned to the user.

Accordingly, almost every battalion has applied the program and found the method beneficial. Commanders are not as concerned of misuse as when the program was first initiated. Yet, some commanders use the manual scoring process to assure confidentiality.

The biggest problem at 1st MARDIV presently is ignorance. Due to the large turnover of units and commanders, many new leaders are not well versed in the program.

1st FSSG commands also receive excellent central support. The Group Human Resources Officer is familiar with the requirements of the program and has a background in management and organizational development processes. All ADP preparation work is accomplished with the assistance of the Group ISMO and sent to 1st FASC for processing and return. Assurances of confidentiality are given to commanders.

Commanders consider the LEAP a very useful tool. Users continue to apply the techniques over time and no derogatory feedback has been received.

MCB Pendleton commands go through the Human Affairs Office for support. All keypunch preparation and processing is accomplished by personnel at the 1st FASC, but a Human Affairs representative is required to prepare control cards. LEAP Answer Forms have been modified locally to conform to FASC keypunch requirements.

Usage is minimal. According to the Human Affairs Officer, commanders are confused over the proper use and procedure of the program.

The Base Education Office is the contact point for LEAP information and material at MCCAGTC, 29 Palms. Commanders must prepare data decks for submission to the Base ASC or Education Office. Turnaround time for processing through 1st FASC is slow, about seven days to two weeks.

LEAP usage on base is minimal, but intermediaries claim that commanders are not familiar with the program and they fear the keypunch/processing aspect may be too involved.

The MCAS Yuma Leadership Officer provides information, material, and processing support to commands interested in applying the program. Since no ADP documentation was provided to Yuma, the technical aspects of data control required some time to comprehend before processing could be accomplished through 1st FASC. Until recently command data was processed through HQMC. Continued usage by the training department, maintenance, and other base support units indicates user satisfaction.

The Leadership Training Officer at 3rd MAW considers lack of LEAP application at El Toro primarily an educational problem requiring a complete promotional effort by an expert in the field of organizational development. While some commanders, using their own resources, have applied and processed the results through the Systems Management Office at ASC-5, many recently assigned officers are not aware of the program.

WESTPAC

Follow-up information from WESTPAC was difficult to obtain. According to several officers who functioned as LEAP intermediaries for 3rd MARDIV, the program received full support from the Division commander and was promoted throughout the division as a completely confidential leadership development tool for the company level commander.

Materials were made available to all commanders and a cooperative Division ISMO provided efficient support and assistance in preparing data decks for processing at 3rd FASC, Camp Butler. Due to high turnover within commands, a three to six month resurvey was recommended by the division.

Accordingly, response by users was very positive. No complaints about the program or processing procedure were received at Division HQ. Although retention of command data was a fear initially expressed by company grade officers, overall usage for the division was high.

Headquarters, USMC

During the course of 1978, a number of commands, including many miscellaneous units such as Marine Barracks, presumably without access to local ADP support, submitted their motivational survey data to HQMC for processing. Keypunch service, processing, and return was provided for all requests by a contract agent within a 10 day turnaround period.

Summary

Since no systematic monitoring of LEAP usage was conducted, it was difficult to determine the number of actual applications. Contact was made with several ASCs for estimates of computer processed applications. Processing requests were estimated to be close to 400 for East and West Coast commands. No statistics were compiled from WESTPAC commands.

Generally, no complaints about the concept and value of the LEAP were received, although persistent dissatisfaction with the racial issues addressed by the current questionnaire was expressed by some commanders. While the racial/ethnic issue, as a critical Marine Corps concern, has diminished within most commands in the U.S., reports by cognizant officers indicate that such emphasis is appropriate in WESTPAC area, especially within Okinawa commands. Updating items, providing previously developed adjunct questionnaires, and informing field commanders of optional survey emphasis are sound recommendations anticipated for future implementation of the LEAP.

Major problems with LEAP implementation concerned the lack of awareness on the part of many junior commanders, and the lack of guidelines established for the training and assignment of LEAP Project Officers. The caliber and background of the intermediate LEAP officer continues to be a critical area for the success of the program.

Other recommendations by field personnel included:

- more central support and guidance from HQMC,
- placement of the LEAP in the operations and training area for program authenticity,
- clear official endorsement of the program and assurance of confidentiality from senior level commands,
- more information about various forms of application, examples of LEAP application, score interpretation, and performance impact.

Evaluation

The LEAP, to be a viable intervention process, had to be evaluated at several different levels. First, the instruments of assessment had to demonstrate sufficient scientific validity. Second, since the methodology was designed for field commanders, the program had to be operationally feasible, that is, capable of being applied properly with results interpreted correctly and usable for Marines with a minimal background in behavioral science theory and technology. Finally, the program had to be administratively sound. The project had to be both capable of support, i.e., administrative apparatus was available, and functionally efficient to provide necessary support to the company commander.

Scientific Validity

The most important first step in evaluating a program that includes a psychological or motivational assessment technique is to establish the credibility of the technique. That is, the instrument of measurement must be a reliable and accurate reflection of an actual state, event, or condition. In this case, the LEAP motivational scales must adequately identify internal causes for specific unit performances, broadly defined as command combat readiness.

It is essential for those intending to administer a survey technique or to apply the results of a motivational survey to know the degree to which the instrument meets the criteria established by the science for validity. Guidelines and standards for the development and validation of assessment techniques have been established by the American Psychological Association (1974).

Following professional requirements, the LEAP Interaction Inventory was subjected to a most rigorous development and validation process (Affourtit, 1978a). Concerning the internal structure of the motivational scales, content validity was accomplished by standardizing items on a Marine Corps population. Factor analysis, discriminant item analyses, and item-total correlation procedures were performed to determine construct validity and to guarantee the discriminability and unidimensionality of the LEAP scales. In addition, coefficients of internal consistency and retest measures were applied to produce overall reliability estimates.

Criterion measures of validity were also performed using Marine Corps populations. Units exhibiting divergent levels of readiness were discriminated on the basis of Command Preparedness scale scores, and populations possessing opposite ethnic orientations were differentiated in the expected direction by the Command Equality scales.

All evidence presented in support of the motivational questionnaire significantly satisfied the technical standards required for legitimacy. The development process established the LEAP assessment technique as a balanced measure of a unidimensional series of constructs that distinguish between various categories of the construct and represent a logical and reliable measure of the domain from which conclusions could be drawn--unit leadership performance, command combat readiness.

A continuing process of validation update studies was conducted throughout the implementation period (Affourtit, 1978e; 1979b). Content, and construct validity and scale reliability were reconfirmed using three separate Marine Corps populations. Criterion validity measures were also expanded to include career orientation estimates, distinctions between rank groups, and mission assignment categories.

In addition, the predictive power of the LEAP scales was determined by correlating scale scores with actual unauthorized absence figures and 1st term reenlistment rates of a representative sample of infantry commands (Affourtit, 1977d; 1979e). Using individual scale and disparity measures it was possible to calculate and predict increases and decreases in UAs and retention rates within commands.

Finally, the data presented in Chapter 8 (Career Orientation) of this report revealed that LEAP motivational scales not only distinguish between career, undecided, and non career oriented groups, but item analysis identifies the issues and conditions which underly career choice.

The total evidence presented over the course of almost two years substantially demonstrates the legitimacy and value of the LEAP assessment techniques. Moreover, these instruments, developed for Marine Corps command use, compare very favorably with those techniques utilized by other military services and industrial organizations (Spencer et al, 1977).

Practical Utility

Beyond the fundamental scientific considerations, the LEAP had to demonstrate practical utility for the company level commander. Other military service organizations contended that decentralization of organizational development (OD) intervention processes, as a self-development methodology was operationally unfeasible. Accordingly, junior commanders would neither be professionally capable of applying the technology nor analyzing the results. Army, Navy, and Air Force OD intervention processes therefore involve the services of professionally trained consultants who are assigned to commands from a centrally controlled agency. These technicians administer OD techniques, analyze data, and recommend solutions.

While the centrally driven OD process assures utilization by junior commands and provides an established administrative apparatus, the notion of outside consultants entering the domain of the unit commander was unacceptable to the Marine Corps.

However, before implementation of the LEAP in the Marine Corps was possible, it was necessary to demonstrate the operational feasibility of the program through pilot application by Marine Corps units under actual field conditions. Operational feasibility was defined in terms of the following criteria:

- Applicability. Can commanders administer the program properly to ensure valid results?
- Comprehensibility. Can results be interpreted sufficiently by field commanders to effect appropriate corrective action?
- Acceptability. Will results be beneficial enough to motivate unit commanders to continue use on a voluntary basis?

Thirteen company level infantry commands representing a variety of mission orientations participated in the initial pilot study. Each command administered the motivational survey and completed the Leadership Analysis Form following the guidelines provided in the LEAP Manual (NAVMC 2670). The results were processed according to the interests and needs of the individual unit commander.

The findings of the pilot study were positive, indicating that the LEAP was a viable and effective leadership/management aid. Small unit commanders were not only capable of administering the intervention techniques and interpreting the results, but they stressed the importance of voluntary and anonymous application of the program as a particular asset.

Concerning unit member response to the survey process, while a standard 20% rejection rate is expected of all survey methods due to confusion, careless responses, disinterest, or "functional illiteracy", the LEAP questionnaire produced less than three percent rejection for the pilot study. Moreover, after a minor change in the Answer Form, the technique consistently has produced less than one percent rejection for over 6,000 cases processed at HQMC since implementation.

Following implementation in 1978, the utility of the LEAP was further demonstrated by the large numbers of Marine Corps units (40% estimated) that successfully applied the program and voiced approval of the effort.

Finally, a recently completed economic feasibility report further established the applicability of the LEAP as a cost effective resource for the small unit commander (Affourtit, 1979e).

Administrative

Paradoxically, while the LEAP is a voluntary, decentralized, autonomous project requiring minimal administrative support, the program taxed the administrative system that was necessary to assure all aspects of independent functioning were intact and to provide sufficient resources to users. There are two essential administrative elements to consider for proper support of a program like the LEAP, viz., apparatus availability and functional efficiency of supporting agents.

The first question to ask is:

- Is an apparatus available with proper resources to facilitate complete decentralization of the LEAP to the company level commander?

In terms of computer hardware and software, all Marine commands have access to an Automated Services Center (ASC) either directly or through terminal connection. Where access is difficult to attain or is not functioning properly, a back-up system is available at HQMC. In addition, all ASCs have the MAFORM (a program for scoring survey data) installed as a Class I system for use by Marine commanders.

Information System Management Officers (ISMO) functioning as ADP liaison are assigned to all divisions, wings, and groups for processing support and assistance. Data Processing Officers (DPO) and Maintenance Management Officers (MMO) with sufficient background in software management are also available to Marines at most battalion level commands. Intermediate ADP hardware such as keypunch machines and source data automation terminals are available within most battalion level commands throughout the Marine Corps.

Concerning a local point of contact for information and material support, the LEAP has been generally if not provisionally placed under the cognizance of a division, group, or wing Human Affairs/Human Development type office, and usually under the quasi-control of the Leadership Officer as an additional duty. As the most probable initial contact for potential users, this officer is vital to proper utilization of the program. The division, wing, or group LEAP representative is the key to the success of the LEAP process. The response given by the LEAP project officer to an interested commander will usually determine whether or not the potential user will take the next step - application.

Overseeing the field representatives is the Leadership Section, Human Resources Branch, Manpower Plans and Policy Division (Code: MPH) at HQMC.¹² This section has been the central source for all LEAP activities, e.g., civilian contracts, development of ADP and ASC documentation and reference material, supply of material/manuals to Marine commanders and field representatives, research and development of LEAP material, and program evaluation. The HQMC Leadership

¹²The Leadership Section has recently been placed under Individual Training Branch, Operations and Training Dept., Training Division.

Section also served as a direct contact and central source of communication for field inquiries concerning all aspects of LEAP implementation. In addition, along with the Command, Control, Communication, and Computer (C-4) Systems Division, the Leadership section had primary cognizance over all ADP requirements and information dissemination.

The second administrative question concerns the operational efficacy of the administrative apparatus:

- Are the various administrative agents and systems interfacing effectively and efficiently to support field commanders in utilizing the LEAP?

Unfortunately, since the LEAP was an experimental effort, no provision was made to establish a firm, official administrative body with a clear understanding of responsibilities and specifically assigned duties. Moreover, the program was initially considered decentralized and autonomous to the degree that administrative assignment and coordination was not necessary.

Beginning with an insufficient supply and material management process, many potential users did not receive all or part of the necessary material to apply the LEAP. While a representative from HQMC did brief commands as part of the implementation process, not all commands were contacted, turnover of commands was high, and follow-up communication was an individual command matter.

Several HQMC ALMARS were eventually sent to commands, but in the absence of reference material, the communication had little impact. In addition, with no instruction to maintain LEAP manuals as part of the official unit inventory, rotating commanders retrained manuals as a personal possession.

ADP documentation and user material were also sporadically supplied. Since the ISMO was not a primary duty, these officers did not receive LEAP field manuals and ADP User's Manuals through the supply system. Materials were eventually provided directly by the HQMC representative during field trips. However, initial lack of such documentation lead to improper input and quality control of data and inability to provide guidance to commanders in some areas. Adding to the confusion the MAFORM was initially installed with a Systems Division transition malfunction, causing the system to abort during certain manipulations.

No guidelines or responsibilities for ISMO and other ADP personnel were provided, although many of these Marine officers considered their positions as supportive to commands in all phases of ADP requirements, and they had sufficient expertise and interest in computer processing to be a reliable resource.

ADP personnel that operated between the user unit and the ASC were the most proficient link in the administrative chain. The problem was in communication of the availability of this resource to the individual commanders, who in many cases, could not get an accurate answer to their inquiries.

While HQMC attempted to stimulate interest in administrative support for the LEAP through division level Human Affairs agencies, assignment of LEAP project officers was accomplished without clear guidelines or background preparation.

Contact with field representatives revealed a variety of assumed responsibilities. Some could not answer basic questions from potential users, were unfamiliar with ASC/ISMO functions or even locations, provided no quality control or support whatsoever, and did not refer problems to cognizant officials at HQMC. However, other field assigned project officers took complete responsibility for LEAP implementation and provided full coordination with user units, ISMO/ADP/ASC personnel and HQMC; produced LEAP material for commanders; gave reliable advice; provided quality control of data; and established briefing schedules to communicate program information directly to designated user commands.

LEAP project managers at HQMC, also lacking in professional preparation and billet responsibilities, attempted to handle supportive functions and information requests without much success. Project manager turnover was high. Preparation for or expertise in social science methodology was not required since the billet actually called for a contracting officer. The office holder was therefore not qualified to analyze systems or give advice on ADP requirements, technique development, and theoretical issues.

Moreover, formal lines of communication between field representatives, ADP personnel, ASCs, LEAP practitioners, and HQMC representatives were not fully established or coordinated. No provision was made for systematic identification or recording of implementation progress or problems. To date, no orders, guidelines, or coordinating instructions

have been disseminated for use by the essential supporting elements necessary for proper implementation of the LEAP.

Officials responsible for program implementation have not officially addressed or effectively communicated the logical, technical, practical, and legal sanctions against violations of confidentiality or cross-command comparisors. In particular, since no assignment was given for complete cognizance of central computer processing requirements, several major and minor difficulties have been ignored.

There is no doubt that lack of an efficient functioning supportive administrative body has fractured confidence in the LEAP.

Recommendations

During the development and implementation stages of the LEAP, several conditions were identified requiring adjustments and modification in program processes, and a number of recommendations were generated from LEAP representatives, computer processing agents, and practitioners. This section will focus on those conditions that will provide proper maintenance and improvement of the LEAP for future implementation. Both essential and desirable recommendations are included.

Technical

1. Develop, enhance, and maintain MAFORM systems.

The MAFORM systems I and II, used for automatic scoring of Interaction Inventory results and installed at USMC Automated Services Centers as a Class I system, require both further development and modification to assure optimal efficiency and maximum benefit to the user command.

- Based on results of field application and recommendations from ADP personnel, MAFORM I system requires modification to include:
 - an efficient procedure for processing several command runs on one set of data (ESSENTIAL).

- a procedure for processing some error conditions without a premature ABEND (ESSENTIAL).
- improvement of error messages to produce more specific and explanatory information (DESIRABLE).
- adjustment of spacing to eliminate blank pages in output (DESIRABLE).
- a procedure for automatic transfer of data to data bank upon inclusion of proper code (DESIRABLE).
- an addition to print each User input control card along with corresponding card assumed by MAFORM I (DESIRABLE).
- an addition to compute and print Disparity Indices for more thorough command analysis (DESIRABLE).
- an addition to include prior statistical analysis of standardization data to print item and scale means for user reference (DESIRABLE).

- The SCANDATA program developed by HQMC for Source Data Automation requires more definitive instructions to keypunchers and input personnel concerning the treatment of multiple responses to avoid present inconsistency. In addition, standardized instructions covering the SCANDATA procedures for preparing User input must be included in an updated edition of the LEAP User's Manual (IRI Technical Manual 78-1) (ESSENTIAL).
- MAFORM II, necessary for processing Interaction Inventory Adjunct Questionnaires (Control and Influence/Work Environment), requires complete development, testing, documentation, and installation (ESSENTIAL).

2. Conduct an appropriate pilot test for Interaction Inventory Adjunct Questionnaires to establish concurrent and predictive criterion validity.

External validity estimates should be accomplished using the same design developed for the initial Interaction Inventory as outlined in IRI Technical Report 77-4. Representative commands are selected at random for voluntary participation in a confidential application of the LEAP (ESSENTIAL).

3. Continue to produce periodic LEAP Volume II Validation Update Reports to assure Interaction Inventory scale validity, reliability, and currency in accordance with APA guidelines. Re: IRI Technical Reports 78-3, 78-10, 79-3. (ESSENTIAL).

Practical

1. Develop standard materials for program presentation and prepare project officers and designated instructors to effectively communicate LEAP information to potential users (ESSENTIAL).

Proper presentation of the LEAP to potential users requires both preparation in organizational development theory and assessment technology, and reference material for response to the numerous practical and technical inquiries that arise during command briefings. Materials for standard presentations and reference guides for typical questions and answers can be provided to LEAP project officers and formal schools instructors with minimal investment of time and energy.

A standard LEAP briefing/presentation package will assist those assigned the duty of informing Marines at all levels in communicating correct information and avoiding the confusion, misinterpretation of concepts, and improper application that result from insufficient background.

2. Provide direct management/leadership consultant medium to field commands and LEAP project officers (DESIRABLE).

Professional advisory assistance to queries concerning typical and unique organizational situations and LEAP results will help commanders derive the most benefit from their data and thereby develop leadership/management

potential. Guidance can be provided directly by HQMC personnel skilled in organizational diagnosis and corrective processes or communicated through the LEAP project officer in the form of a concise written reply or telephone response.

Requests for information can focus on any phase of the LEAP or organizational processes including the following issues:

- How to deal with small group fluctuation in scores.
- How to analyze high turnover commands.
- How to set up an experimental design for determining cause and effect relationships.
- How to measure the effectiveness of a training program.

Queries requiring particular expertise can be referred to appropriate personnel or submitted to a leadership/management panel for review and response. The process can be recorded (without command identification), tracked, and maintained for historical record and temporal analysis.

3. Develop LEAP materials for senior level organizational development projects (DESIRABLE).

Survey materials for senior command organizational development projects can be produced based on the standard LEAP procedure used for company level commands. Designed for application by senior command and staff personnel, the technique will diagnose organizational conditions at battalion, group, regiment, division, and wing levels. Miscellaneous units such as recruit/training commands and special staff groups will also benefit from specialized diagnostic techniques.

Assessment criteria should include communication flow, equipment readiness, command support, administrative policy, training requirements, and judgments of command effectiveness. Anonymous data can be balanced against FORSTAT reports, used to identify system deficiency and data disparity, and applied for senior level intervention projects. The senior command survey process will also allow junior leaders to provide direct, systematic input into the chain of command.

4. Conduct annual Marine Corps LEAP surveys (DESIRABLE).

By conducting annual Marine Corps LEAP surveys on an anonymous basis using representative samples of personnel, it is possible to accomplish the following tasks:

- Obtain data for continuous validation of the Interaction Inventory scales.
- Identify new issues and concerns of Marines for update materials.
- Provide feedback information on current Marine Corps issues for command use at all levels.
- Develop overall Marine Corps standards, means, and scale ranges, and monitor improvements over time.
- Accumulate historical Marine Corps data for annual reports and follow-up study.

Final reports should include standard analysis of data with emphasis on critical categories and topics of particular interest to policy-making agencies. In addition, division level reports can be produced for local use.

5. Install and manage the LEAP Network Monitor System (LNMS) (DESIRABLE).

The LEAP Network Monitor System is a functional data bank that has been developed as a practical aid to the company level commander and allows direct access to anonymous Marine Corps source data (IRI Technical Manual 79-4). Once installed and operational, information input and data feedback can be provided in consideration of any number of command conditions such as unit composition, unit status, mission, location, and effective strength.

The field commander can also utilize the data bank to determine potential solutions to a number of organizational conditions based on actual outcomes recorded by experienced Marine commanders.

Administrative

1. Establish a professionally competent and functional agency to provide administrative support for LEAP efforts (ESSENTIAL).

A strong central administrative agency with expertise in all aspects of LEAP technology is needed to provide guidelines, coordination, and support to all LEAP functionaries. While the LEAP is essentially a decentralized, autonomous project, a central governing body is necessary to assure that the administrative apparatus is available and operating efficiently to support those commanders who desire to apply the program. The official in charge of LEAP activities should have full responsibility for the following functions:

- Developing directives/orders concerning LEAP application and sanctions against violations of command confidentiality and program misuse.
- Providing guidelines for duties and responsibilities of all intermediaries such as LEAP project officers, ISMOs, and ADP personnel.
- Assuring proper coordination and liaison between project officers, ISMO/ADP personnel, local ASCs, and HQMC systems authority.
- Assuring adequate supply of material to intermediate supporting personnel and users.
- Providing periodic reports to field representatives concerning administrative discrepancies, recommendations, and organizational procedures deemed beneficial to users.
- Monitoring all phases of the LEAP administrative apparatus through direct contact or periodically through a reporting network.
- Establishing inspection guidelines for those functioning in supportive roles to cover such aspects as application problems, rates of processing requests, recommendations, material available, and knowledge of program availability.

Although a properly established and more integrated administrative agency can serve a vital role in deriving optimal benefit for the Marine Corps, the entire effort can be accomplished by a contingent of one or two professionals.

2. Provide more detailed information to commanders about the LEAP (ESSENTIAL).

Most Marine commanders and LEAP project officers are unfamiliar with the scope of the program and therefore have insufficient understanding of the mechanics of administration, potential uses, and benefits of the program. An information package sent to all commanders should include the following elements of information:

- Information about the meaning of scores and additional guidance concerning interpretation of individual command results.
- A description of the disparity-index (rank/ethnic, etc.) and how to derive a command measure.
- Case histories covering various applications of LEAP data and intervention styles used under actual conditions.
- Complete description of the LEAP materials available and resources for each installation including location of LEAP project officers, ISMO/ADP personnel, and ASCs; guidelines for keypunch operation and data preparation; and local support conditions and options.

This recommendation represents a comprehensive promotional effort that could be accomplished locally through the assigned LEAP project officer or directly by HQMC.

3. Conduct formal presentations at Marine Corps professional schools, DOD conferences, and scientific symposia (ESSENTIAL).

Formal school and conference presentations are ideal mediums to inform Marine Corps commanders and policy-makers about the LEAP and to generate discussion about application

and improvements. Marine Corps attendance and presentation at scientific gatherings will also produce exchange and cooperation that avoids duplication of effort and produces other benefits to Marine Corps interests in the field of leadership and organizational development.

4. Provide direct technical processing assistance to field commands as needed (ESSENTIAL).

For a variety of reasons some commands, particularly miscellaneous units, do not have easy access to ADP support or prefer to have motivational survey results processed at HQMC. Such technical support has, in the past, proven beneficial to such isolated commands as Marine Barracks and for locations where ADP systems were not functioning effectively. The process is simply accomplished by a clerk with an appropriate SOP for reference.

5. Upgrade the position of LEAP Project Officers as a leadership/management organizational development expert (DESIRABLE).

Through establishing proper guidelines and requirements for LEAP project officers, the position can be enhanced to a level where assignment would be desired by career oriented Marine officers. As a leadership/management organizational development expert, selected Marines would have an opportunity to learn a variety of theoretical, technical, and practical skills in all phases of organizational processes.

The position could be enhanced by providing opportunities for temporary assignment to seminars, conferences, and professional schools given by both industrial and government organizations. Management and systems design training through local universities could also be supported to increase the skill level of the position.

Summary

In the first year of implementation the LEAP has proven to be a scientifically valid, economically sound, and viable leadership/management tool for use by company level commanders. Furthermore, the necessary administrative apparatus for full support of the program is available and can be structured to function effectively.

The primary recommendation for continued implementation of the program concerns overall management at the policy-making level. The LEAP is accepted and utilized by a large number of Marine commanders. There is enough interest in the program to suggest, at least, that application can have a significant impact on the Marine Corps if given proper support. The LEAP is no longer an experimental project, and a decision not to provide proper administrative management and maintenance support is a decision to conclude the program.

This recommendation does not represent a movement for control. The program's greatest strength lies in its decentralized simplicity and independence from intervention specialists and large scale institutional control. The recommendation is made only for a central agent to take an active interest in and responsibility for management of all supporting aspects of the project down to the individual user.

The Marine Corps has produced a program which can be effectively and economically utilized to increase the organizational efficiency and combat readiness of commands. This project, which required minimal budgetary support, rivals in legitimacy and practical utility, the multimillion dollar organizational development efforts designed by other military services. Continuing in its finest tradition, the Marine Corps is still doing more with less.

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APPENDIX A
VERBATIM COMMENTS

VERBATIM COMMENTS

LEAP Interaction Inventory administrators are instructed to encourage respondents to write comments to expand or qualify responses given to any item or to express an opinion about any relevant command or Marine Corps issue. Space is provided on the reverse side of the Answer Form for this purpose. The verbatim comments provided further insight into unit concerns and augmented interpretation of categorical responses. The comments received from the sample of commands throughout the Marine Corps were also used to develop two LEAP adjunct questionnaires for individual command use (Affourtit, 1979).

The comments listed below have been arbitrarily categorized to facilitate review. Some of the comments overlap several categories and some may be classified as separate factors. With a few exceptions, the syntax of the comments was maintained. Minor punctuation was added when necessary for clarity.

This sample does not necessarily represent a random subsample of the Marine Corps LEAP results. While these comments provide useful qualifying information, they reflect the opinion of those who took the time to write additional comments and those who felt they could adequately express themselves in writing.

If a respondent referred to a particular item in the questionnaire, the item number is given in the left margin. Use Appendix B, LEAP Interaction Inventory Questionnaire and Answer Form, to locate the item that corresponds to the item number.

General Command Conditions

Item
No.

Running 4 to 7 miles every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday doesn't boost the morale of any Marine. I believe it tears the morale away. SHORTEN THE RUN!

I feel that since Las Polgus is so far away from everything, there should be more of the recreational area. I feel this would be a motivating factor -- indoor swimming, go-cart track, bowling (within this area), theater (one in which two movies are shown), different classes in sports and self-defense.

Item
No.

Food -- it's often unsat. Living conditions -- we should have BEQ's or get paid money to live out in town. Pay -- people on unemployment and welfare make more than I do.

Pay is f---.

The mess hall in this area is bad. The food is poor. They always run out and the portions are small.

Food is always f---ed up; not nutritious.

The chow is very, very unsatisfactory.

Don't see why a Sgt can hold a paycheck from someone. Don't see why field day we stay after til jobs are done. Just to f--- with us. Being refused to go to sick bay. Don't see how they can make someone go to the field with light duty. Don't see why light duty's get f---ed with.

Chow hall s---s.

The mess halls are wasted!

I feel that the disbursing system or the people who operate disbursing are nothing more than spoiled kids. The only things on their minds seem to be how many people they can mess around and how soon they can get liberty. I came here February 22, 1978. I didn't get paid until the 15th of March. The following pay day I didn't get paid, then they paid me \$67 short and this pay day \$51. Now I do my job good and definitely expect them to do theirs also, as a Marine that is!

Having our paychecks held until 1630 and later. They don't give people enough time to take care of personal problems. We are not treated like men.

There are a lot of pigs in squad bay (dirty individuals).

Late liberty.

I think this base would be all right if you had the transportation around here.

They should have civilian workers in the mess hall.

I feel that this base is too spread. The field Marines are isolated and it hinders their social life.

Item
No.

52. There is little or no courtesy or respect shown for privacy or quiet by Marines.

The road in front of the battalion should be repaired, patched, or paved. I know you hear a lot about not having the money, but more POV's are torn up going over this road than probably anywhere else on base. If it cannot be paved, at least have it graded more often. It may not seem important, but to those of us who have spent what money we have to repair our vehicles due to the jolts and holes and bumps in this road (even while traveling 10 mph and under), it is important.

21. I highly disagree with this statement. Morale in this command stinks. Especially those people housed in the barracks. It's hard to be motivated about your job in the morning after freezing all night because of no heat and having to shave with cold water. And taking a cold shower after work doesn't make it any easier.

More money and time should be put into the barracks. The living conditions are clean but very poor. There aren't even enough wall lockers to go around. Get us permanent personnel better housing!!!

Morale would be uplifted if the Marines were treated with respect as adults, and not told to act like an adult and then not be treated as one.

Another thing is that in BEQ's NCO's should be separate from junior troops. This causes a lot of friction about troops' socializing with NCO's.

21. The morale and spirit of group is very low because many restrictions have been involuntarily imposed on Marines of this command. I could give many examples, but it would take forever and ever to write, so I'll just give a couple of examples. The 22 area gate; the grave site at the mess hall; the refusal of extending the EM club hours; Special Services not getting basketball courts repaired. etc.

21. Manpower short, workload too heavy due to people being TAD and FAP.

16. We've been told time after time we'd be getting early liberty if we did a certain job, but still got off at 1630. The jobs, also, have been completed.

Item
No.

Open squad bays -- in the grunts a man has no privacy. All the Marines are around other Marines. BEQ would be fine so each Marine has a little more privacy.

The hygiene conditions should be looked at a little more seriously. Cold water for showers, washing is not up to par.

I do not feel that this command is to blame for this. The Marine Corps needs to devote more money to the training of "grunts." The lack of motivation and pride is because we seem to always be in a maintenance stand down. We are expected to be the best, so most expect to be trained and treated as the best. All grunts resent the fact that we always seem to get the short end of the stick. It's depressing when base and office personnel live in new BEQ's and have decent chow halls when we live like this.

52. After-duty activities should be planned and encouraged. Examples: trips to professional football, beach parties.

Too much stealing in barracks.

Nothing is ever done about missing gear or request mast. Living conditions should be improved. They should let E-3's and below live off base even if they are not married, draw BAQ and BAS.

Morale is low. New boots have no discipline.

I think that we should be able to drink in the barracks instead of drinking out in town or in the club, because I don't think there is any sense in selling beer in the store we have on base. I also think that we should get out early on PT days like we used to.

Morale in this unit is worse than any command I have been assigned to.

They should let us drink beer in our rooms during weekends. They can put a limit on how much beer in your room. Sometimes you feel like having a beer or two. It's much better than going to town and getting hurt or drunk, and you spend more money in town. But inside your room you just drink a little and nobody disturbs you. If everybody could do it like that, I think it would not be a bad idea.

There is no morale in this battalion because of commitments and information we get of what we are doing and the hours we keep are pretty f---ed.

The following are a few things I can see wrong with this command: the mess hall; unsatisfactory living quarters.

The following are a few things I can see wrong with this command: unsatisfactory living quarters; unsatisfactory work areas; the mess hall; you are lucky if you get a hot shower once a month.

More liberty.

I have not been paid correctly for eight months!

I am totally outraged about the living conditions we Marines are subjected to -- a cement structure, which produces heat only six months a year, a structure which is infested with mice, rats, and insects. The head is filled with the stench of urine and is a breeding ground for bacteria. I feel very let down, disgusted, and dismayed. I would feel very dishonored if anyone were to visit me at where I stay.

The living conditions in the barracks are very poor. Cockroaches and mosquitoes all over so you can hardly sleep.

The barracks we snuffs live in are described in one word -- pitiful, for a country as rich and wealthy as ours.

Most of the troops in this command are dissatisfied because of a lack of BEQ rooms and because they have been here for 2-4 years and may have, at one time, been on summer augmentation. I have been here for only 4 days and this seems to be the major complaint.

And, frankly, the OCS Marines do not enjoy living in open squad bays. There are times when we would like to be alone but cannot be.

Working late hours when there is no justifiable reason.

I think that this command isn't fair on liberty call in the evenings. A lot of times we aren't doing anything, yet we don't get liberty until 1800.

"How is morale?" In garrison it is terrible, but good while in the field.

I think each platoon should have enough people to fill the guard and have two people off each duty day, because it was like that before, and there was better morale and motivation.

This would be a better place to be stationed if we had a better bus system so that most of the Marines without cars could get off base. The Marines at ITS, most of the Marines, cannot catch a bus in the morning to get to work. That takes away a lot of off-time from us. The PX is always sold out. The ITS man schedule should be changed so that permanent personnel could get a chance to buy health and comfort items.

Well, in the dining facility, the time that cooks get off is being taken from them and being used for training because that is their time.

I feel the personnel themselves should get more time off (to themselves). Working hours are terrible, low status of personnel, short most of the time. Your time off is taken up by other classes scheduled for you (not by choice).

I think there is a big morale problem in this company. I think you could raise the morale in this company by not individualizing people and putting more emphasis on the company as a whole. I think we should start running PT in company formation led by the company commander and let everybody look at, and be proud about ourselves and our company as a unit. Another thing that might raise the morale and maybe help keep the area cleaner. By writing on a piece of paper you have won a "96" or a "72" on a piece of paper and wadding it up and throwing it on the ground somewhere. This would create the idea of picking all the papers and trash around and help keep this place squared away all the time.

21. Morale in this command is not as low as in others in this Bn, but this command has numerous operational commitments and when the Marines get off on operation about a week later they go on another.
21. Command has a definite lack of morale. It is displayed by lack of participation in CO trophy events and poor attitude. All of this is due to poor leadership and lack of interest in sports by officers and senior SNCO's of this command.
21. In the field morale and spirit are very high. In garrison, it's not as high but the work gets done and done properly.

Item
No.

The morale of the troops is low, some because they feel they have been screwed over sometime. Some have low morale just because they don't care about anything; they would be the same if they had everything in the world. No fault of the command. Maybe we need a little more discipline; some get away with too much.

The morale is high but there is no motivation. It depends on the NCO's.

15. I'm not sure how efficiency is defined. If we relate efficiency with morale, I must say I think this command is inefficient.

The Marine Corps doesn't station their personnel where they will be happy, thus the morale and spirit are very low.

This command has a very bad problem and that is the morale. I think if the command would stop playing with the troops' minds, it would be okay.

21. Not the staff and officers.

Hard work and fun training is a good way to bring the troops together. People that can depend on each other to do a given job builds good morale and good performance of duties.

21. I think that there is not any morale or spirit left in this company. We need something that will motivate the hell out of every man or this company will become nothing but "f---ed up."

I think the Marine Corps and Camp Lejeune attitude and morale are low. I want to get the hell out because I'll kill me and somebody. Not all, but some of the suckers here care about what happens, and some don't give a s---. In my mind, the leadership is s--- and the troops act like s---. This unit is like a f---ing nightmare.

Morale of troop handlers is pretty low as far as I can tell so far, mostly because of the lack of discipline and lack of being able to do something about the discipline of the troops we are handling.

21. Too many petty "details" which take Marines away from their primary job.

Item
No.

The platoon system is completely and totally f---ed up. The whole purpose of it was defeated on the last operation when one of the platoons was split into several different groups. We aren't run as sections in the platoon (wire, radio, comm center). It's all controlled by the radio personnel. I think the old system was much better.

The platoon program instills competition which is essential for good troop motivation. When a platoon is given a job, it should do that job and no more. If a platoon can't do the job or has problems, they should learn, find out what the problem is, and solve the confusion themselves. They'll work more as a team which is beneficial to all. Me, I'd rather be back on the block.

I strongly disagree with the change of the company splitting of platoons.

The three platoon system sounds good, looks good on paper, but it just doesn't work. According to the way it was explained to me was that each platoon would be able to handle field problems just with one platoon. However, instead of one platoon doing the job, it usually ends up with two platoons or people from another platoon or gear from other platoons. If this is to work like it's designed, there will have to be a major increase in troops as well as in gear in each platoon. Otherwise, operations will be just as unorganized and poorly planned as they have in the past. Another thing is the way the word is passed and changed so many times. I really thought having three platoons would cut down on the scuttlebutt, but instead, if anything, the confusion has increased, deteriorating motivation and morale of all personnel involved.

23. Most of the troops would rather serve in another command, not because of the command but to have a job where they would not have to work with prisoners. For this answer I would say that the Marines would rather work in a different MOS.
23. I would like to be transferred (but! not because I dislike this unit, because I do little work in my MOS).

I cannot see why a Marine (with 4.6-4.6 pro and cons mark) is denied to go to jump school because he had one office hours a year ago. Plus, at this time he's considered an outstanding Marine by the company commander and platoon commander.

Item
No.

12. Because they place you in a job that you don't like, then they change you from one to another.

12. It is not the job that most of the Marines are dissatisfied with, but the abuse they receive as guards from the prisoners.

I think if the Marine Corps tells you that you can get this job, they ought to give it to you, and if not, let you out.

Job satisfaction is of no importance to the upper echelons of this command.

12. I came in to learn a trade, not dig foxholes and hump hills.

12. You don't learn from this field. Same old bull----. After so long in this field, you don't learn anything, especially in the civilian world.

12. Any person(s) in a rut situation is dissatisfied.

I think it's bad when a Marine has the ability to do another job other than his MOS and can't change because it is a "so-called" critical MOS.

28. This command is not organized. It's proficiency is not up to par as being an independent command. An abundance of work has to be done in order for improvement!!

I just got on the base two weeks ago. So my opinions of this place are probably less prejudice than those of people that have been here awhile. I'm looking at it from an outsider's point of view. So far, I've seen a lot of people doing nothing. In my opinion, there are too many people assigned to a job.

15. Administratively, this unit is flat (needs help).

16. This unit is too worried about taking care of other folks to realize the needs of its own troops.

18. The unit has so many little problems in every section, the troops can't help being confused.

19. There is entirely too much time spent on personal problems.

30. Too much emphasis on production, not enough on quality.

It's not what you know, it's who you know in this command.

Item
No.

My comment deals with the weekly inspection of the barracks. It is unreasonable to expect and require the levels that are necessary to pass. The SNCO and officers should temper their judgment with the knowledge that clusters are on a 24-hour schedule.

If any discrimination is shown within this command, it is not against minority and majority. It seems to be between how well you get along with the person who can show this discrimination. I've seen persons get away with things that others have paid for only because they know certain people. I have seen a lot of trouble on leadership within this command, especially in the way of making decisions. This includes officers, SNCO's, and lower enlisted. Their fear seems to be paying for a mistake they've done. The responsibility always falls upon someone else who must finally make the decision.

17. The troops have a respect of rank but there appears to be little respect of persons.
16. I feel that the examples set forth by a few of the SNCO's and officers are to be considered very poor in contrast to ones in other units I've been attached to.

There is too much demotion, a lot of commotion, and no devotion.

No support to guard forces or guard supervisors. Motivation is very low between the troops.

27. The men in this command go through the motions of being Marines while actually dispising everything military or related to the Corps. This is a prevalent attitude, not a small or inconsequential one. These men need less rhetoric and more positive, small unit leadership, and higher quality, more sensitive small unit leaders (NCO's).

In this command, there is a very good understanding between the troops and the command, but they lack a little in promoting athletic organizations which, at the same time, could solve some UA problems, and it would have a "positive" effect toward the command.

In this command, there are too many politics involved in our work.

We are always getting f---ed with.

To me, all commands are only as good as the men and women put there. We are all Marines. No one should be put down because they are new or of a lesser rank. I have found out people like to play with others emotionally!! We've all been to boot camp. There we were boots. Not anymore, we're adults. My parents aren't here so I shouldn't be treated as if I'm last. People who put others down and ridicule them makes the Marine Corps stink!! Sure, on my liberty days I like and should have fun. But, I get away from everyone because I'm not a boot or a worm; I'm a man and I want to be treated with the same respect I show others. Until then, I really don't know what to say. I really feel sorry for those who like to play games with others, because it's them that shouldn't be leaders. Some shouldn't be where they are today. I respect everyone and I feel I should be treated like a Marine, not a recruit. I'm not a recruit, I'm a Marine and very proud to say it!! And, I'm not afraid to sign my name to this statement and I will sign it. With all due respect, _____.

I think the' Marines here have too many personal problems that interfere with their job. They have problems with credit union or other places. They come to work with a down attitude about things. They blame it on the Corps.

Navy and civilian personnel should stop being able to control the Marines at this command!

22. I believe many men in this btry would give their life for fellow Marines.
47. Not all platoons have a fair chance to an assignment due to lack of experience. The best platoon is usually sent and this does not give the platoon who is not as qualified a chance.
8. I am undecided because, though I have tried to reenlist not once but three times, and HQMC cannot guarantee me the specific MOS I wanted.

More teamwork. Recon doesn't work enough on it. Where everybody in a team is assigned a job.

The only comment that I can think of since I haven't been here very long is that there is something wrong with admin, because we always seem to be short personnel which causes a lot of trouble for Marines when they have to stand extra duty and don't get paid back.

Item
No.

This department is definitely undermanned. Our command needs more people who are willing to work and hold down a job status.

36. I feel the commanding officer should use detention of pay in NJP vice forfeitures.
18. There are too many changes, too much of the time.
21. Only when things run smoothly. Too many changes drastically reduce effectiveness.
23. Another MOS.
26. Yes, but sometimes they give ridiculous orders. Like today when we were digging foxholes, we couldn't take our shirts off, even though we were admin.

People in charge should have sense to punish a person who uses a weapon on another Marine without having the consent of the Marine who was injured. I feel I have the right to do the same.

I came into the Marine Corps to better myself, but how can I; it's like we're being treated like little kids, and that doesn't motivate me at all.

This command doesn't use their NCO's enough. By that I mean we have staff NCO's and officers that are afraid of the battery commander and are afraid to let their junior NCO's have any real experience.

15. The efficiency of a military command can only be judged on its ability to perform its primary function: combat effectiveness. I've experienced no training in this area since assignment to this unit. But, then again, I'm not in artillery. That's even more reason.
28. Being organized would mean fewer job dissatisfactions, i.e., metro stays in the PEQ all day, gunfire also. Our individual confidence to sustain ourselves on the battlefield should be built up w/ education, such as individual protective measures and tactical maneuvers.

This command tries to mold everyone into one perfect prototype or a perfect Marine. Why can't you realize that we are all individuals with different attitudes on life.

Item
No.

13. I find that many Marines have more complex problems than I ever had in 18 years of service.
22. There is no respect between men in the battery.

Some of the NCO's of this command don't set a very good example by drinking in the barracks, but for the most part, of NCO's, they are outstanding.

Improve the system in the motor pool. It is totally unsatisfactory. Everyone is not treated like a person but like a boot. One minute one thing is said, then a completely different thing the next. There are two senior NCO's down there that think they can do anything they want to.

30. Verbally troops are encouraged to do their best, but physically they are degraded and demoralized every time they turn around.
15. My answer to this question is in response to both the company and battalion. It seems that a common practice to problem solving is to push it down the pike. There are too many people involved when only two people making personal contact is necessary. There is a common belief that additional duties take priority over primary duties. I do not believe the command realizes the problems it is creating.

The biggest drawback about this company is that most of the time the Marines are left up in the air about something. And when things aren't done when they're asked to be done by the lower rated individuals. There is no trace whatsoever of racial discrimination. We act as one and we work like one. There is a great deal of respect between the individuals themselves and not the difference in rank.

The command at this base seems to be making every effort to help the individual Marine, yet the final stage of the chain of command is deaf and unreasonable to the needs, problems, and living conditions of the lesser ranked Marine (E-6 and below) on this base.

I feel that since I have come to this unit, I don't know what to expect from the Corps. I had plans of staying around, but if I have to put up with this childish company, I might as well get out and go to the soup lines.

I think this command is hurting for quality leaders. This course is not going to change anything. We need more staff and officers who haven't got their heads up their a--es. Morale is at an all-time low, and you turkeys do nothing about it. You people also do a hell of a lot of chicken s--- things.

Our outfit has about the finest SNCO's an outfit can have. They stick with us all the way when someone's in trouble. They are easy to get along with (that's half the battle), and they can give fairly sound advice for personal problems. It seems to me the NCO's are busy trying to tell everyone else that their s--- stinks. And due to that, the unity has dropped. Our unit is still tight but not as tight as it once was.

Being with this unit and in the Marine Corps a short time, I have seen the NCO's to have great leadership ability, with the help of the officers as overseers and a guideline to lead, making a better person and a fuller Marine. With such leadership and a willingness to achieve it, it would be one's own fault for not getting ahead and being not a good but a great leader. Putting one in charge or giving him the rank of a leader doesn't make a Marine nor does taking away ones rank force him to do better. It's up to the individual.

I've had a lot of problems since I came in. Problems that grew worse because of my responsibilities to the Corps. Being one of the troops I can see most of the problems going on in the company. The morale is low and close to no motivation. There are a few people in this company that take advantage of the slack given sometimes. Usually the people with the real problems who really need time off are the ones that get f---ed. In my opinion, I can see no way the CO can raise the morale of the troops. I have a little under two years left. I don't know if I can make it. I signed the paper and there's nobody that can change that. I've got to live with that fact.

This inventory is wrong because it picks on racial too much, but not on s---birds which are the biggest problem. Personnel in high command spend to much time on bad Marines because they can not get the Marine Corps to discharge them.

22. Between all Marines no. Non-rates don't usually treat each other with respect.

Item
No.

I feel that in order to support the leadership and substance abuse program with full-time workers, the field MOS's are being shortchanged in that they must pull double duty and sometimes triple duty. In an organization 5000 strong, it is unsat for a man to be required to spend more than 30 days on mess/guard each year, or to spend as much as 6 months on field exercises. If a man cannot function as a Marine, then he should be a civilian.

This command does have its problems, but any command of equal size would have to deal with the same problems. If I were to go to town and gather 400 civilians and call them trees, put them under the same conditions, or even better conditions, I would still have to deal with the same problems. If everyone of those 400 civilians were Mexican-American, black or white, the problems would still arise. This command has had its share of downfalls, but it has had a greater or equal amount of high points. People are people, no matter what you call them or how you dress them. We can only strive to make tomorrow better than today, and with each day learn something new, not only about our jobs, but ourselves, and those with whom we eat and bed. Every Marine has within him the pride of being a Marine, no matter what happens tomorrow, or how hard he or she tries to fool him or herself. A Marine's pride never dies; it's pride that's kept us Number 1.

14. Question 14 of the survey states "Staff NCO's do not take the time to help the junior men in this command." I have to strongly agree with this statement because 99.5 percent of the SNCO's in _____ only look forward to one or two things and that is 1600 going home with the family and the 15th and 30th of each month.

The squadron must fully realize that we non-rates (snuffs) are responsible for the maintenance of this squadron's aircraft. All these rules and regs are unnecessary and could eventually affect flight hours, etc. I could write all kinds of interesting comments, but this is as far as I go. Because most of these comments "go in one and right out the other." Good people are not recognized.

30. People in starboard, in most cases, really don't care if they do a good job because they aren't, by far, motivated. While on duty, they never (on weekends) get a chance to rest.

Item
No.

Many times troops are ordered to do a job that is unsafe or impractical. We are rushed to do jobs that will, in the long run, endanger someone's life. Maintenance is very unorganized and proper tools and equipment are hard to get a hold of. Jobs are completed often by experience and not by tech manuals.

23. I feel the reason that most Marines in this command would rather be somewhere else is that "Air Wingers" are considered to be out of place by everyone else on this base, because of their differences in dress, i.e., safety shoes, flight jackets, etc.

Most problems that occur in our squadron happen because of the lack of organization. Many of the NCO's are gaffed out because their enlistment is up. This plays a big role in the development of the junior troops. They tend to act the same way as the NCO's that are getting out.

I would say that this command tries to work for us and with us, but on the other hand, there are a lot of Marines who don't have the time or consideration to help. I have often tried to be transferred off or out of this MOS, being that I dislike it very much. I receive so very little help; things just don't rate any checking on. I have repeatedly heard other commands on this base are better all around. One (reason), they don't have to impress anyone, do not have officer candidates. I am starting to believe this myself.

Alcohol problems should be addressed (having to join the Club system when you don't drink and you see it as a problem).

40. Not character nor color and background -- "the clique or favorites" if they like you fine, if not tough.

I feel that enough free time should be given to the Marines to manage personal problems, because I feel that I don't have enough free time to do this. When time off is given, I still have to report to the barracks sooner than I should have or feel necessary (two days work, eight hours off).

This company is not organized and doesn't have any discipline. The leaders need to show a better way than just using the troops' liberty.

Item
No.

23. Having a 2500 or 5700 MOS on this base gives you a zero chance of going to another squadron, except to go on a cruise. So, if a Marine is having trouble with this command, he's stuck and eventually ends up getting disciplinary action for a personal bitch with another Marine, instead of failure to comply to military orders.

In this command they are making us walk to and from the range. I don't think that this is a very good idea, because when you get down to the camp, you're tired and don't feel or want to work.

25. I believe all the troops are proud to be an Amtracker. If you don't believe it, just go down to the club and let an engineer stand up and say Amtrackers s--- -- about 20 full beer bottles will fly off his head.

If the Marines didn't play such petty a-- games, every Marine would probably do a better job.

The efficiency rate of this company is terrible, to say the least. The only alternative to problems on base is to go off base, and that is not economical in all of the lower pay grades. The people will find a way to cope but it will not be the way it should. The future Marines will be the ones to pay for the mistakes made today, probably with their lives.

This company is the poorest excuse for a Marine Corps unit. I feel it lacks leadership in the higher ranks. If you're liked here, you become one of the "good guys" then the troops think you're "one of them"! There's a lot of irrational impractical thinking; things tend to get stereotyped whether it's true or not.

30. Rumors travel and when one hears from various sources over a period of time (2-3 months) that their section is messed up, and even the higher-ups have made a comment that it's a waste of time to check upon them, it works on the Marines involved and they will develop this very attitude that they are worthless, and their work will reflect it. In this case, the section has tried to encourage (even though handicapped), but those above and other sections tear them down and after awhile, any help by the section can't do any good.

I just think, since this is a training unit base, there should be an MCI school here.

Item
No.

To improve the morale and accomplishment of the Marines, MT has a system in which you drive 2000 miles and you get a 72-hour liberty. I think everyone should have a goal as such.

It seems that all the s---birds from all the other units here on base are sent to ITS. How can you do anything with them in the first place? I feel they should be home with Mama.

I also think it's bad when a Marine requests leave and is turned down for reasons such as, short of personnel, etc. Cooks and other MOS's that put in that type and amount of hours should be paid hourly. NCO's should have to have a high school education. 3371's are totally excluded from all holidays.

28. Too many changes!!

There is a need for the Marines at _____ to stick together more and trust each other more than they do. We don't do enough activities together as we could. I was taught that the Marine Corps was a fighting unit that acts as one. But, there are times I wonder.

The comments about this command and the Corps are both good and bad (mostly bad though). I will start off by saying that never in my life have I ever served with more people than at this command. Leadership among the troops is very low. Blacks and whites don't get along, and the command has a lot to be desired. Too much discipline for petty bull---- that should be discarded, and I would just as soon get out of the Corps as quick as possible, for it has caused me nothing but problems.

Most of the Marines coming into the company are barely out of boot camp and don't know what they're doing when we go out in the field.

Senior/Subordinate Relations

19. To a degree they do. If you have a problem several times a month, you're looked down at.
NCO's are prejudice to their subordinates.

Item
No.

26. The CO -- a lot of troops don't have confidence in him, especially the way he handles drugs. He is too devious.

14. It should be noted that I also am speaking in general terms. For example, my staff is an outstanding Marine. I am proud to serve with him. I cannot help but admire him after seeing the utterly useless day-to-day confrontations with his superiors. The uninformed and uneducated opinions and orders he must follow to the letter while trying to maintain some regard for his men, all the while knowing what should be the best for his section, men, and morale.

I really don't understand why the cpl's and below in our work section are made to do things that our NCOIC's and OIC's never would do. That is definitely not a sign of good leadership. The Marine Corps has matured a little bit, but I really can't contribute that to anyone but myself. I enjoy the work I do, but the people in my office who are suppose to be leaders are not showing any type of leadership at all. They make a junior cpl stand duty three times a month, while a senior cpl stands it only once. That is definitely not fair. I've been in over two years and so far, I have yet to find a good purpose for Marines.

29. The leaders in the command are very concerned about the troops. They propose or try to get what troops need but nothing ever comes of it.

29. Leaders of this command do not realize people are human nor do they realize we command the same dignity and respect as lower enlisted as do officers, and should be treated as such in our living quarters, work spaces, and on liberty time.

I think that this command needs to get together a little more with the troops. TTB -- Together the better.

17. Some of the troops have no respect for NCO's. I came from a battery where NCO's had respect from the troops. Here the troops say the heck with it.

Everybody s---s on everybody. When you have a need, desperate or not, the staffs don't give a s---. NCO's aren't responsible enough. They're not good leaders.

Most SNCO's don't understand their troops at all!

Item
No.

There are certain Marines in this unit that don't show respect to personnel of higher rank or more time-in-grade.

26. Apparently not, because they jump the chain of command too often.
29. Too responsive to their needs in most cases.
27. I believe the troops are not motivated around here because the staff and officers play too many games with us.

This company in the last year has done a complete 180 degree with Capt. _____. He told us if we work for him, he will work for us. This company has done nothing but make him look good, and all we get is more and more pressure put on us. Every day there is always some new bull---- that they pass on down to us. Pretty soon, if he keeps it up they are going to have a s----y company. The CO expects a lot our of us and doesn't want to do s--- for us. Things are getting pettier by the day, and I can tell it isn't going to get any better for the non-rates in this company. I remember when Capt. _____ first came to this company. He weeded out a lot of messed-up Marines and worked with us. Now, most all the officers, the CO, and the staff NCO's of this company are conspiring against the troops. Capt. _____ is now working against us and it is hard to work "against the grain" so to speak.

It is very hard to work under staff and officers who have no feeling of responsibility to the troops and have no trust in them and are constantly out to burn them.

24. Some SNCO's do not seem to understand that this unit is not boot camp. These people here need to be treated as men instead of boys. Equal respect is needed here in this command.
14. There are only about three SNCO's that give a s--- about the troops; the others do their best to burn them.
31. Officers/SNCO's discriminate against junior troops except for about three SNCO's.

The Marines are ready for combat and the amount of officers lost will show that they don't care either. The officers push a Marine without thinking that one day in war, that Marine will save his ignorant a--! The officers should be lenient but firm to an extent and stop playing John Mother-F---ing Wayne.

Item
No.

There is no respect for the troops by the chain of command. All they are interested in is how well they look in front of the people in charge of them. Most of the leaders in this company don't know their job as infantry-men and the only reason they are in the position they are in is because they either come from barracks duty and they run around with loud voices like they know what they're doing and they don't know a damn thing. To be an NCO or a leader you have to be a suck a--.

There are many NCO's that are out only to help themselves and do not want to get involved with the troops' problems.

More questions need to be asked on enlisted-officer relations and goal fulfillment.

I'm sick of being treated like a f---ing kid all the time. They want us to act like men, but they will not treat us like men. Playing games, like in boot camp. We volunteered to be here; we weren't sentenced in court.

It's always you don't rate and because a Marine doesn't rate, he seems to find himself in some type of trouble. A little more help should go for Marines with personal problems.

The NCO's don't give the troops any respect, yet they want respect from the troops. As far as I'm concerned, they will never get my respect.

The command should talk to the troops to see what problems they have. Also, the command doesn't have the full support of the troops.

Getting f---ed with all the time; playing silly games like babies. Getting threatened by leaders.

I feel an enlisted Marine is as good as an officer or NCO is. They put their pants on the same way. They sure as f--- ain't God like they act.

24. Understand, but do very little constructive correction. Too many times it's "I don't give a f---" and punishment rather than correction is handed out.
15. Troops are efficient; SNCO's and officers are not!

Item
No.

In my opinion, a lot of the problems on this base have to do with personal attitude. The attitude that a person has is because of the leadership that the NCO's and staff NCO's don't even care about their non-rated personnel, which I feel causes the worst attitude around the base. The NCO's and staff NCO's refuse to promote personnel because they don't want anyone to get ahead enough that maybe can help solve the attitude problems.

24. Staff NCO's give you an attitude they really don't care, such as saying they do not have time to fill out a guard roster properly. The troops care about this, but they don't.
24. The only one who tried to help me is my 1st lieutenant and my major. The information I got from my SSgt was worse than my enemy would give me. He helps demotivate and promotes decay to the base!

When you have a problem and it is a real problem, you can't talk to anyone. All they do is put you on extra duties, when you really need help. Example: drinking.

26. The troops think the leaders are always trying to burn the troops.
14. SNCO's don't take the time to help the junior men mainly because they don't know that he needs help. Because of the way that the Marines are disbursed among the Army, a SNCO seldom comes in contact with any one junior Marine on a steady basis. For that reason he does not know of the junior Marine's problem unless the junior Marine comes to the SNCO and makes his problem known. If he does that then I think he is getting the help he needs.
- 19.

The command would be better by promoting esprit de Corps and confidence in its leaders if it did not contradict itself. Example: The colonel says to us, "There is no such thing as a non-rate; everybody rates." And then he goes right back and says, "When you men get promoted to NCO, you are on our team; you're not a snuffy anymore." Our team? I though we were all one team. And what the hell is a snuffy?

14. (SSgt ____ is a fine example of a man who works for his men.) Certain SNCO's care and will do all in their power to help troops under them; others care too much for their own necks.

26. The main reason for this is because the CO of this barracks lets his ignorance of his prejudice and narrow-minded attitudes show to all who get near him, which, in turn, results in a lack of trust and cooperation. I feel that if the CO evaluated his prejudice and opinion of people more closely, he could understand why very few people will cooperate with him.
24. Some of the staff NCO's are excellent leaders; others are about 10 years behind the times and cannot relate to the problems and decisions of the junior troops.
19. The troops get help with their problems insofar as they are usually given time off to take care of their problems, although I do not believe they are given any personal assistance.
22. There is a lot of respect between troops. There is a lot of respect between NCO's. There is a lot of respect between officers and staff NCO's. However, there doesn't appear to be a lot of respect between troops and officers or NCO's and SNCO's. It doesn't seem like SNCO's and officers in this command trust the NCO's to do their job properly, and there is not enough respect for troops and NCO's from SNCO's and officers.

I don't think offic ~~rs~~ have to lie to us to get us to work, but they do. We would work just as good or probably better if they didn't lie.

Now about the SNCO's and officers. They don't really do much to motivate their personnel. How do you think it feels to be referred to as a p---y because you dropped out of the run up Recon? Or, because you always stood by the fire in _____ to keep warm? The SNCO's and officers were in the CP hooch playing cards and shootin' s---, but they aren't p----s. Is that right?

14. SNCO's are out of touch with the troops living in the barracks. They share a common work environment but different living conditions. Also applies to officers.
29. Sometimes you can tell them something and you still have no response three days later.

The problems in this unit come from the fact that too many of the NCO's are not doing their job properly. They buddy-up to the troops, allowing attitudes to be formed without some sort of a check to stop the bull----

Item
No.

29. They listen and understand and pass the word up, but where does it go from there?

In this command, many of the officers put their needs before their men's.

Staff and officers very seldom give a compliment to squared-away individuals. They often call it "kissing a--." If a man doesn't think anyone appreciates his appearance, he feels he is cheated out of recognition. Marines who are constantly squared away should be rewarded. Few SNCO's "set the example" for troops and NCO's. The majority of the NCO's in my company need to be more learned and outspoken. Staff and officers are rarely on time for a class. They keep the troops waiting and wondering. Officers need to exercise a lot more tact when addressing an NCO and should never chew out an NCO before the troops.

Problems face Co in leadership is for some unknown reason, mainly from the NCO's basically. New ones have replaced leadership with the charge sheet. This lack of responsibility is the main reason NCO's are losing the men's respect. Failure to understand the men has led to many, if not all, of this company's problems. I only wish there were more ways to help the unit understand: that leadership comes from men and not from undue harrassment.

I think that the NCO's are given too much power, the reason being because a lot of the time us non-rates know more than they do.

I think that all Marines in this unit should have more opportunity to express their opinions to seniors. The Marines in this company get no support from their seniors.

The Marine Corps -- as long as personnel in a supervisory position push for "blind loyalty," commonly known as "brown nosing" -- cannot correct its morale problems. I cannot find the justification to sign the contract ever again.

Too many staff NCO's don't give the straight scoop (beat around the bush). A big gap between staff NCO's and non-rates.

17. Have fear not respect.

Item
No.

45. I interpreted the question not to be racial, but rather on the basis of pets or favoritism by SNCO's or officers on people in their platoon, and on that basis, I would say that there is much favoritism and it isn't hidden very well.

A 2nd lieutenant who will be leaving soon does not seem to work with the troops on better ways to do things. He wants to just do it his way. His platoon sgt is a back stabber. He says one thing and does another. He also kisses a-- when he can to make himself look good.

Favoritism is shown for people working in the office, such as promotions, duties. They show no respect for higher rank around the troops.

24. Sometimes they are stoneheaded and only think what they want to think.

Many non-rates in my platoon think that the platoon commander has a "holier-than-thou" attitude and puts himself on a pedestal. Personally, I think he sets his standards too high and as a result is disliked.

Many Marines out of boot camp are not motivated and despise orders given to them by their superiors.

24. Staff NCO's in this command very seldom want to be bothered with junior troops. If for any reason a troop has to do something, it is denied because of no reason at all. I feel any Marine who has put in six years or more, regardless of rank, should be treated as such and not because you have the rank to push him around.

I think we need a lot more understanding from our CO. It seems to me he plays the part of a little kid who has to have everything his way. He can only see it his way; he is not very understanding, and if I ever wanted to kill myself, all I would have to do is go to combat with him and I'd surely die.

The CO should be more of a leader rather than a person who uses his rank and doesn't care about the welfare of his people.

24. The maintenance NCOIC is a cold individual who pressures too many people and is an annoyance to be around -- back stabber. Too many "lifers."

Item
No.

The command should work more for the people instead of against them. Higher ups in rank also think they're higher up people, like some kind of perfect god, and us lowers ain't s---. We are all the same and should be treated that way.

This place treats people like they're in grade school -- do this, don't do that. Every NCO feels he is better and I don't feel one stripe is so great. They feel superior to the troops and watch things happen like when troops get f---ed over, they just let it happen.

29. They get around to it.

There is a problem in this unit with the NCO's. At this time, it is beginning to work itself out, but before there were more non-motivated NCO's than motivated. The better NCO's are now getting together. Before this, you could not straighten out a troop because the NCO's did the same thing.

This is the worst command I have ever been in. There are three groups in this squadron: officers, staff NCO's, and snuffs, each is understanding only of its group. The officers live upstairs in the hanger and don't bring themselves down to the snuff's level. This is the only command I've been in that each of these groups doesn't work together. I've never seen _____ in my shop. I can only think that he doesn't care about me and my welfare. I have only been in this squadron 8 months, and I only know one officer, my OIC.

This command is not well organized. The troops of this command have little confidence in their leaders, which, in turn, the leaders are nonresponsive to the needs of their troops. All in all, the morale and spirit of both enlisted and commissioned are low.

I don't think there should be such a big gap between officers and enlisted. Maybe if they know their people better, it would be easier to get along with them.

I get the impression that candidates as well as officers do not really care and also look down on the enlisted man. At least at another command more emphasis would be toward the enlisted.

30. They could do better about encouraging troops.

Item
No.

That company gunny must have Parris Island and confused. He treats us like we're in boot camp. I worked damn hard to become an NCO in the Marine Corps. and I feel we should be shown some of the respect that we're expected to show higher ranking personnel.

22. The officers always look down on the enlisted, as if we are the slaves and they are the masters.

The 1st sgt of this command is trying to run a circus with his NCO's. Nothing wrong with going by the book, but why should NCO's be harrassed with petty bull---- like making errors on the duty log. It seems like a person can't even go up to the CP without him getting on a person's case. He should try to help the troops instead of trying to give them the shaft. After all, isn't he a senior enlisted man that junior enlisted men can turn to for help or advice instead of being ignored.

17. They will show respect for their leaders as long as they are informed and treated as human beings with some respect.

The 1st sgt has a lot of problems; I would say any incompetence lies there.

I strongly feel that a lot of misunderstanding between officers (leaders) and enlisted personnel lies in the fact that officers play a tremendous amount of "mind games" with the intent to confuse or, should I say, mesmerize the individual with his intellect. Needless to say, this deluge of intellect does not lead to the delusion of the "troops" as it was intended. Basically, what I'm trying to express is that at this command, as is true of other commands, officers display an image less than desirable by the troops.

Seniority -- Just arriving at this command, people consider me as low man on the totem pole. Three-year L/Cpl keeping on a boot L/Cpl's a-- all the time. (As they will tell you to do something and sit back on their a--es. Disgusting.) Most NCO's don't show enough leadership here. That is one of the main things that should be enforced here, and leadership traits.

The action of the troops in this command is a direct result of the action by the NCO's and SNCO's in this command.

Item
No.

29. Responsive, but no effort is put out.
26. I think that the majority of the troops here have very little faith in their NCO's and staff NCO's, even though I don't agree with the other troops.
27. Personnel in the starboard platoon are not motivated because they feel they are f---ed with by NCO's of port and starboard.
35. In this unit, Sgt _____ usually put's most extra duty on certain groups, such as colors, etc. He is extremely unfair (not minority groups), just people he doesn't like. He also refuses just because they're junior rank (he lacks, in my opinion, NCO traits (some)). He needs maybe to be talked to about leadership by maybe the CO or XO.
26. When you say leaders, I know you're not talking about
24. SSgt _____ and 1st Sgt _____. Can you respect either of them when the SSgt threatened and wanted to fight a private in running formation? If you ask me, SSgt _____ hasn't got a shade of leadership in his non-PTing body. Cannot talk to him. He gets upset like a f---ing little kid. He is also fast to jump on people when he doesn't know what is going on. He will pull the rope, to take up the slack, hang himself, and his head will crack.
26. No, they don't have confidence in their leaders. Some of them, yes, but not all of them. There is only one captain and two cpl's and one SSgt you can really talk out the way you can explain how you really feel. Now, if the rest of the people would be willing to listen, you might get better response out of half the company, but I don't think I will say it when I am here. Because the rest of the leaders are out for themselves; they don't give a s--- about the rest of the people as long as they can say what they want. They always pull rank on you when you start to talk, so I don't know what to do half the time and neither do the rest of the Marines here.
26. There is confidence at the officer level but at lower levels, trust and confidence is low.

The majority of the NCO's have their heads up their a--es. It's a shame that most of the non-rates are more efficient in their jobs than the loud-mouthed NCO's. We should be recognized.

Item
No.

Leadership -- misdistributed to the troops from the leaders. Set bad example by being inconsiderate. Rank in the company is pushed to profanity to the troops and disrespect to the leader. But as far as my own experience is concerned, I've been cussed by profanity many times since I've arrived here. But not once did I present disrespect, as I have been accused of so many times.

This command has too many f---f--- games. Start treating the Marines like men instead of boys.

22. It really depends on what kind of respect is really meant. For each other yes. But for higher ranking persons, not all the time.
23. Most troops, of most units, are tired of being treated as less than human.
24. Some of the staff NCO's relationships with juniors are very limited.
26. Of those SNCO's identified as having problems, I have noticed varying degrees of improvement. How this has affected the juniors, I'm not sure.

Overall, the training department is a fine place to work. I think the higher rank does care and does watch out for the people.

14. Cannot -- due to insufficient background and talent (i.e., natural or learned).

This command is great as far as knowing what has to be done in work, but I feel there are very poor examples here for troops to follow, too much double-talk in the officer and staff NCO ranks.

I think this command would be better without the CO and 1st sgt. I think this command could use a better education and drug NCO representative. I think this command would be better if everyone was not standing around waiting to burn you on the littlest thing.

Well, I've only been here for six months. In my parent unit I feel more like an NCO than what I feel down here. The reason why I say this is because it seems that the only thing that goes is SNCO and officer, a cpl or sgt is just like a pvt of PFC, not too big of a difference.

Item
No.

Troops are treated as recruits resulting in lack of cooperation. A L/Cpl is not treated as a L/Cpl, same for cpl and sgt. Poor leadership presence. Troops are told not to this and that and they're doing the same thing. (Practice what you preach.) Example: Tell a Marine to take his hand out of his pocket while you've got your hand in your pocket. They ask Marines getting out, "Why don't you stay in?" and the Marine says to himself, "You treat me like a private. Cannot do this, can't do that, while a couple of years ago you could." The answer is only officers can. What the hell are you needed for? Just to get the blame for something. A Marine doesn't feel any job satisfaction.

14. In my particular case it's not so much he doesn't help as he doesn't know how. A SSgt who just picked it up shouldn't be put in a command position (especially a M/Sgt billet) until he's had some training and experience.
30. Not encouraged, but instead, threatened.

I believe the rank of E-4 should either be treated as an NCO, meaning backing by senior ranks and authority to go with responsibility, or the title "NCO" should be taken from this rank.

Too many rookie sgts (E-5).

24. Staff NCO's don't exert their authority.

Too much emphasis is placed on rank. Not only at this command, but throughout the Corps. I feel that E-5 and below are not treated as equals with staff NCO's and officers. E-6 and up have more rights and privileges than do junior enlisted.

42. There should be more NCO's because when you put a L/Cpl in charge and he doesn't know what he is doing, well, that's trouble. But there are some L/Cpl's that know what they are doing and would make good NCO's.
62. If a Marine wants to spend time with another, he should not be put down because of the difference in rank, such as L/Cpl and sgt.

We need a few good leaders and less NCO's that don't know their jobs.

Item
No.

What I think is sgt and below think they can do anything.

I feel that Marines in this command are not treated equally with respect to rank. Certain Marines of the same rank are given special privileges that all Marines of that given rank rate.

Rank has its privileges is only true for SNCO's and above.

Spirits are low and people have bad attitudes because of how they pick leaders.

I believe the morale, spirit, and motivation are the lowest I've seen in the two years this unit has been active. I also believe it is due to the lack of leadership on the part of the command. I also feel there is too much undue harrassment by the command. We, the troops, are treated like children instead of United States Marines. There is no personal privacy in our living quarters.

The morale and spirit of this unit is down very low because the peers have no leadership. In fact, the morale and spirit are at the lowest point they have ever been in two years.

21. Marines do not have high morale because some of the NCO's in the barracks are leading them the wrong way.
21. I've noticed that my morale has dropped a little because at times I'm still treated like a private from those above me.
31. Not racial, but NCO's are prejudice on an individual level.
29. If they were, they would look to better the activitities within the company areas for the troops, so they had more things to do.
29. I feel that my platoon commander and SNCO have helped me a lot with my problem. The Marine Corps needs more leaders like these men.
16. Many NCO's are not well dressed when wearing the uniform of the day. Many NCO's are sloppy looking and don't bother to correct themselves.

Item
No.

14. In most cases staff NCO's never correct troops, and that's bad.

A lot of SNCO's and officers make good Marines but lousy human beings.

When I answered my questions about the staff, I was speaking in majority, since I feel that I couldn't have a better NCOIC. Some of our leaders have no more knowledge about comm than L/Cpl's, and the bad thing about it is they could care less.

Leadership is to understand people by knowing if making a decision will improve morale and spirit or lower them. A Marine should understand by putting himself or experiencing the feeling they would have overall.

19. A man's problem can be attempted to be solved very quickly in this unit, only if the man speaks to someone about it.

26. To a specific level.

I think that the troops down the commanding officers all the time.

19. The troops with personal problems seem to be placed in different categories. And the ones with more serious problems get help first, but then the individual might have more of a problem than this command thinks. So his problem shouldn't be placed in a category but taken care of regardless.

16. My NCO's are also dissatisfied and this reflects on their performance.

19. Too much, to the point where they take advantage of special libs.

17. The answer to that question is definitely no. I feel that any Marine, regardless of job status or relations, should be told what is expected of him as a Marine.

24. Troops is a word applied to army of soldiers. I feel that all SNCO's help when they can. But because of demands of an administrator or supervisor role are thrust at you with 30 Marines, you deal with 30 separate Marine feelings.

Item
No.

The troops act as if officers don't amount to anything.

The SNCO's and officers worry more about petty discrepancies on morning clean-up than about training. They don't care about the troops' welfare just about looking good for the "man."

24. Staff NCO's are in need of lots and lots of training. They operate in the parent mode at all times except when questioned. They they revert to the child mode -- very seldom in the adult mode -- X theory never Y.

Communication

I feel that it is very important that the troops in this command should be more informed.

The only bad thing about this company is no one for a fact is really informed on the things that go on around here. Our CG inspection went over bad because no one had the right information to pass on. That's the only major problem with this company.

We are always informed at the last minute or never even informed.

There is a definite lack of getting the word passed in this unit.

13. We are the last to find out anything.
13. The troops are informed, but the information is 90 percent of the time distorted and tardy.
13. The troops should be informed on all matters pertaining to the Marine Corps and world events on a daily basis.

They are telling us one thing, then they turn around and do another. They are always telling us about how much time we have off and then we get f---ed by the green weenie.

13. The troops never see the full picture.

The word is never passed until the last minute.

Item
No.

30. The troops are encouraged to do their best, but they are poorly informed. They throw too many things at one time at you and nothing gets accomplished. Take for instance, the shops. They split up the shops with the personnel and gear making three different platoons. Half the personnel don't know what's going on because they split everyone up and tell you when you are going on operations, then personnel are getting grabbed from other platoons to fill a quota for LSG-5. The gear is scattered all over. Platoon leaders do not know what belongs to them. I think splitting up the platoons was a good idea, but as you can see now it's not going to work. As far as the gear goes, everything from ECR cards to yellow copies are getting misplaced. And now troops are getting thrown from one platoon to another. As for the gear, as far as I can see, it's a very unorganized company and poorly led due to lack of supervision and wrong people doing essential jobs.

The NCO's should pass the word more often and make sure that it's the correct information.

We never get proper information before we do something.

No one knows what the hell is going on until the last minute.

Never get proper info.

The communicators in this battalion are never given the recognition they deserve.

13. This battalion needs more aggressive and better informed education NCO's. By aggressive I mean more contact with the troops and a hard-sell program with emphasis on future benefits.

Whenever a troop f---s up, they always (and I mean always) say, "We didn't get the word." This is bull---- 80 percent of the time, and makes NCO's look bad.

This command should have better communications between its sections. Too many times personnel are called to the company office for something and no one knows anything about it. Or you go to find out something and instead of saying they don't know, they pass the buck to the same person you just saw. As far as I'm concerned these people should be replaced or retrained.

Item
No.

18. Most policies are not fully understood or completely unknown to the non-rates as well as NCO's and some SNCO's.

13. Troops in the Maintenance Department never know what is going to happen from one minute to the next.

I've only been here a short time. I can really see where everybody is so confused. They don't know what to do. One minute you're told something, and the next minute it's changed. If the troops are expected to do it right the first time, they should be well informed. This kind of leadership affects the troops' morale, spirit, and motivation.

13. Stress more career planning, education opportunities.

The company I work for is messed up -- poor leadership and organization at the company level. Information given to the junior troops is almost nonexistent.

Training

20. For those who are school trained, it is felt that they are pretty proficient.

I do not feel the individual Marine is trained as well as he should. Because of my lack of confidence in the Corps. It has something to do with getting out or staying in.

20. Well trained in basics, but not in special areas, like calling in a medivac, arty, airstrike.

Can't get better training in your MOS.

20. The troops in this command are not well trained, because military schools are not sufficient enough for our jobs. To become well enough informed on exactly how we should do our job and how we should improve our training is almost impossible because of the lack of training in our field (motor transport is my example).

20. The unit relies on one section for one set thing, therefore, cheating the other 3/4 of the unit. Should pick from all sections for JOB, TROOP, and STOMP, etc.

Item
No.

I have been on this base for over one year, and I have received way under 20 hours of tech training. We need tech training to do our jobs better. In this outfit, there seems to be difficulty in even menial tasks. There are too many people that really don't know what's going on, but try to fake it.

20. Not enough money is spent for adequate training for the personnel of this command. If the people of this command are expected to survive in combat, more training is necessary.

Most of the time it's (training) a joke because there isn't enough money to train men right.

20. The biggest problem is getting the money so that this unit can operate in the field, which will make a better trained Marine and increase his morale and spirits. The inability to operate leads to boredom and trouble.

21. All these questions, which I answered negatively, could be answered positively if more money were to be allocated for training. As the situation stands now, efficiency, pride, and motivation are hard to keep when you know you are not tactically proficient because the Marine Corps won't give your unit enough money to ensure survival, let alone victory, in combat.

This program would be fine if somebody would take the time to read and improve some training programs.

47. Prejudice against MOS. Administrative field gets unequal training opportunity.

PT -- not enough.

67. The sending of Marines to NCO school, in my opinion, is a waste of time and money, if the Marine doesn't want to go and he is not career-oriented.

Marines need to have the basic knowledge of their particular MOS. They have none -- classes on MOS.

This place is so unorganized and cheap that it's unreal. I though we are suppose to train to fight so when the time comes, we can stand our ground for the Marine Corps. There's more professional janitors in the Corps than there are sharpshooters!!

Item
No.

The weapons platoon should have more training in their own MOS's and not with grunt units and should have more live fires.

The training program for weapons platoon is bad, thus making Marines have low morale and want to leave the unit. The reason is because there is not enough training in their specific MOS. Instead of training a lot with the infantry, there should be less training in their field and more in the MOS Marines hold in weapons.

I would like to make it a career, but if the training doesn't start improving, I won't. I don't plan on vegetating for 20 or 30 years.

20. Compared to the training I received 2 years ago, right now I feel like I'm at a boy scout camp.

To train I would learn more in a day that is sunny, not lousy. Not the same training over and over, more live fire courses. Dig foxholes and stay in them all day, that is no training.

These people are f---ing up by trying to run this place like the boy scouts. The troops are starting to get p---ed off and one of these days they will show it physically instead of verbally. And how are we supposed to be proficient at our MOS if we don't get enough practice in it?

I think the infantry should do more training and harder at one time and get more consecutive time off. It's too much penny stuff because much of the troops think it's not necessary to perform as in war. Should be more realism, agree it's expensive, but. . . .

Not enough hard physical training. Our job is to kill; we should learn more on how to do it, instead of playing like janitors or boy scouts. More live fires.

Going to the field and doing absolutely nothing at times. Going out for one week and training good only for a day, when we could just go out training for a day and come back.

They send us to the field and we don't do anything except sit on our a--es.

20. For their jobs.

Item
No.

Going in the field for a week and working one day and doing nothing for the other four.

There should be more active training.

Not enough money for training.

Not enough money in the Bn for training equipment and maintenance equipment.

20. Need to emphasize more on physical conditioning, land navigation, close combat, patrol, and individual movement.

More training in the field. Training off base in the civilian world. More jump and diving. Give us back our spy strap!

More training in the field, but have everybody participate.

One of the major problems at this command is boredom. The only answer to this is more training exercises, not drill and inspections thrown in the training schedule as they are viewed as harrassment.

Resident (local) training should be encouraged on the squad level. Night training should be done more and then by squads only. This would ensure greater survivability, morale, and unit integrity (vs. the task-oriented company operation). More patrolling, more short-term and varied deployments. Self-defense should be taught to give men self-confidence. Activity!!! Don't let us rot!

20. We put off a lot of working hours to training.

47. If you are not one of the "three" officers, you have no opportunity to further your job training "because the budget won't allow it." But, if you are an officer, a three-month school to train in a job you will never work in "is okay."

20. Could use more "stick time."

20. In many areas, sections, this is the case though.

Justice

Item
No.

I feel marijuana laws are too strict in the Marine Corps. If one man gets arrested with even a single cigarette of pot, he might as well forget about ever staying in. If we can smoke it out in town, why not in the Marine Corps!

Marines in this command like to impress their CO by burning other Marines for any little thing that don't amount to s--- that they could've let pass.

If one person breaks a rule but is right in his ways or the outlook on the situation, he should never be punished through office hours.

I think if there was better leadership in this company, there would be a lot less problems. If a man is UA or disobeys an order, they should burn him, take his money away. I bet he would think twice the next time he screws up.

40. Does a machine, robot, or rock have any character? If so, this command does judge us fairly.

I think that this command is too burn happy. I think that this command should have a bitch session.

Cut down on the severity of punishment for possession and use of marijuana. Harmonize and Legalize.

The Marines are not judged here by their character or their color or background. I strongly believe that they are judged by rumor or what someone has heard about you.

45. All Marines are not treated, they are dealt with as peons.

The questions concerning racial/ethnic questions are fine, however, this LEAP questionnaire does not touch upon the majority of command prejudice, i.e., rank! The greatest amount of injustice is directed toward the rank structure. There is no such claim as equal protection under law -- it has no place in the military. The most rife examples of discrimination (especially dealing in justice) are directly related to the rank structure.

51. Punishment is decided by a few people who don't observe the effects of that punishment.

Most questions in this questionnaire should be related to not only ethnic groups but also to a Marine's rank, which, I feel, is a major problem of this command.

This questionnaire leans toward racial prejudice too much. Other prejudices are much more evident, specifically rank (if you have the rank, you can get away with more and you are treated differently, i.e., worse if you don't have rank, better if you do).

35. The birds usually get put on working details.
35. There is personal favoritism within the battery office compared to all the other sections. Examples are duty NCO and field exercises and also working parties.
35. Working parties are unfair (by GySgt).
51. Yes, because I have been a Marine for three years and have seen this problem a lot. I believe when an NCO has to put a charge sheet on a man, that Marine should be sent to CC or restriction, not a slap on the hand. I also believe that is why a lot of the troops don't respect NCO's.
35. The work details tend to pick on only two or three certain people.
36. I don't feel justice is equal many times. It is based on how well the man is liked in the unit or by how much he kisses a-- and not by the actual job he performs.
51. Punishment isn't handled fairly, because often the man is judged by who he is and not what he's done.

In short, the people that kiss the a--es of the higher rank make rank and get treated well, but a man that makes a mistake gets looked down on and is treated like he isn't s---

35. Work and punishment in this command are given arbitrarily and capriciously -- with no rhyme or reason. This is not an observation from a three-year PFC with four NJP's but a third-person view from a sergeant.
51. If you are not liked at the company level, you will get the green weenie put in a little deeper.
36. Justice is a joke in this command.

Item
No.

I've seen instances where a SNCO physically beat another Marine (non-rate). He (SNCO) got counseled by the Bn CO. Tell me, if I hit that SNCO, I would not have been burned.

All UA's that are running current should be picked up, placed in the brig, then sent to their NJP. All UA's that come back should be given their NJP as soon as they show up.

45. Us good Marines get better treatment as is expected.
51. Two Marines went up for the same charges -- 7 days UA. One got restriction; one got restriction plus \$200 fine.
47. Certain leaders favor their troops for many reasons.
Not fair or impartial.
36. None of the punishments are equally administered. No two people get the same punishment for the same crime. Some people get more for lesser crimes than others for worse crimes.
36. I feel that if two people do something it should be equal punishment, not separate. It's not that way in this unit.
51. No warnings. Treated very harsh for first offenses.

NJP is many times harsher, especially when a civilian misdemeanor is comparable.

The Marine Corps penal system is certainly a program which should be changed or, at least, performed in an equally just manner. I was tried for an incident two years ago -- the punishment was declared but never performed over a period of two years, certainly past the expiration date of any well-organized legal system. Now, because of this, I haven't been promoted for over two and a half years. Because I belong to a minority group, I believe my career was ruined for one incident which is unjust. And certainly a bad mark against my feelings toward this organization. I wouldn't stay in the Marine Corps for this reason. It's a bad representation of a governed organization. It s---s!

36. Injustice is done to those that don't kiss a--.
51. Officers/SNCO's can do something but if a troop does it, he gets burned.

Item
No.

When one or two s---birds f--- up, we pay for their mistakes no matter how clean we are or keep. And, after awhile this s--- gets tiresome and to everybody! Then UA's don't think we should be limited and kept from going home for lunch (since it is our lunch time). Punish one for his crime, not 60 nonguilty people who have to eat at home.

I feel brown baggers should not have to field day the barracks because they don't live in them.

Our commander said that NCO's are always right, even if they're wrong they're still right. I came to the conclusion that non-rates don't have a chance if they're sent to see the CO. The CO will believe the NCO before he would believe the non-rate. If the non-rate is right, how could he/she get a fair deal? Are NCO's a higher class of human being or are we all created equal? We all have the same rights, don't we, or did the Corps take them away?

36. The same Marines get punished for small, minute things that only matter to officers who balloon these into office hour offenses. But, if an officer commits a crime, he gets away scot-free.
29. My platoon commander keeps trying to bust me and my platoon sergeant made me go on remedial PT, because I had to go to sick bay one time in my first year here.
35. If you are on guard, you get stuck with every s--- detail that comes along.
45. If you are in guard, you don't get a chance to do anything but work.
36. Justice is a funny subject in this command. When officers pass judgment on a person, his story doesn't carry too much weight. So, they decide what is justice from their point of view not yours.

Civil misdemeanors shouldn't be handled so harsh in NJP.

Getting in trouble for the most stupid things.

35. A few of the people catch the green weenie, while others skate.
51. No one is being punished to the fullest; harder punishment is needed here.

Item
No.

- 36. The athletes of this command are all made pets; they can do no wrong.
- 51. Again, the jocks get over, along with a select "few" who are the "colonel's pets" so to speak. These few people get anything they want.

We are not being treated equal to those of other services. We are constantly being violated of our constitutional rights. What happened to freedom of speech? If you say an officer s---s or he's f---ed up in his job, you can say it, but look out for the office hours or a black listing for the rest of your time in the Corps.

- 36. Some of the sgts and higher ranking NCO's think they are not under the same set of rules for punitive action. They think if a troop does something illegal, he should burn, and if a sgt does the same thing, he should only be warned or not said anything to.
- 47. My squad leader favors this one Marine and he always gets the job.
- 36. Justice is used in a way to manipulate, to frighten and put one back in his place.
- 51. It is not handled from a judicial point of view, but whether or not an individual should have pressure applied upon.
- 19. Interrelated with 36 and 51. People have personal problems adjusting to the Marine Corps. They seem to be handled by statements 36 and 51.
- 36. My experience says that I got a raw deal when someone with a worse offense got off almost scot-free and not because of lack of evidence. If someone doesn't kiss a--, it seems, or isn't liked well enough, he gets the green weenie when others are let off very lightly in comparison.
- 36. I do not feel that justice is "dished out" equally due to the simple fact that some Marines here don't know what rights they are entitled to. Therefore, they don't realize when they are being "played on."
- 51. In the particular command I am attached to, if you are not one of the favorites or in the "clique," you are dealt with or tracked down, so to speak.
- 45. Marines in equal rank are treated equal.

36. "Justice." In this company, people who receive non-judicial punishment in some cases are not fair. I for one was given the same amount of NJP for a misdemeanor when another was a felony charge. Some favoritism is shown. Some Marines get written up five or six times, while they're here and never receive NJP just because their platoon commander or some one in the chain of command below the CO likes them. "Favoritism" is a problem. It needs to cease or a racial problem will start within the troopies, and then the troopies vs. SNCO's and officers.

You almost need to be a lawyer to get office hours processed. If the Marine Corps wants to boggle up the company office with paperwork, fine. We'll hire lawyers to process office hours. But, of course, you'll probably have pending legal action for a year or more. Simply, let's get back to basics. Basic discipline, basic work. Let's cut off some of this petty bull that enables the troops to get over the system.

45. I joined these two because the inequality is involved in this area. If one is suspected or convicted of a charge, from that point on he is blackballed, not rehabilitated. Everything is blamed on him and sometimes without investigation. Furthermore, the section he works with receives the same reputation.

There is no racial discrimination here. It's more of morale of the troops. If you were awakened at 10 p.m. liberty time (after hours) so the MP's can run dogs through, how would you react? It seems to me that there are more people out to (burn) write up someone else than to help him out.

I personally feel that this command really gets its rocks off by burning Marines for petty articles of the UCMJ. They are fined far beyond their paychecks, especially if the CO and 1st sgt don't like the individual Marine. Personally, I would like an AA farm put in.

I don't think Marines are treated fairly in this command.

- 36. They give the max sentence.
- 32. I say all personnel be punished equally, not by their rank.
- 45. Only if you're an officer.

Item
No.

36. No, it is not. If they like you, you don't get punished as much. There were Marines that did the same as me and they went to the brig, and I was put on restriction and a suspended bust. So it is not fair. They tell you that you are an outstanding Marine and you know you can't be if you keep getting in trouble.

There is too much favoritism in this company.

I believe very strongly that discipline is very unfair.

General -- All Marines, minority and majority, are treated equal. It is the Marines who are not liked for personal reasons by an officer or SNCO with some pull (rank), who get screwed over. An example, let's take a captain, he has two Marines who have committed the same offense, but have separate officer hours. Well, if the captain has a personal grudge against one of the Marines involved, that particular Marine will get a far greater punishment than the Marine the captain may like or just not have a grudge against. I've seen it happen many times, not just by captains, that was an example, but by Marines in general with rank over someone they just don't like. It's no way to get even!

The commanding officer in this unit is only interested in burning people in his command, and also gives one man a page II entry and another a court martial for the same offense.

51. A lot of impartial or nonobjective views are held.

Marines here have to be disciplined more for wrongdoing by section head. Most of it stays in section.

Promotion

42. Many times a Marine isn't promoted because he knows his job well but by favors and special little jobs he does for whoever he is under.

42. Promotions. Good question. What is it? What about people with overtime in grade. Isn't that what meritorious is all about? It is not their fault they are in a lousy MOS.

I just want to say that I think the Marines are a pretty sorry lot when a man with a clean SRB and a reputation for being a good worker has to remain a L/Cpl for 32 months, as in my case. Discrimination of a Marine because he is four pounds over the USMC weight limit is unfair and a damn good way of losing a quality trooper. In this regard, I feel the Marine Corps s---s d---, and it can kiss my a--. I have four months remaining on my contract; after that, you can f---ing kill yourselves for all I care.

42. Promotions in this company are not based on a person's ability. My MOS is 2542 and I know that I know my equipment. I even have a working knowledge of multi-channel radio and radio equipment. I have been a PFC for 12 months. My last PRO/CON marks were 4.5,4.5. I received one NJP in January for drinking in the barracks. Even though in November I had more than enough time in grade for L/Cpl, I still wasn't promoted due to discrimination. Just because I went to alcohol rehabilitation in October and came back in December. There are several entries in my SPB saying that I will be evaluated for L/Cpl upon my return from alcohol rehab. I've been back 4 months now and I'm still a PFC. I'm a good worker and a good Marine, but I'm tired of promises of L/Cpl promotion when I know I'll never receive it. That's life in the Green Machine I guess.
42. Promotions in this command are generally awarded for completing a time-in-grade requirement. There should be time-in-grade as well as meritorious promotion boards for the purpose of testing MOS knowledge, GMS, personal appearance, and bearing.
42. It has been my observation -- in the past 10 years -- that promotions have not been based on a Marine's ability in his MOS -- but rather how well he can run a PFT or how brightly he "polishes apples," which has resulted in deterioration of the NCO/SNCO image. We have SNCO's and NC 's wearing the stripes, but in actual practice, the Pvt/PFC he's in charge of actually knows more than he.

In a majority of the promotions, the man who was promoted didn't deserve it. He just got a lot of "brownie" points with the higher echelon.

I think that supervisor posts should be run by time-in-grade and time on base, not by the COG babies.

I'm also not a "lifer" but promotions in MTM go solely on one's ability to s--- and that I don't do! So, I'll more than likely leave the Marine Corps a L/Cpl over 5 years, even though the fact that my superiors all say my work is out-f---ing-standing, quote-unquote!!!

You don't get promoted unless you're a smack a-- or WM.

Favoritism is used in giving rank in this command.

42. It seems in this command that it doesn't matter if you do your job, it's if you are liked by your superior.
42. It's who you know! Not what you know.
42. That's bull----!!! The bitch I have about promotions is that some Marines are not judged by ability. There are people in this command that get promoted because they kiss a--. I think the only way to explain is by example. A Marine has been a certain rank for over his time. He is squared away and does an outstanding job. Other Marines are promoted to his equal rank. A few months later, these same Marines are promoted to the next rank, but they are as squared away as the Marine who has been that rank for the longer period of time. How can they leave that one Marine behind in rank and promote others of lesser time-in-grade to the next rank?

When some s---bird L/Cpl gets squad leader only because he is a L/Cpl while good PFC's are waiting and waiting for paperwork or time-in-grade or what not, but still have less time-in-grade, but rate to be L/Cpl and sometimes L/Cpl to be NCO's but are never noticed. Too much favoritism and s---birds who have rank, while we follow orders from s--- like that! That's why many want out, go UA, or transfer to recon.

It's not how you do your job, it's who you know, and if you get along with the higher rank, you get promoted. And on this base, if you tell what you know about things that you don't want them to know, again you get rank.

42. Well, since being here the short time that I have, I haven't been to a board yet. But, I have seen a couple of Marines around that know their jobs and are squared away. But by talking to them after boards, it seems that their liberty time and personal life hold off a lot of promotions.

There are little provisions for promotion as far as MOS performance. A very unwise aspect. Nothing can be gained by doing a better job over a poor job.

42. Only kiss-a-- (Marines?) get promoted.

Promotion is unfair here. It is not right not to promote someone for the people he associates with.

42. Promotions are based on if the major likes you or not. It's like a big drug interrogation -- 100 percent true.

42. Not true. Promotions are based on whether you follow the golden rules to the smallest print. If you try to change something which needs change, you become an outcast.

42. What a joke! If you want your good men to stay, how about unfreezing the O3 promotion field.

42. Promotions aren't pretty good here and the troops get p---ed off and don't do their jobs good.

42. Promotions aren't based on ability, they are based on kissing a--.

27. Poor motivation stems out of very few promotions. Regarding the ratio of troops qualified for promotions against the ones actually promoted.

42. Promotions in this command are based only on the thought that if you promote a man maybe he will square away, but the man already squared away feels the rank he's attained isn't worth a s--- because some bird received the same rank.

42. I think Marines should get promoted for the work they put out and how long they put out! Most Marines here at this command are judged on their personal background and not how they work or put out. If there were more promotions, there would be better Marines. (Too much discrimination and too much tension.)

Competence is often disregarded as a promotion factor in favor of obsequiousness.

Promotion boards don't ask enough MOS questions. All they do is ask military subjects.

Item
No.

It makes me sick to my stomach to see s---birds in the other platoons. I mean Marines with page 12 entries, etc., that pick up NCO after two months as L/Cpls. There are a lot of hard-working L/Cpls that have to wait eight months or more just to see corporal. It goes to show that the Corps now operates on favoritism and brown-nosing.

42. Item 42 asks if promotions are based on individual ability. My response was E, as most times promotions are based on one of two things, the first being time-in-grade. If an individual is an average or slightly below average performer, he will be promoted if he has the required time-in-grade. The fact that he is not recommended by his staff NCO's is not enough to hold him back without documenting poor performance or attitude. This puts the small unit leader in a difficult position. I do not wish to blemish an otherwise clear record book by stating that the man has been counseled due to poor performance, when all he really needs is another month or two to adapt/learn about the responsibilities of the next higher grade. The second basis for promotions seems to be job proficiency (MOS). This method of selecting Marines for promotions does not take into consideration the "total Marine." Can he lead troops? It should make no difference if the man is the most qualified 2531 in the Marine Corps if he does not possess the ability or has not yet learned the techniques inherent in the classic Marine leader.

If the individual's ability was the only thing he has to be promoted by, there would be a hell of a lot more people promoted around here. But just because a person is on the drug and alcohol program or the weight control program, he can't be promoted. That's f---ed. If the man can do his job, he should get promoted period.

They should promote the Marines who have been here a longer time.

42. A board is held for everyone eligible.

42. It's not only the ability, it's the way he is dressed day by day and mostly time-in-grade.

42. I do not think that Marines in this command are promoted for their work.

42. To the person who kisses hiney the most.

In this command the promotion system is screwed up. A Marine can bust his a-- doing an outstanding job for the Corps but always gets stabbed in the back by SNCO's or section heads, either because they dislike you or they have a hair up their a-- when recommendations come around. Solution -- more meritorious promotions for qualified Marines!!! P.S. Other personnel in this command feel the same way.

Promotions here are really bad. A lot of good Marines are really overlooked. It's a shame to see a good Marine go down the drain because he got screwed over on promotions because of his cutting score. Cutting scores, I understand, are there for a reason, but a lot of good, outstanding Marines are really being overlooked and left alone. This individual can't help but get a bad attitude about the Corps because of this.

42. Promotions are based on how you handle a board, not what your work section says. Therefore, one could be proficient in his job but if he can't show this in a board, forget it. Vice versa, if one can bluff his way through a board but isn't really qualified, he can get promoted. (Everyone goes before a board, time-in-grade or meritorious, here.)

Overall, I don't think the Marine Corps' promotion system is fair.

42. As far as promotion is concerned, you have to kiss a lot of a--, and everybody ain't into that.

42. Come promotion time, promotion should be based on qualifications not quotas.

42. I went before a board and didn't pass due to the questions asked. If he is admin, ask about admin, not CMR or off-the-wall s-- .

42. On promotion boards there are not enough questions concerning the Marine's present MOS. Too much time and questions are used on EST. I would recommend that before he goes in front of a promotion board, a Marine takes the EST Test, then he could be questioned on his current MOS by the board.

Promotions and admin in general are always late and discriminative.

21. Morale and spirit among the junior enlisted men in my shop are almost nonexistent. A good part of the problem pertains to the lack of promotions; high cutting scores have kept a large number of E-3's in the shop from being promoted to E-4. An E-3 with 18 months plus time-in-grade is not uncommon in my shop. Morale is also affected by high stress from supervisors to turn out a lot of equipment with a limited amount of technical ability.
42. I am a squared away Marine, do what I'm told, and know my job. But, I believe I am held back by my open opinions, and I am not scared to tell anyone how I feel. I don't talk back or question my orders until after it's done.
42. I have been a cpl now almost two years. They have been telling me that HQMC's cutting score is too high even though they would like to promote me. I don't feel it's the CO's fault I haven't been promoted; I think it's a hangup somewhere in HQMC.
42. For the most part the statement is true, but too many personnel are promoted because of time-in-grade and not because he knows his job.
42. In this command, rank is given out to those who kiss the most a--, not what the individual knows. Favoritism is widely shown, not only in this command but throughout the Marine Corps. I feel that the rank structure is very inadequate.
42. In this command as in other commands, Marines, on the whole, are not promoted based on abilities but on their military knowledge (EST).
42. Promotions are based on what kind of Marine you are, which is good, but very seldom is a Marine's ability questioned.

Promotions in this command are not handled right. There are a lot of Marines who have 20-23 months time-in-grade to cpl, who are just picking it up, who do their jobs, no discrepancies such as office hours. When we don't pick it up, we're never told. Around here if you want to know why, you're out of luck because everyone could care less.
42. "Ability" for what?"

Item
No.

42. Seems to me they only get a promotion if they reenlist.
If you get the SNCO's or company G-man in a jam, they will promote you or make you Marine of the month.

42. There have been some instances where undeserving individuals were promoted over more deserving men.

42. S--- no!

Education

63. Going to night school.

11. I wish I could take class at night but going in and out of the field, you don't have time unless you're an NCO.

11. It could be better. More information passed on how to enroll, when to enroll.

If the Marine Corps is going to promote education, particularly in the case of responsible NCO's, they should allow them BAQ and Comrats if they so deserve. This would be an added incentive to the individual. Also, increase chances for educational advancement by upping recruiting standards. A man who has already completed high school is more apt to continue his education.

11. The unit encourages education only because it's a policy of the administrators of the Marine Corps. If it were not for that, it never would be emphasized! When a unit does let a troop go and improve his/her education, 50 percent of the time (he) never completes the course that was taken because of the Marine Corps objectives, such as mess duty, guard, and field exercises.

Off-duty education is not encouraged in this command very much. They don't want people to take education when it might interfere with your work like when you go out to the field.

11. We aren't given the time to see our career planners.

11. There is no chance for educational development because of all field commitments.

Item
No.

11. In units that have field commitments, educational development is discouraged, but they still transport people back and forth for athletic activities.

Education should be furthered and made more available to the troops who wish to apply themselves.

11. It's lip service. You end up missing classes because "you're a Marine first, a student second." Granted that's true, but you still miss classes.

All Marines should be screened individually to find out if they are serious about completing their high school or college or any other type of education program.

11. Education is available, but it is not encouraged.

11. This command has refused to allow me to further my education, on my time -- three times.

11. Some but not as strongly as it should.

11. Depending on which platoon you're in. One platoon commander does not encourage education. The CO does encourage it.

Educational programs -- need more of them.

11. When I first started looking around for help and advice on how to get some college education, I was told I couldn't go and was discouraged from going. I went every place on our camp and couldn't find one person who knew what the hell was going on. The only one who offered to help was my platoon commander, but he didn't know about any programs available to me. I finally went to the college on my own time and found out all that I could. I now go to school, but it's hard to get time to study.

11. Education is very difficult to arrange and follow up on in this command. This serves to demotivate potentially interested troops and contribute to low morale.

11. True, they encourage education, but the majority of us that would like to go to college have to go on our own time.

I don't believe the command encourages education enough.

Item
No.

11. I personally don't feel that education is stressed enough. I think there are a few Marines that are interested, but there isn't enough encouragement on it or information given to the troops unless an individual goes and asks about it.

This place s---s. There are no educational opportunities and it is for the most part run on favoritism.

Like for 0311 that they want to go to school; it is hard for them because they just don't have enough time to study.

I think it would be nice if the Bn could get some kind of high school completion program here for the people who don't have transportation to mainside. It's hard to catch the bus and make class on time.

11. Educational development is somewhat encouraged but not beyond the high school level, because you can't complete any type of college course while in the 0300 grunt field.

11. Command encourages education, but it is difficult to get.

They do not encourage college and if they do, all they tell is you shouldn't go because it will interfere with your job.

In this command, further education is at a standstill.

11. The company office frowns on it because of duty.

11. Only if you can work it in on your off day, if you don't have to train.

In education, there has been no problems, but no help.

11. Educational development is hindered by the lack of interest and help of certain squadron individuals who are responsible for the education. Could be termed "GAF."

11. Many education opportunities are publicized and the career planner and CO say that they support these programs. However, when a young enlisted Marine makes an attempt to further his education, he is treated unfairly. His superiors say that he is only attending classes to shirk his duties and responsibilities.

Item
No.

Career planners have little knowledge and really don't care. Can't get any answers on educational programs.

11. It's damn near impossible for a "Trac Rat" (1833) to get education after hours due to field commitments.

Educational and leadership opportunities are few and far between in this company, battalion, and group.

11. But not enough encouragement by all sections.

Women Marines

In my opinion, WM's serve no useful purpose in the Corps. WM's get promoted too fast and are not trained well enough to lead a bunch of girl scouts. WM's are disrespectful and snobby about 90 percent of the time. The Marine Corps should do away with WM's!

73. Only if they can't do the same s--- jobs.

75. If a male sgt cannot get roomed with another sgt (two men to a room), why do female pvt's get two to a room?

74. Not in all situations.

They should stand duty.

WM's not in a leadership capacity over male Marines serve well, but they have little expertise in handling the physical and mental well-being of their counterparts.

In considering minority groups, I include women Marines as minority troops.

76. Answer in reference to the total mission of the Marine Corps, combat included. If a person has the name Marine, they should be capable of performing all tasks considered with that title.

I personally have been under the command of a woman -- she had the rank of captain. She very much lacked leadership qualities.

This is just my opinion on this form, I think if women want to be equal, they should be that way.

Item
No.

73. I feel WM's should not be in charge of male Marines because I have had experience with a WM colonel and her prejudice toward male Marines.
75. Male Marines should be entitled to the same opportunities as WM's. WM's are taking the good jobs away from the male Marines.
76. WM's should be in the 01 duty field only.

As an artilleryman, I feel that women Marines, officer or enlisted, have no place within the 08 field. However, I believe that WM's make excellent leaders and troops within the support establishment.

I feel women in the Corps should be used in support roles (service support), if any, such as all food services should be female. Also support and admin positions. A woman Marine is of the weaker sex and should have that much respect. Any further respect should be earned.

With the women's rights going the way it is, do they want to be equal or what? Why don't they be grunts and do a three-mile PFT and the like? If the men got the breaks they do, we'd be a bunch of p----es. I feel if they are going to be in it, they should be in it all the way. Plus the promotions they get -- lay on their backs for a staff and they get a meritorious promotion. Not all of the women are like that; there are a few good ones. There are, I'm sure, quite a few that can kick a man's a--.

74. Women Marines should not be assigned to combat MOS's or billets unless they are required to do everything a male does, including the PFT, the obstacle course, and carrying a full pack on combat conditioning marches. I also feel if a woman is assigned to combat MOS's and billets, she should live with the Marines she will fight with.

I believe women Marines should be trained as male Marines, not only for combat but for details such as guard, rifle range, etc. It is not fair to exempt WM's from duties the male Marines have to perform.

73. Because a lot of male Marines feel some resentment towards a woman telling him what to do.

I think women should be used in the office, but that is the only place.

Item
No.

WM's stand by while heavy work is being done by males, but still get paid the same and complain about equal rights. (I don't see them in live combat.)

I think it would be a bad idea to have them lead troops in the combat arms occupation. It could be dangerous.

- 74. But women Marines only!
- 74. Ain't no way in combat, at least not yet.

A Marine is a Marine and sex should have nothing to do with their opportunities to better themselves. If a female is fit to be a Marine, she should rate equally as males.

- 71. Women Marines are not as strong enough mentally to take on such a big responsibility, and mostly in time of danger.
- 73. Women Marines should not be put in charge of men because of the thought behind it.
- 74. Their ability is more of a down slope than a man's.
- 76. Yes, my room!

Have never worked with a woman Marine, so I can't give you an answer for Part V.

All of the WM officers that I have known have been excellent officers. As a matter of fact, most of them were better as boot lieutenants than men. They were more aware of troop needs and less concerned about petty garbage.

- 75. WM's represent the most privileged minority in the Corps. They have been known to get special privileges not offered to male Marines.

There seems to be an emphasis on protecting the rights and dignity of the WM. In the process we have completely overdone it, and now the average WM receives better treatment than most SSgts on this base.

- 73. Some missions can be accomplished as well as male Marines; it depends on the mission.
- 74. Again, it depends on the mission.
- 76. Not in the field, in bed maybe.

Item
No.

76. Women Marines should only be used in an office job.

75. They get promoted faster than men -- unfair!!

75. WM's should also be subject to the same deprivation and duties.

71. I don't deny women deserve the right to function as leaders in the Marine Corps. In disbursing any administrative billets women Marines should be allowed to command. I have observed, however, that women Marines just don't have the command presence to instill confidence in them. In billets other than admin, this lack of confidence is, in my opinion based on my observations, justified. WM officers I have observed, who are put in charge of area guards or have served as OD, have all been markedly less professional than their male counterparts. Granted, their lack of knowledge can be remedied, but I have serious doubts that their lack of decisiveness, military presence, and anxiety under stress situations can. All this, of course, affects the performance of their subordinates.

71. It depends on their jobs.

72. I don't believe officers deserve any special respect unless they prove they are good leaders and deserve it. Of course, the shiny stuff on the collars warrants respect.

76. Until WM's lead troops and fight in combat, women do not belong in a military organization.

74. The statement has yet to be proven on the field of combat (so the benefit of the doubt was given to that statement).

Women Marines in this group are treated with so much. WM's have a limited job here and they want equal rights. Let them, they don't know what they're getting themselves into!

75. Women Marines receive partial treatment by some senior staff NCO's.

76. There are certain jobs they can hold, such as supply, admin, truck drivers, and non-combat roles only. In time of war, I feel they could not mentally or physically carry their fair share of their role.

Item
No.

74. In a garrison situation only -- an NCO is an NCO, male or female.
76. We need someone to keep male Marines serviced, don't we?
74. I don't think women can lead troops as well as men because women don't belong on a battlefield. When you put men and women together, nothing can go right.

You don't get promoted unless you're a smack a-- or WM.

Too many male Marines are doing jobs that WM's should be doing and too many WM's are doing too many jobs that the male Marine should be doing. Women have caused conflicts between the male and female race since women's lib. I disagree much with the male and female settlement of this day and year. The male today and yesterday has been too liberal with the female.

71. It doesn't matter what sex you are, it's whether you can do the job.
73. I really don't think a male Marine could put his trust, as in a combat situation, in a female, because he was brought up to believe a female is weaker.
76. I don't believe a woman should have to be put in a combat situation, but should be there to take the jobs of the men that are fighting.

I have worked with/have had dealings with a fair number of WM's. Many of the enlisted WM's attempt to avoid physical labor or dirty details because they are women. Of the few WM officers I have encountered, most were knowledgeable of their MOS and did a good job of relating to male troops.

74. Yes, they can but they are few and far between. Give them a few more years; they certainly have potential.
76. The Corps has a need for women Marines -- to bring out the best in the male Marine.
71. WM's usually have more privileges than men because they are women; and when WM's and male personnel are in the same unit, they should both be treated equally.
73. WM's may be placed in charge of male Marines except in a combat situation. There, I think, the males would mutiny.
76. The women do have a place in the Marine Corps and that's with the male Marines.

Item
No.

- 71. When put in charge of male Marines.
- 76. A place, but not every place.
- 75. Male Marines should have the same opportunities as WM's.

Concerning WM's, I answered according to what I saw on
_____(noon TV program). A WM captain stated she "was
a woman first, and a Marine second." This contradicts
everything she represents as a commanding officer.
Marines are trained to be Marines first. How can she
expect her men to live up to that when she openly admits
she doesn't? If she's not a Marine first, she doesn't
rate the bars she's wearing and should not be in charge.

- 76. There are a lot of officer jobs where WM's can do a good job. There should be nothing outside of that.
- 71. In my eleven years as a Marine, I have yet to see a WM who could even think about being a leader of men.
- 71. I cannot agree or disagree that women make poor leaders -- their role in society, not the USMC, must be taken into context. Women cannot be relied upon to be effective leaders in the FMF. Respect for junior officers and NCO's stems from experience shared (or to be shared) in combat -- women cannot stand up to this test. However, they have proven to be satisfactory in managerial roles in an industrial or administrative environment. *

Women Marines are given too many privileges due to gender and do not have enough qualities of a good Marine.

- 75. While WM's do have the same privileges as male Marines, the WM's in this command do use the fact that they are female to get better treatment.

Women Marines are treated much better on this base than male Marines. They also have more privileges.

- 73. WM's, in some cases, should be put in charge of male Marines -- admin, etc. But a lot of Marines, especially in outfits such as comspt, field art, etc., would resent a WM in charge.
- 75. Women Marines get more attention, better living conditions than male Marines. They use the fact that they are female to get over, which happens quite frequently.

WM's could not lead men into combat.

Item
No.

76. If women had no place in the Marine Corps, there would not be any in the Corps today.

I have never had any experience working with WM's. I want to make one thing clear, keep them out of field or combative MOS's. I wouldn't want to work under a woman officer, and I sure wouldn't want any working under me.

Women Marines should not be allowed in the Corps, but if they are, they should not ever be in a command billet of any type over male Marines. They have no experience in working with men. We, the Armed Forces of the United States of America, are here to defend our country, our way of life, our women, and our loved ones, not have them defend us.

Women Marines don't belong in combat; they should be placed in offices only.

74. Women Marines are entitled to a lot of opportunities in the Marine Corps, but with all the hassle and bull---- carrying on, women Marines might be in danger if they intend to be in charge of a Marine male unit, preferably a grunt unit, which causes so much frustration. Women might get hurt.

Most WM's receive special treatment and extra-special promotion chances. Most get more favors or special consideration because they are WM's. If they receive equal pay and chances, they should do ANY! job a male Marine does, i.e., rifle range, PFT, swim qual, etc.

76. Women Marines should be in the Corps but not placed in control of male Marines. I think it is all right for women Marines to work with male Marines in some cases.

71. They make good leaders for women.

73. I would never follow a woman Marine. Hell, I wouldn't even listen to my mother, that's why I'm in the Marine Corps.

74. They can head women Marines, not male!

75. Women get too many privileges -- women would s--- on themselves in combat as they get scared over mice, bugs, and snakes -- women are sissies. Women can't take pain or even give it.

I have never been led by a woman Marine.

Item
No.

73. If she is the best person for the job, she should.
76. Every branch of service needs females to work alongside the men.

I have a sister in the Marine Corps and many close female friends also in the service.

I've never been around a WM.

76. Only as secretaries.

Not enough WM's in the Marine Corps.

73. Some jobs they do, but not in the field or anything that has to do with war directly.

71. Women Marines, if they should be in the Marine Corps at all, should lead other WM's only, but I feel they don't belong in the USMC at all. Furthermore, WM's have privileges that male Marines don't have. Inadequate, unsanitary, and outdated quarters are easily passed on to the male Marines, while WM's use their sex for either position or promotion, or as an excuse on whether or not to work. In short, I feel that WM's have contributed highly to downgrading the Marine Corps. Keep our good men in. Help them. We need our good men, so why have the trouble and expense of WM's.

73. In a combat environment only. I don't believe I could make a good or fair judgment about WM's without working for one or having a WM company commander. What I do strongly believe in is that WM's have no place in a combat role. They have never been given a chance in combat, and I do not think our country would give them a chance, because we may have too much to lose just to prove WM's are as good or better than male Marines.

75. But, male Marines should have the same privileges as WM's (i.e., promotion, housing).

74. Female troops, yes; male troops, no; because of the work we're involved in.

75. WM's, I think, are a little more pampered than male Marines.

Women do not belong in this type of service.

Women belong in the kitchen or behind a desk or in bed.

Item
No.

75. Male Marines are entitled to the same privileges as female Marines.

The Marine Corps should never have let women come in. We do not need WM's. They are no good, not at all.

71. Women Marines are good leaders in a field that would not take a forceful hand.

73. I can't see a WM lieutenant leading a group of men into combat. Someone like that needs to have a forceful voice that would strike fear into a man's heart and make him kill.

75. Question should read, "Do male Marines have the same privileges as women Marines," because male Marines usually are in the worst part, such as, WM's have better barracks, are treated differently because she is a lady. The WM's cannot be hypocritical in saying they don't get the same privileges as male Marines. The privileges are just different.

76. Women Marines have a place in the Marines, it is just that they have certain places in the Corps.

72. Not in a combat situation. I think that women would tend to break down in half the time a man would.

74. When it comes down to where a man refuses to do something and you have to slap him upside the head because you don't have time to play around. A woman Marine will get her butt spanked.

76. I do not disagree or agree on WM's being in the Marine Corps. But I don't believe they should actively fight in combat areas.

75. I believe that women Marines are entitled but I also feel if they deserve the same privileges, they should be able to do the same job -- combat, for instance.

I feel that women Marines can be Marines just as well as anyone, but in a war zone, I wouldn't trust a woman. Sorry!

The program to put WM's in combat MOS's is very stupid!!!

The Marine Corps has no reason to employ WM's.

74. Only under certain conditions.

71. They should make women grunts.

Item
No.

I have rather strong feelings for this issue of females in the U.S. military establishment. I feel they have a definite role to play and, in certain areas, I feel they could function adequately in a combat environment. I do not have a strong position currently regarding females in career level schools that are oriented toward combat, i.e., AWS. My feeling in this regard is that, if we are to educate them in this environment, then that education should be put to use in the environment for which it is designed. I stress the many talents women possess and their use. I do not support tokenism which, I sometimes feel, may be the thrust of our policies.

75. But men are entitled to the same privileges as women. Women receive better quarters and faster promotions as a rule.

I strongly feel that women Marine candidates should not be training alongside the male candidates. There should be a separate program. I feel that much money is wasted by the government by having women do anything in training that will have no bearing on their careers while in the military. Example: 1) field training; 2) firing on rifle ranges; 3) learning tactical exercises. When women can go to combat to fight for their country then, and only then, should they be allowed to participate in tactics of any kind and be allowed to fire expensive rounds on the rifle range. The space is limited so I stop here.

I feel that women do have a position in the Marine Corps, however, it is not in the combat-related fields. I do not feel that the majority of women are physically or mentally capable of handling a combat situation.

75. I think the statement should read, "Male Marines should have the same privileges as women Marines. I haven't seen any WM's lacking for privileges.

There is a time and place for everything, but why in this Marine Corps? Just too many things to be settled with male Marines. Why have the extra problems?

My responses toward WM's would be more favorable to them if they were not given preferential treatment, e.g., living conditions, duty stations, promotions.

If a woman wanted to join the Marine Corps in the first place, she must be liberated -- let her fight.

Item
No.

I think every male Marine should be issued a woman Marine.

76. Have one per fire team to clean up and get satisfaction from.

76. One for every fire team for working parties and other squad functions.

I think that women Marines should be with this platoon so that everyone would show up on time.

75. Women Marines are treated preferentially in the Marine Corps. Lots of males resent this.

I believe every Marine should be issued a WM in boot camp.

75. They are entitled to more.

Racial/Ethnic

I feel that in this command, presently, there is very low spirit and morale. Mostly due to prejudice and discrimination of minorities, the majority of them being black.

54. It is becoming ever more present that I should not associate with individuals with different life styles and/or values. It threatens my "career."

32. Although some troops feel there is prejudice, I feel everyone gets treated the same.

60. I think that when I first came in three years ago, this was the case, but I feel that since the Marine Corps has raised its recruiting standards to high school diploma level, it has eased the situation. Everyone is more able to deal with something as petty as you're black and I'm white.

31. A very touchy subject. My only complaint is that the administrators should not stereotype minorities. A Marine that belongs to the minority group has to work twice as hard to get recognition for the outstanding qualities that he/she has.

This is a bunch of s---. It seems to me you're worried too much about racial tension than anything. F--- the blacks, if that's what you're worried about. If the blacks did their job like everyone else, there would be no problem. Sure the number of black s---birds to that of whites is the same, but the blacks get noticed easier.

10. I feel we should not distinguish Marines as ethnic group or minority and majority. They should all be called by the term Green Marines or Marines period. We are all Marines, not majority or minority or ethnic groups, but U.S. Marines only.

This section (II) deals mostly with minorities and mentions very little on the majority. Questions of this as any command has more minorities than majorities than the white American (majority) would then become minority. Who would then be discriminated upon? Would there be another leadership program/leadership evaluation conducted? The only way to solve interrelation problems is to have a set standard/regulation in which everyone completes. Example: Everyone be tested for promotions, set punishments for failing to get a haircut, set punishment for day UA, two days UA, etc. This would eliminate 50 percent of discrimination between all Marines regardless of rank, race, or ethnic background.

39. Only minority group members who are s---birds stick together.

55. You must judge a man by the man himself, not by others in the group. Only if you force people. We are all equal. Only education and environment determine life style.

31. Whites are the ones discriminated against in the Marine Corps.

48. They (majority troops) are in certain areas, such as promotions. They will promote minorities just so they can have a comparable number of minorities in the NCO ranks.

61. No one's got the right to run your race. Maybe you're proud of your race and you want to do it because you want to. You don't care what anybody else thinks.

56. Only the fact that they are free Americans.

Item
No.

60. I feel that there is a little more racial discrimination in the Corps because I have heard a lot of white Marines say that they hate niggers, and a lot of black Marines say they can't stand to be around white people. Some white and black Marines get along good. Marines have a good tradition, but I think the "Band of Brothers" is a lot of bull----. A lot of whites and blacks hate each other in the Corps. Everybody is out for themselves. I believe in helping my fellow Marine, black or white, because we have to stick together.

Get rid of the minorities.

Too many niggers in the Corps.

It is evident around here people dislike blacks immensely. I myself am Mex-Indian and really don't give a damn about one's color. It's the a--holes that p--- me off!

62. Racial and ethnic groups should hang out with whoever they want. There is no reason they should have to do anything to preserve a "balance." The people who think people should stay in separate pens are either scared or bigots. Now bigots should be penned away from normal people. Everybody has prejudices, but a bigot has to be trained.

43. In a few cases in this command, minority troops were charged more, in my opinion.

60. Well, it's not more, it's just extremely more obvious or to put it in words, you see it more in the Marine Corps.

If there is a black sgt, it is the black L/Cpl who gets cpl, squad leader, etc., not because of their qualities but because they are black or drinking buddies -- when they don't rate to be an NCO and, in some bad cases, to even be in my Marine Corps.

I think that a troop should be able to hang with whatever other troop he/she wants to after hours, as long as the individuals govern themselves accordingly, in keeping with the Marine Corps rules and regulations.

The command appears to have small fear of minority uprise.

I think racial problems start in this command because of lack of leadership traits and abilities in the higher echelon.

Item
No.

60. Personally, I think the military makes closer relationships between races.

Just because a man's in a minority doesn't mean I have to go out of my way for him. Whatever shade of green -- if the man's a punk, I'll let him know; if I look up to him and respect him, I'll also let him know.

My biggest problem I've got is prejudice. Whites got it made especially in my platoon, and Mexicans too.

This test isn't going to do any good because things will always be the same. Minorities don't have much of a chance in the Marine Corps, and in this company, for sure, and it's showing bad.

56. People should show a certain extent of pride in their racial background. We're all Americans.

33. Relations in race are becoming less and less. The men are so dissatisfied with their training and command job. They say no motivation, take it out on the other guy.

34. Less chance, since the new COMB, things look better!!!

31. The black Marines are treated very unfairly, and I think that Headquarters Marine Corps should look into this soon at _____.

38. The "majority group" doesn't seem to think the blacks want to be friends with them. They are very prejudice and "bigot like." I wish the commandant realized just how f---ed up his Marine Corps is on race relations.

37. Hell no, the blacks are treated like dirt. You should see all the confusion and disorganization there is at this command.

42. Blacks are treated fairly according to rank; the white man, (excuse me) "majority group" tries to hold us back and that's why I'm getting the hell out of the "white man's army," the Marine Corps, the Dept. of the Navy.

32. Any white vs. black incident in this command will 90 percent of the time go to the black because of the fear that they might bitch prejudice.

52. They do this for their own protection.

61. There are always that 10 percent who are troublemakers, but not all are.

62. It's better to do whatever you want to.

Item
No.

This test should not be taken by the black man. A lot of the questions do not pertain to him or his career in the Corps. It shouldn't be taken by any of your so-called minority groups. What I am saying is this test is down rating every man and woman that's not "white." The only people who should be taking this is the white man, because you know it and I know it pertains only to him and not us (the minority). The Marine Corps will never find an answer for the problems they're having, but race has always been an issue. But this questionnaire is not the answer.

When I got to question 53, I realized that this class is not for the minority. It is only for certain ethnic groups, not the black man. I cannot answer the rest of these questions, because I refuse to lie any further about this integrated hell house. There are some racial problems that can be solved and some will never be.

32. Prejudice against blacks -- 32 is just the opposite. This command is so prejudice it makes me sick sometimes. Also, Marines are supposed to work as a team. This command does the opposite instead of working together; they're always trying to play the role of Mr. Cop. Let me see, who can we burn today? And I quote, "Who can we burn today?"
56. I feel that a person should be proud of what he is (race, service, or organization), and that a symbol of this is displaying pride as it should be, as long as it is not being pushed at everyone else. There are too many people who flaunt their symbols to such an extent that it makes everyone not a member of that (race, service, or organization) uncomfortable to be around this type of person.
59. 61. Minority troops are not messed with because people of this command are worried about someone bringing out a prejudice.
37. Better chances.
47. Bull----. Blacks have more since all this s--- started, and this command gives in, not the CO but the plt cmdrs.

There is prejudice but only in a few percent.

This command has no racial problems to speak of. The minority Marines and majority Marines hang around together after working hours, some do, some don't.

Item
No.

62. I think it is good for people, no matter what their race, to associate with other groups, as long as they have a common interest and not doing it because they feel that this is expected of them or it is just the thing to do. People should be together because they enjoy being together or go to the same places because they enjoy being there and doing the same things because they have an interest in what they are doing.

Why is there so much fuss over the racial aspect of the Corps? It's clearly obvious that the white man runs the show. And why does the military find it necessary to judge the men by racial and ethnic backgrounds? You might as well just have an all-white military. Civilians don't judge people like that when they go for jobs and s---. They look for qualities in people that would benefit their business. That's how the military should do it.

To say this command is racially prejudice would be putting it mildly, because I know that discrimination exists; the command knows it too but refuses to admit and accept the fact that blacks are in the Corps for the same reason that whites are and until the people in this command and in the Corps realize this, there will always be a racial problem.

31. I believe a black will give another black a break whenever possible. An example is I/Cpl _____. He was promoted after coming back from UA.

I feel that the Marine Corps has done a poor job in solving their racial problems. For reason of my own experience there've been too many times where the black Marines are "tagged" as (what they call) s---birds. Being victimized on the outside is enough. But to have it in the military is absurd. Why should it be a difference when we all are suppose to be Marines? So, since this is the case, then there's no place a black person can go to be treated equally. So should we go to war in a foreign country or fight for our rights here?

37. They don't get special privileges, but it seems there is a reverse racism within most of the Marine Corps.

38. I have a lot better relations with minorities than whites because I am ashamed of what whites force on others -- past, present, future.

Item
No.

37. In this command black and white Marines get along very good. I have noticed that some black Marines try to get out of more details than white Marines, but there are still a lot of white Marines that are also lazy.

34. Some Marines of minorities seem to think they're being cut from some good training, but almost all of them have been to either jump or scuba school or haven't gone because they just got here or don't wish to go.

55. It does more harm than good when it is done simply for the sake of "integration" because it creates friction.
They will never do anything about the racial problems. All I think is they're trying to snow everyone over.

32. This is a question that could be discussed over a long period of time. As long as I've been in the Marine Corps, it has been felt that the minorities get more than their worth. (This problem comes under Leadership Discussion.)

59. That may be, but I feel that is where a lot of your racial discrimination starts.

48. Some of the staff NCO's in this unit do occasionally discriminate against the majority.

56. As long as it's not taken too far and turns into an ego trip.

59. Racial and ethnic symbols are only an expression of your superego. A racial and ethnic symbol is worn to shove a problem in your face and only makes the problem worse.

I though we were all Marines! Not white, black, Mexican, etc. I myself am tired of all this majority/minority garbage. Why don't they stop all the useless concern and leave it alone and everyone will be a whole hell of a lot happier.

60. In the military it is more apparent than in civilian life.

37. I feel that the Marine Corps and the entire military give blacks a special break.

We don't need pride in ethnic groups in the Marine Corps. Ethnicity should be ignored, and pride in a group isn't helpful.

I think you're expressing minority groups a little too much and saying the same things over and over! By doing that, you're separating the minority from the majority groups, which I think everybody is the same and that's it! P.S. There is no difference.

60. On the contrary. It is quite the opposite. But things are really improving. I guess people are getting over differences in skin color and things that go with discrimination.
62. People are people. It doesn't matter to me about the color if I get along with the guy, and we go out and party together. He's a man like me.

All Marines are not the same. Black Marines have it harder for the simple reason they're black. Most NCO's are white and it's harder for a black Marine, unless he's willing to kiss a-- or just be a fool or sucker. Racial problems are never solved because you can never get to the bottom of it! But, I feel that it's up to the individual himself to make it, black or white!

No nigger should be in charge of a white man.

61. I feel that groups such as the KKK, Black Panthers, and others along this line are nothing more than crude terrorists whose only purpose in life is to try and start trouble with people for reasons uncontrollable.

The issue on race relations: The question was brought to air -- if it would be better if minorities and majorities intermingled during and after work hours. Yes, if the men live as men, not as animals! No, if the men don't rate to be called men!

32. I strongly agree because everybody is trying to prove that they aren't prejudice towards minorities and as a result, minorities get recommended for promotions more rapidly.
39. They mostly stick together and it is encouraged, because they have segregated rooms in the barracks.

Put the blacks back in the jungle where they came from.

Item
No.

61. Minority groups are considered equal until groups use symbols to show off or try to be better than someone else of a different race.

I personally feel the race problem is so minor here that I can't see any.

52. I think that Marines are people. I try to mix with people as much as possible, but blacks are black and so on and that is the way of the world.

56. I don't think people should be broken down into racial groups.

38. Racial problems are heavy in this unit. Fights go on all the time. There is a constant bitch between races.

45. Considering minorities and majorities, everything goes about equal, but there are some cases that I feel are open for discussion.

52. Not everybody here is prejudice. I myself am not that prejudice. But, I've met some people, minority and majority, who are a--holes and nobody likes an a--hole.

55. Depending on the people, that's the job for the battery gunny to talk to very new men and if the person absolutely can't stand minorities or majorities, try to put them where they might have a better chance of getting along.

59. No, but some carry it a little too far (meaning all).

62. People gather in choice. Nowdays minorities and majorities mingle quite well considering. But, everywhere you go there will be selective racial groups.

56. No, because we are all Americans. I also like to say that one big problem is that they treat most of the blacks like babies. Because, if I usually give an order to them, they always say you're prejudice.

68. A paid for skate, conversation when ethnic groups get together and get sympathy. A f---ing waste of time.

31. I think blacks get away with too much because every time they get into trouble, they start yelling discrimination.

49. (Black) minority Marines' personal appearance is generally poor and many discrepancies are overlooked.

60. There may not be more racial discrimination in the military, but for a minority group, it can hurt you worse than in the civilian world.

Item
No.

62. It seems to me that most of the people (not all) hang together in their own race. The whites have Jeffs, blacks, the Elks, Mexicans, the Taco House.

You cannot put white Marines in one big bunch. I see problems and have experienced them myself. Someone from an eastern city or LA and someone from a small Texas town or Utah or Idaho -- if he was rural, his values are different and the other "Marines" give them a hard time. I don't think a black Marine has it as bad as a white Marine who isn't into getting high and rock music. If you are alone (no friends), the only thing to do is leave the area as soon as liberty is sounded. Your morale is low because you're not part of the unit, just there.

Most of the questions concerning ethnic problems would have been pertinent 8 or 10 years ago. In the last 6-8 years, I have not seen racial problems. Unfortunately, however, if a white and a black person are involved in a conflict, it is reported as a racial incident.

61. By virtue of the fact that we are Marines, we accept many customs and traditions (with pride) that isolate us or, better put, set us aside from non-Marines, i.e., uniforms, saluting, rank structures, etc. The often-used form of greeting among black American Marines, which varies from verbal to intricate handshakes, is not a Marine greeting and isolates (in my opinion) them from their fellow Marines, whom they greet in different manners.

I have found that Marines of all racial/ethnic groups interact well and maintain a degree of politeness in their work. However, after work, they tend to stay with their group.

I, as what you people label a minority, have had no problems with the fact that I am a minority in the military. Here I feel I have been treated for what I am. I have no complaints.

55. Maybe for the first year, but in the long run, it's the only way you're going to get this country together.

60. Reverse racial discrimination is the most prevalent form.

61. They're just wanting to be seen and show off. That just shows you how ignorant they are.

Item
No.

The ethnic groups all get along pretty well here, unlike Okinawa, where there were many problems.

Discrimination is used in the military to get over. Otherwise, I've seen very few cases of actual discrimination in this command.

31. It seems like the ones who always get into trouble get too many breaks.
41. Capt. _____ is very prejudice. "He'll probably cause the company to mutiny."
56. Being proud is one thing, but it seems those people who
59. are "proud" of their race are trying to force it on others and make people think that theirs is the best. I also think that I am discriminated against, not by my military leaders, but by minorities, in the fact that a lot, not all, of them seem to want compensation for discrimination over 100 years ago, and I don't feel I should have to pay for my ancestors' crimes! I try to look at people as individuals; but people in groups make it hard, because they make themselves known as part of that group and not an individual.
48. I feel that all a colored person has to do in this command to get promoted is do his job fairly well. But a white Marine just doing his job does not get promoted. If the same black Marines were white, they would most likely get promoted. Black Marines 9 out of 10 times talk back when given an order. Not all black Marines are that way; there are a few exceptions. And, if you get two black Marines arguing, the arguments last, without a doubt, 2 to 3 times longer, because both of them want the last word. Compared with white Marines, which usually will feel some type of guilt when being chewed out. And, last but not least, most of the discrimination problems start with black Marines and not white. They are the ones that bring out the word discrimination, and the white Marines are usually shocked because discrimination is the farthest thing from their mind.

There is too much emphasis placed on minority and racial groups. They have the same opportunities and advantages as everybody else.

45. There are some NCO's that are prejudice in this command.

In my platoon, I feel that my platoon sgt is highly prejudice. He treats those his color much differently than minorities. And, when a negative attitude is shown, of course, the other side is going to jump right back with another negative attitude, which makes for a low level of spirit and morale and also poor relations between races. I am neither really black, white, or brown. The color of my skin is tan and my last name ends in "ez," but I was raised in a white community and environment all of my life since I was born. Earlier this year, I hung around with some blacks, and I really did feel the prejudice come down on me. This prejudice even made me turn against whites and even start to hate them, when I have been raised by mostly WASP's all of my life. I can't figure out what is the problem with this company. I hope that the whole Marine Corps isn't like this company. I feel that I have been treated unjustly in this company and am going to be very happy when my rotation date arrives.

34. Everyone works for himself and others in his race.
59. What ever happened to "we the people" or the bald eagle?
62. Troops should hang around together because they are friends, not to show that people from different races can congregate in the same place.

I sincerely believe that unless a person would be willing to sign his name to a questionnaire such as this, true feelings would not be given. I like the idea that the Marine Corps takes the time and energy to improve race relations. Maybe sheets such as these could be filled out and discussed in a classroom with the people that did the answering. This would not only be effective in race relations, but relations between authorities or seniors as well.

I believe questions about ethnic groups were okay, but I think the question should be put forth about individual favoritism in this company. Also, the questions about racial problems -- I believe we have some, but altogether I think as one there really is no racial problem. I believe the problem is individual favoritism.

45. There is prejudice in this company, and it is building up to something bigger than it is being shown. I'd look into it if I were you, from private on up. You might be prejudice yourself. Think about it.

31. This is so, even though complaints are not formally filed.
62. Even though our troops do not, I think that they should be encouraged here.

11 through 62 deal with some sort of racial or ethnic questions. I would like to know if the Marine Corps went to a conflict in Africa, more specifically Rhodesia, would my black brothers and Cuban, Spanish, or Mexican brothers fight by my side against the enemy (whomever it would be) or would my brothers fall into the category that Ambassador Young, in a speech to the United Nations sometime late last year, said that the U.S. could not possibly give Rhodesia any military support because of the percentage of black minority and other ethnic minorities within the military. That these minorities could not be trusted to fight on the side which the U.S. military had been sent to defend. I would like to know yes or no. Are my black brothers and other ethnic brothers traitors or not? Or was Ambassador Young blowing smoke?

I have been on this base for about three weeks in the 22 Area. There is a high degree of race discrimination in this company. I say this because the facts are -- no black officers in this command. One black staff sgt, one black sgt. You can count the cpl's on two hands. I'm not saying I am against all whites, just the few narrow-minded bigots, who don't have the intestinal fortitude (guts) to find out what other people are all about. Instead of going along with stereotypes and the crowd and what they hear others say.

I am tired of hearing about every problem the Marine Corps has being related to a racial problem. I have seen little of it, and what I have seen usually occurs because of friction within the Corps itself. When a man is dissatisfied with his job, his pay, etc., he tends to take out his hostility on everyone else around him. How come everytime a black and a white get into a fight, it's classified as a racial incident, even before the circumstances surrounding the fight are known? We haven't even scratched the surface. Let's get to the HEART of the problem!

More involved in ethnic backgrounds, you're missing the whole point. This questionnaire is unjust, not a fair questionnaire. There is no racial discrimination here.

Item
No.

Being black doesn't mean you are a minority. To degrade a person because of his or her race can bring about more discrimination than you people that sit behind your desks and not associate with people can dream of. If you're going by numbers, you are a confused bunch of quacks. I'm black and proud of it.

I don't consider the black race as minorities. I strongly didn't appreciate answering most of these questions because they were strictly based on racism. And personally I think 1st Sgt _____ is the biggest racist in the company.

I would like to say that as a white American, I am shocked at the arrogance and inability of blacks to try and lead this organization. I had planned to be a career Marine until I saw this real problem we seem to be having. I think it is now obvious that the two races were not made to be in the same fighting force. I truly feel for the young white men who will follow me in the Marine Corps. God be with them.

I don't think blacks are a minority.

There is no difference in training minorities. Majorities get the same training available.

59. Racial and ethnic symbols are, in my opinion, only used or displayed by insecure individuals who want to show the world who or what they are, but they fail to realize that most people and myself already know that they are Marines.
31. It is true they talk about how lazy the black people are when you know some lie. They all are equal.
33. Now, between some of the troops (relations) are really tight and there are people trying to get them away from each other.
10. All U.S. citizens are Americans and should not be classified by race, i.e., white Americans, black Americans, Mexican Americans.
62. If they want to; they shouldn't be forced to "hang around" minority/majority troops they don't want to.
61. Depends on where, when, and how such symbols are used.
55. Especially sexual relations in this command.

Too many questions seem related to racial problems rather than to overall interaction between SNCO's, officers, and troops. I feel the point is being missed when we concentrate too much emphasis on racial rather than on the problems inherent within the system.

56. People should show more pride in their backgrounds. I'm a country boy. I was raised in the cotton fields of Georgia. People are always kidding me about my southern voice. I know other people from the South try to change their speech and try to act like they came directly from Hollywood!!!

43. In most cases, hell yes.

52. You have no choice.

61. Not necessarily.

31. I don't know about complaints, but there is a lot of discrimination and prejudice.

52. In most cases, yes.

32. Most of the time, no. But if, say for example, a black staff NCO is plt sgt and a black man gets in trouble, the black man can get off. But if a white man does the same, he will go up for office hours. I know, it happened to me.

61. Some of the people do, but most don't.

39. It appears this is beginning to happen among some of the blacks.

52. As above, it appears to be beginning.

59. Not necessary for a person to be proud of his background.

Too much emphasis on race relations -- everyone in uniform should be treated as equals and not separated or talked about in two groups.

56. I disagree on the way question 56 is stated, because there isn't but one race on Earth as we know, and that is the human race! This statement should be stated as groups are breeds of people.

31. Unjust complaints -- made only by the prejudice people. They are the only ones who complain.

56. If more believed in the positive aspects of the U.S. and the future of the U.S. instead of themselves and their kind, the possibilities and future ahead of the U.S. would be very, very bright.

The only discrimination is against S---BIRDS and they deserve it!

Leadership/Human Relations Program

I feel a Marine is a Marine. The Leadership program has made people afraid of treating people as equals.

Since I have never partaken in this program, my answers are or should be interpreted as to what this type of program would be like in my present command (in my opinion).

- 66. A well-conducted class will benefit the Marines of this unit.
- 68. This command's program is poor but could be improved if the instructor wanted it.
- 67. I think it's according to MOS.

There is hardly a time for such a program in this command.

The only Leadership training I've received was in boot camp.

- 66. The program must not be eliminated, but brought up to date. "Progressive" NCO's must be worthy of respect. The Leadership program cannot only deal with Marine Corps problems and situations, but must encompass attitude, education, reevaluation of long-term goals, and motivation of each Marine, both on and off duty.
- 64. I do not feel that the Leadership program changes a person's behavior. It makes the individual Marine aware of the problem that exists and shows him both sides of that problem. If his behavior was part of that problem and he is shown that, then he will change his behavior accordingly. I feel that if an individual does not want to change his behavior on any particular thing, all the leadership programs in the world won't make him do it.

We should have a Leadership program in this command and also more educational programs.

- 68. Uninspired, insincere, and too programmed.

Item
No.

63. The training-leadership program should be expanded toward more combat training, only short distances away from this command, such as certain Army bases. We could use their courses more than just to fam fire.

66. As currently used, classroom instruction and discussion must be carried over into command activities to be effective.

Don't know enough about it, but the Leadership program will help teach people a little more about what it takes to make good leaders.

66. Yes, because people don't practice what they preach.

67. One or two leadership sessions should be enough for Marines.

The program at this command turns into a bitch session and nothing gets accomplished other than airing of complaints.

There has been no evaluation program in this command. There is no real reason for it. The racial problems we do have are individuals and aren't problems. The personnel are mixed up and the individual unit section tries to help some, but mostly the individual Marine is screwy. The real problem is the officers or people in charge. They have power and some let it go to their heads and the NCO's are given no responsibility, and if they do, the person still overrides his orders!

55. This question is a perfect statement of human relations. Most racial feelings are hidden and when HumRel class brings them out, people get a different look at a person and find out they really don't like them or approve of them.

The two groups (40 hrs) that I participated in turned into a big bull session in which non-rated troops and younger NCO's totally forgot about basic military courtesy and bearing. I was amazed at the off-the-wall subjects that were discussed. The Marine Corps and the people in it have changed to suit the young who want everything handed to them.

The Band of Brothers concept is a good one, if only it were honored.

Item
No.

69. Because our leadership is given in class.
70. Same.

The Leadership program is generally handled by lackluster personnel and suffers thereby. It has a lot of potential

HumRel program has resulted in a "way out" for malcontents to excuse their behavior by crying "poor leadership" or "discrimination"!

This is a complete waste of time. All we hear is Band of Brothers from all the heavies in the Marine Corps. Every time I've been to leadership, I usually come out more p---ed off at minorities than I was when I went in.

As for the present Human Relations program, the Marine Corps took a good idea and blew it.

66. The present system does nothing to enhance the leadership traits of individuals. However, a point must be made that with certain modifications the program can be proven to be beneficial.

The Leadership Training program has been presented well, but I feel it is inefficient in producing effective leaders.

Training program has been well presented, but I believe it is totally inefficient in producing better leadership.

67. Leadership training has no bearing on performance.

65. Leadership program only sets guidelines for a better leader. It's up to the individual Marine to act upon those guidelines to become a better leader.

65. Gives them more ideas to help make better leaders.

Many effects of the Leadership program are only seen for a short time, then they wear off.

Have never been offered the opportunity to attend any Human Relations courses or NCO leadership courses, although a sincere interest is present.

63 to 70 Our platoon has never really had any leadership training at all. Our plt commander, all he ever talks about is the job, then leaves.

The Human Relations, changed to Leadership, program is, in my opinion, a good waste of the taxpayers' money and our time. When a young Marine goes into the class, he is an adult. The Marine has formed a pattern in his life style. Through the years I've been in the classes, I've seen that some of the instructors want an answer that makes them happy, and sometimes hold the way a man answers a question over his head when it comes time for promotion pro/cons and fitness reports. I believe the program has hurt more than it has helped.

66. Not a complete waste, but it should be given more interest by all concerned and discussion should be greater instead of just reading the book in class.
70. I am an instructor here at _____. I have been here for three years and I have put a lot of good Marines through the course. I think that puts me into the 60 hours and over group.

The Leadership training should be on leadership, not human relations. Instead of skimming over leadership and digging deep into human relations, it should be the other way around. Skim human relations and dig deep into leadership.

I have been a training NCO in two different commands and observed several Human Relations (Leadership) classes. Three years ago, they were just bull sessions, the subject ranging from which is the best state to who has the best girl. The last two years I noticed better unit discussion leaders (lieutenants) who gave the class by the manual. The information was there, but there was no class response. HumRel classes are a waste of training time, money, and is, in my opinion, no way useful to solve the racial problems.

64. It may change behavior but what about attitudes? "Proper" behavior may be learned as a response, but I doubt that much progress has been made to change acquired attitudes -- pro or con.

Leadership/Human Relations programs are usually ho-hum to unsatisfactory. A more dynamic program is necessary.

The Leadership program should be more open-minded than knowledgeable text. Main areas should be covered in order to accompany some thing.

Item
No.

No Human Relations or Leadership course or training taken.

No extra training has been administered.

Too much stress is put on human relations in the military. Certain people are cut out for military service, and some people do not make it well in the military service. It is a well-known fact that people are all different from one another and are able to handle situations in different manners. The Marine Corps, as I have experienced it, is very discriminative toward people who are not cut out for military service. People almost have to hide their true feelings so they are allowed to do a good job while they are in. Also, this command has the least amount of unity I have ever seen. It is the CO that causes this.

If a person is not doing well, they may not think about inviting them to leadership classes.

I feel the program lacks much. Needs much improvement.

The program conducted by this command is very poorly run. The "guided" discussions rapidly turn into bitch sessions and rarely achieve the objectives which are stated in MCO 5390.2.

The class was not well organized. For example, we continually had Marines interrupting us thinking that they had a class in our room. I think the gunny did a good job considering the amount of time he had to prepare for it.

65. The program can, but the individuals must use what is taught and know it well -- leadership starts with an understanding of people as individuals -- each person is his own person (life, values, etc.).

Any training program to be successful depends on its ability to get the message across to the troops. This program, while better than the old program, may still not be able to change a person's attitude or basic opinions towards other people.

63. The Leadership program is not given enough to the troops of this command.

The Leadership program needs to be attended by all Marines, SNCO's and officers as well.

I would rather put my name on a sheet of paper and, either in my own words or through a battery of questions, try to express my feelings about the Leadership Program and its impact on my command, than try to respond to questions on many levels not knowing, for instance, whether I should answer as a gunnery sgt, Marine with 10 years service, 0848, or what. It is my opinion that the program, as observed by myself, in this command is inadequate, especially in its basic approach. What exactly are we trying to accomplish?

Effectiveness of the program is hampered by a general lack of understanding on the part of commanders as to the program's purpose and scope. There are as yet no people in this command who are both trained as UDL's and in a command position. Implementation of the spirit of this program depends on command emphasis and command understanding from the FMFPAC level on down.

I feel that entirely too much time is spent worrying about racial/ethnic human relations. It's fine for someone to sit in his office and dream up this bull, but I feel they don't understand Marine relations. I would rather our time not be wasted with these programs when all it serves is to remind Marines about racial tensions in the civilian world. Occasionally, we do have individuals who are prejudice, and that's unfortunate, but nothing short of psychological help will straighten these individuals out. I feel that more time should be spent on training relating to Marine Corps subjects. The only way to iron out any tensions there might be is to train Marines as Marines, make the people dependent on each other. It's awfully hard to be prejudice when you're depending on someone to save your life or make the right decisions. We can save all these human relations, racial/ethnic type programs for the doggies.

The HumRel program should be dropped completely. It is totally irrelevant and never has been relevant at all.

I have been here for almost one year, and I haven't got any class on leadership. I have got so far 40 hours of Human Relations in Okinawa.

Leadership can be taught, but if it is not put into practice at all times, it is worthless. That is where the downfall is in the program, the everyday living of leadership.

Item
No.

I think the class should last a whole week.

64. No leadership program can change behavior. Only the individual can change his behavior. Leaders or leadership programs can only offer information and skills. If the individual chooses to ignore or refuses to accept what is presented, a change of behavior is impossible.
65. Same reason as item 64.
66. The most valuable tools for understanding people are working with people, living with people, and trying to understand people.
64. Most people take the HumRel program as a joke and are only there 'cause its required.

Some of the questions can't be answered in enough detail to get the point across. Race relations are better, but there is still institutionalized prejudice being practiced in the Marine Corps today. The majority of the staff are too ignorant, salty, or proud to give the leadership classes a chance. They will not participate objectively. They can't be open-minded.

67. The time wasted on this program could be devoted to drill, essential subjects, rifle range, clothing and equipment, and technical training, which would tremendously aid in general appearance, discipline, and, in turn, a much higher morale and esprit de Corps would arise.
69. During my career I have attended approximately 60 hours of basic leadership, and all it's been is a BS session, no general value to the units or my career.
70. Haven't attended any classes (in this command) but did instruct one 20-hour block, and the response and attitude from the troops and staff was hard to believe. They could care less about leadership training. Some students wanted to sleep all week and had to be constantly reminded to wake up.

Leadership training is being overlooked in regards to what the word means and what it stands for. 20 or 40 hours a year doesn't give the Marine the right to call himself a leader. Leadership has to be worked on 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, regardless of the enlistment, regardless of rank.

Basic leadership class isn't long enough. Doesn't get into any one subject long enough.

Item
No.

I believe the Band of Brotherhood in this command was a very good idea. This is the first command that has had this idea!

66. It makes people more aware of others' views. And might enlighten him on things he doesn't understand.
65. The Leadership program will only affect the ones that want it to; the others, who could care less, it does no good anyway.

I think that the Leadership/Human Relations program helps out quite a bit.

Leadership classes are very poor with NCO's in this company.

Too much time is spent on inter-race relations and not enough on simple leadership.

The Human Relations program only instigates any feelings of prejudice.

If the command would use their Leadership program a little more for the troops and not play dumb games, the troops may give a little more leadership themselves.

Community Relations

The city of Oceanside is second only to Jacksonville, N.C., for ripping off Marines.

53. The 10 percent give the 90 percent a bad name with civilians.
53. Civilian businesses and anything in town want the Marines' money and in the end won't do anything for them.
57. Civilians around all of southern California treat you like s--- and try to rip you off, so even on liberty you can't live like a human being!

Being in a military town is like being in jail. Females will not speak to men unless you're either an officer or you have a lot of money.

Item
No.

53. This community of Oceanside is a poor area to start with. It is always apparent that civilians along with the founding fathers enjoy the benefit of getting bucks from Marines, but could care less about our total worth to all communities.

53. Most places around Camp Pendleton it is "f--- you, jar-head." This comes mostly from young people up to 25 years of age.

57. Civies dislike us. We're on the entire coast of southern California -- all branches.

Public relations is low between the public here and the Marine Corps. There are a lot of Marines that f--- things up for a lot of others. That is why I want to leave the Corps when my EAS is up. Many times people don't believe I'm in the Corps, and I think sometimes -- what makes the public think like that?

57. The same woman problem as wherever there is a military installation. You look at a woman, she sees you and looks away disgusted, or p---ed off. They have seen too many animals or they know they are in demand and can choose who they want.

53. The civilians treat Marines like dirt. The ones that treat you nice are only after your money.

53. I disagree, due to the fact that unless you have a car, you are forced to use San Clemente or Oceanside, and they know this and take advantage of it, as far as the prices they charge for their services.

53. I believe that the military-civilian relationships have always been bad because ever since I've been on this base, I've always seen military and civilian differences that end up with someone getting hurt or something getting destroyed by this kind of clash.

57. With the kind of trash the Marine Corps recruits, I don't blame civilians for the way they act. With all the criminals the Marine Corps gets and puts them in one town, only one thing happens.

57. Is not so much that civilians dislike Marines as much as it is civilians judge all Marines by what one Marine might say or do.

Item
No.

- 57. I've had civilians whom I've never seen before spit on my car at a stop light, simply because of my uniform.
- 57. The people of Oceanside don't like Marines but exploit us anyhow.
- 53. Being a Marine is a handicap. People will always see Marine first, individual last, or, if you're lucky, a person.

I have never felt so low in my whole life. I feel like the scum of the earth. People out in town treat you like you're dirt, call you names, and make you feel like you're marked from birth.

- 57. I think civilians dislike Marines and think that if we were Navy or dependents, it would be a lot easier to work on base.

General Marine Corps

The Marine Corps needs leaders, but right now it seems as though a "fellowship" or subordinate class should be available. Even though this was the primary objective in recruit training, the basic ability of most non-rates to carry out orders has suffered. All NCO's should stick together concerning decision making and expect the others to render support when needed.

- 21. Our morale and spirit if better handled by congress could be better by stop comparing us (Marines) to civilians, because we are trained at war. Example, medical help is poor, but at no cost; however, if I was on the outside as a civilian in a union, I would get better care, and get a tax reduction to boot.

The Marine Corps has treated me good, but the only thing that bug's me more than anything are the new Marines, or so-called Marines!, that come from MCRD. This new scientific way of training boots is bull----

Too many s---birds getting out of the Marine Corps with general or better discharges. S---birds should be discharged with less than honorable and no benefits.

Item
No.

A common goal should be to respect the fact that some folks are individualists and always will be. Making troops accept a situation, such as conditions, morale, race, etc., will only tend to worsen the situation. As long as I can be myself and get respect for it and to be known as such and not what my superiors think I might be, then I'll accept the Marine Corps. But, right now it's totally screwed and total war will prevail in the Corps.

17. Authority, in my opinion, has dropped severely in the respect that when a Marine is told or instructed to perform a task, many times it consumes far more time and is normally not done with quality. The reason being told that this is the new Marine Corps or the new breed. I was once told by a sgt major that there was no new Corps or old Corps but only the Marine Corps.

This is just another Big-Brother technique that breaks people down to statistics for generals to sit around and contemplate trends in social behavior. Squadron/group scuttlebutt and general feelings of dissatisfaction/satisfaction. As well, it deludes the people to believe Big Brother cares and is going to solve all their problems in social encounters for them. Individuality is the answer -- deprogramming the key -- 1984 is only six years away.

23. Very few troops like their MOS's and would rather have it changed.

To me it seems like they're trying to find if we have racial and ethnic problems. As I see it, I think the Corps should turn in the other direction and start turning out some quality Marines in boot camp. They're too salty and have no respect for authority.

The overall evaluation of the Marine Corps is poor for they are slowly losing their grip on all things which matter to the individual Marine, and it is turning into a place for small kings on their pedestals. Anyone with something on his collar thinks he is a better man than anyone underneath him.

Marine Corps discipline is very lacking and steps should be taken to improve discipline in boot camp. Also, recruiters should make a higher demand on men coming into the Corps.

The bigger problem in this command is that of people who don't want to be or should not be in the Marine Corps. Putting criminals in the Corps instead of jail has reduced the once-proud and patriotic force into a force that I wouldn't rest the defense of the nation on. It has a cancer that must be cut out or the entire body will rot!

The type of Marines being brought into the Corps today is totally f---ed.

I think the Corps needs a lot of changes. That Marines are not shown the respect that they are entitled to. The MP and police harass Marines unnecessarily. The barracks are about as good as 10-day-old dog s--- and sick call is more of a joke than anything else. I wish I would be discharged 'cause I see no sense in wasting my time where it is not of value to myself.

If one-half of the so-called Marines we have in this place were not so self-centered, every unit in the Corps would be tight. What we need to teach these young men in boot camp is how to pay the price of hard work, to form a more close-knit bond. Questionnaires like this only raise questions of doubt in commanding officers' minds. You can look at a unit and tell if it's together without a questionnaire like this.

My time spent thus far in the Corps has proven to be a big disappointment. I find that staff can get away with things, such as tardiness, and not hear about it. You get no encouragement for anything you attempt to do right and are constantly being more or less threatened in one way or another. To me, the Corps is one big joke and you either get along with the man and conform to his ideas without question or burn.

My major hangup is the expeditious discharge program. I don't see why a Marine who gets out of the Marine Corps after serving only six months and can't hack it and he gets the same benefits I do after serving six years. There should be some sort of discharge that would just let him out of the Marine Corps without benefits. I am not saying he should get a bad discharge.

The Marine Corps discourages a lot of people about reenlistments and everything else, because most of the leaders I have met are out for themselves.

I do not believe that the Marine Corps has lived up to its high standards. Today's boots are completely disrespectful. I believe that boot camp must have gone soft. The majority of these people do not have discipline, do not believe in the Corps. It's either f--- this or f--- that. My time for reenlistment has come up. I don't think I'll have a second tour (unless)?

This Corps is a j--- o--. It expects a hell of a lot from you, but will be damned if it will give you as an individual anything, be you a 4-year person or a lifer.

Overall, in the Marines you are not treated human until you get to be a cpl or sgt. Everyone tries to burn you on anything and the Marines also don't give you a chance to learn a trade that will benefit your future. I don't totally dislike the Marines; it's just that you can't live a normal life here and that is sad, because we put our lives on the line for this country and its population doesn't appreciate any of it!

The Marine Corps should screen all applicants before allowing them in.

I'm writing this statement because no test could describe my feelings toward the Corps. I've had good and bad experiences in the Corps. One thing though is that the Marine Corps should send people overseas as soon as they finish formal training. A lot of young Marines in this command don't know s--- about the gear because they never had enough training. I feel they get more than enough overseas.

Why is most of the questionnaire concerning race? Does the Marine Corps consider this the most important subject? What about marijuana use in the Corps?

I think as myself, living on base most of my time in the Corps, that the living conditions are poor. About the middle of April, all heaters come out of the quarters, making for unpleasant temperatures at night. The quarters are about 45' by 20' with 12 people living in these quarters. They have cement floors, poor lighting systems, bad ventilation. While all of the other services (95 percent) live in BEQ's, the Marine Corps has to live in open squad bays. Are we not equal human beings to those other services?

The Marine Corps is a pretty good life. The first two years have been outstanding. I've learned many things and met some good people. Sometimes though there is a lot of bull---- stuff we're made to do. Sometimes the leaders get a little carried away. We are babied too much -- do this, do that, it gets kind of sickening. "We're Marines and we know what the f--- to do." We're here to protect our country; don't hassle us so much, we're on your side.

I think the Marine Corps is behind the times. "Can't walk a normal street without feeling proud." "A haircut makes a difference." It s---s. I'd rather serve time in jail than in the Marine Corps. It's embarrassing telling what my job is to people.

After three years in the Corps, I've learned nothing whatsoever that can help me in the least, once I'm discharged and go looking for a civilian job. And, also, the Marine Corps doesn't prep a Marine enough before he gets out. It's as if they think you are an outcast from the company and battalion and are no longer any use for them, so the Marine goes into the world not knowing what to expect.

Not enough money to do something for the Marine Corps. Believe me, in the next six to seven years, there will be no more people in the Marine Corps except lifers, because the Marine Corps doesn't walk on the words they say. The Army knows how to take care of their troops, and that's why the Army is the highest and the Marine Corps is the smallest in USAF.

The problems we're having in this company, I feel, are beginning to apply to the entire Marine Corps. It's the irresponsible, immature a--holes getting into the Corps. They don't give a s--- and you can't change it. It's the people, not all, but many (useless).

As far as Marines, generally, I feel a big letdown in boots. The quality of Marines is by far the lowest since I've been in. Bring back ITS (ITR). The leap from boot to FMF without that transition is destroying possibly good Marines.

Now, I see a downfall in the Marine Corps because of the quality of the Marines coming out of boot camp -- main reason for finding a new career. NCO's are no longer NCO's.

This isn't the first questionnaire I've filled out since I've been in. They always say how they want to help out and improve the Corps. I'm not a boot, then again I'm really not an old-timer either. The Corps needs help and a lot of it. If changes were made troops never heard them. How can we be the world's finest when the officers we are supposed to respect and follow try to be some sort of "god" towards the troops? Esprit de Corps -- it's been boot camp since I have seen or heard it. Aren't we Americans? Fighting for freedom, our country. Communism is suppose to be kept out, yet at times, quite often it's here, hopefully not for long!!

It's apparent that the program is concerned over the equal treatment of minority and majority races. But, what can your program do to help? A piece of paper with answers and questions is not the solution to present-day problems faced by Marines. In addition, how can a country justify spending money on such programs, when day after day bills and resolutions are made to cut back our benefits, pay, education, and other materials vital to make a good, adequate living when a person finishes his active duty obligations.

Being a member of this command which is actively involved in the unit rotation program, I must say that my opinion of the program is very low. I feel the men are being exploited by the Marine Corps. We are not getting any less time overseas, and we are not getting the deserved benefits of PCS orders, such as family moves, travel pay, etc. This is a major factor in my decision to leave the Marine Corps at the end of my current enlistment, with eight years of active duty served.

Personally, since joining I have been demoralized, pushed around, stepped on, and s--- on. The Marine Corps is functioning 20 years behind the rest of the world. I have never felt this depressed in my life. I have seen my friends in the Marine Corps driven to drinking and drugs so they could escape from the pressure. I'm glad I get out in 235 days, and I pray they go fast. You can have it. I only hope you can sleep at night. I know I've lost a lot.

Go back to the pre-'52 standards of excellence.

I think the Marines coming out of boot camp now are totally undisciplined, irresponsible punks.

It's great to know the crotch is so interested in racial s---. Trying to revive it or what? How about unsat SNCO's, moron officers, and leadership itself? What the f---. More MC paperwork. Total bull----. This test in itself says a f--- of a lot about administering leadership. How it's so important that we are surveyed anonymously once a year. How it is given is great (right, wrong, wrong). S--- a hog's a--. I'm tired of being taken for an 8th grader in the cracker factory. The "leaders" around here better get off their high hills and get to know what the real problems are in the MC. As far as I'm concerned, it's no better than the Army or etc. Standards are actually lower. How about a new motto, something like the "leftovers." I haven't got s--- to be proud of here except for keeping my own act together and knowing that I can take whatever s--- is being scrambled up by our "leaders." F--- you, CMC.

The Marine Corps should start looking towards the future where training of recruits are concerned and should also push congress and the government for a more realistic budget. The budget is self-explanatory. The training of recruits is getting to be a joke among Marines; a lot of troop handlers are beginning to feel like "babysitters." The Marines coming out of boot camp are just not tough enough. In order for Marine units to be effective on the "modern battlefield" (i.e., Europe), we have to start recruit training in a very tough program and stop letting civilians and a certain amount of government officials tell us how to do the job. If we don't start now, we'll find ourselves faced with a situation we had in the early forties, unprepared, and we won't have the time to "gear up" for it as we did in the past.

If more concentration was placed on the individual platoon as an operational/functional unit, people in this place would not only make better Marines, but performance would become better. If the small unit leader could get the support he needs, not only logistical but also command support, a definite unit improvement would be seen!

23. This place shouldn't be a Marine's first duty station because they don't appreciate it. They should go in their MOS first and this should be their second or third duty station, then you might have less violence and a better quality of Marines.

Old Marine Corps was better -- get me the hell out!

I feel that the Marine Corps is a total farce. Their advertising is false; their promises are false. So far as I am concerned, the Marine Corps is living in the past. So far as their traditions go, so on and so forth. I think they should come out of the hole and live for the future not the past. Also, people should be given the true scoop when volunteering. I can see how someone who is drafted might get f---ed, but why f--- up a man's life with false promises and advertisements.

I think the Marine Corps s---s. You make a mistake by joining because a lot of people join to see how it is, and all they do is get in trouble. But they bust their a-- when it comes down to work. So where do they wind up -- out in the f---ing streets with a BCD or a UD. What kind of s--- is that? If somebody would talk to me like I was a human being and not some kid they could yell at and push around, because I said I didn't like the Marine Corps or something similar, I would talk to them and try to get out of this place.

I've said a lot of bad, although my answers to the other questions will reflect the good side. This unit is trying to improve. If the Corps would just stick to basics and stop playing politics, we'd be a lot better off.

Before I enlisted in the Marine Corps, I thought it was an establishment of well respect within itself as well as it is outwards. So far, this thought has faired none. Myself and many others are each day made to feel unimportant and are more or less here "doing time."

This test was good to give to the Marines, but a lot of these questions people might write bad. Well, the Marines in this company make it this way because there are a lot of p---ies in the Corps. I don't know how to make them tough, but the Corps is not the Corps over here, but we do have a good command.

I'd like to say that I've done three years with the U.S. Marines and I have a year left until I get out. I'm not going to stay in the Marine Corps, but I'd like to say that working within the ranks has been the best schooling and experience of my life to date.

I think the Marine Corps should do something about the morale and spirit of its men before it's too late!!

Item
No.

I thought the USMC was great before I joined. I guess we all make a mistake once in our life.

All the Corps' propaganda posters talk of the Corps as being so elite, "The Marines want their good men to stay." Wouldn't everybody be better off if they got rid of those who are nonproductive and honestly want out?

The recruiters -- it's an office full of bull----.

The system of the Marine Corps is all right, but the promotion is not the way it's set up to be. The people who are in charge, that 10 percent of people who like to use leadership to show off, cause the lower echelon to really hate this place.

I believe the change in boot camp is one of the main reasons morale and spirit in the Corps are down. I think it would be a good idea to go back at least 10 years in boot camp, like about 1968.

The Marine Corps is nothing like the recruiters or ads say it is. I myself am very disappointed with the Marine Corps. I do like it though, because it is my life for the next three years. The Marine Corps is okay; it is just the people who run it.

Where is the service going to get the leaders it needs to survive?

I could see the Marine Corps going downhill because of the slack in boot camp.

APPENDIX B
LEAP INTERACTION INVENTORY

THE LEADERSHIP EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM



LEAP INTERACTION INVENTORY

The purpose of the LEAP Interaction Inventory is to allow Marines to express their perceptions and feelings about the positive and negative conditions which all Marines experience today. More specifically this questionnaire was developed to:

- Assist commands in understanding personnel relations and unit motivation.
- Determine the effectiveness of training programs designed to improve leadership and unit performance.

The LEAP Interaction Inventory was promoted in the belief that all Marines can work together toward the common solution of Marine Corps concerns.

LEAP INTERACTION INVENTORY

I. INSTRUCTIONS

A. This questionnaire inventory asks for your opinion about conditions as you see them. This is NOT a test. There are no standard "right" or "wrong" answers. What is right is whatever is right for you. A "correct" response is your description of exactly how you see conditions. It is recognized that people see things differently and that people have different opinions about certain issues. Therefore, you will not be judged in any way by your answers.

B. This questionnaire inventory requires anonymous replies, that is, YOUR NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER ARE NOT GIVEN ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE OR ANSWER FORM. So feel free to express exactly how you feel about any issue. But think carefully and be honest in your reply. The best solutions to problems come from accurate and honest responses.

C. DEFINITIONS. Before responding to this questionnaire it is important for you to understand some of the words used.

1. COMMAND. Statements which specifically state "in this command" refer to your COMPANY, BATTERY, OR SQUADRON, to which you are presently assigned. If you are not assigned to such a command, or if you do not know your command, the Administrator of this questionnaire will explain what is meant by COMMAND in your case.

2. ETHNIC/MINORITY AND MAJORITY GROUPS. The Department of Defense has determined that all military personnel will be considered according to their race or ethnic background. Ethnic/minority means races or groups of people classed according to common traits and customs. To be certain that every service person is represented, the Department of Defense has designated 17 separate categories:

<u>Ethnic/Minority Groups</u>	<u>Majority Group</u>
Black American	Eskimo
Spanish American	Japanese
Puerto Rican	Korean
Mexican American	Cuban
American Indian	Aleutian
Asian American	Other
Chinese	Unknown
Filipino	None

White Americans are in the Majority Group because most members of the military service classify themselves as White Americans. The categories listed under Ethnic/Minority Groups represent the smallest number of people serving in the Military. Most of the

people in the Marine Corps who are members of a minority group are Black Americans.

When reading the statements in this questionnaire remember MINORITY troops mean those listed in the above categories, and MAJORITY troops mean those who are White Americans.

D. ANSWER FORM. Use the LEAP ANSWER FORM to record your responses. The Answer Form contains a series of numbers and letters which correspond to the possible answers given in the Inventory booklet. When you select an answer to a question or statement, find the corresponding number and letter on the Answer Form and completely fill in the box underneath the letter you choose. Look at the example below:



RIGHT



WRONG



WRONG

If you make a mistake, erase the mark completely before entering a new one.

E. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA. Now begin with question Number 1 on your Answer Form and answer the following questions:

QUESTION

NO.

1. AGE. How old are you? If you are :

a. 17 to 20 years old, mark the space . 1. A B C D E

b. 21 to 25 years old, mark the space . 1. A B C D E

c. 26 to 30 years old, mark the space . 1. A B C D E

d. 31 to 35 years old, mark the space . 1. A B C D E

e. Over 35 years old, mark the space . 1. A B C D E

2. SEX. If you are:

a. Male, mark the space 2. A B

b. Female, mark the space 2. A B

3. EDUCATION. What is the highest grade in school you completed? If you completed (Mark one) :

a. 8th grade or less, mark the space . 3. A B C D E

b. 9th to 11th grade, mark the space . 3. A B C D E

c. High School Graduate, mark the space 3. A B C D E

d. 1 to 3 years college, mark the space 3. A B C D E

e. College graduate or above, mark the space 3. A B C D E

4. MARITAL STATUS AND LOCATION. What is your present status? If you are (Mark one) :

a. Not married and live on base, mark the space 4. A B C D

b. Not married and live off base, mark the space 4. A B C D

c. Married and live on base, mark the space 4. A B C D

d. Married and live off base, mark the space 4. A B C D

5. RANK. What is your present rank (pay grade)? If you are a (Mark one) :

a. Private or PFC (E-1 or E-2), mark the space 5. A B C D E

b. Lance Corporal (E-3), mark the space 5. A B C D E

c. Corporal (E-4), mark the space . . . 5. A B C D E

d. Sergeant (E-5), mark the space . . . 5. A B C D E

e. Staff or Gunnery Sergeant (E-6 or E-7), mark the space 5. A B C D E

f. First Sergeant, Master Sergeant,
Master Gunnery Sergeant, or Sergeant
Major (E-8 or E-9), mark the space . 5.

g. Warrant Officer (W-1, W-2, W-3, or
W-4), mark the space 5.

h. Second or First Lieutenant (O-1 or
O-2), mark the space 5.

i. Captain (O-3), or Major (O-4),
mark the space 5.

6. MILITARY EXPERIENCE. How long have you been in active
military service? If you were on active duty for (Mark one) :

a. Less than One (1) year, mark the
space 6.

b. One (1) to Two (2) years, mark
the space 6.

c. Two (2) to Three (3) years, mark
the space 6.

d. Three (3) to Four (4) years,
mark the space 6.

e. Four (4) to Six (6) years, mark
the space 6.

f. Six (6) to Ten (10) years, mark
the space 6.

g. Ten (10) to Fifteen (15) years,
mark the space 6.

h. Over Fifteen (15) years, mark
the space 6.

7. TIME IN PRESENT UNIT. How long have you been assigned to your present unit (company or equivalent)? If you were with this unit (Mark one) :

a. Less than Three (3) months, mark the space 7. A B C D E

b. Three (3) months to One (1) year, mark the space 7. A B C D E

c. One (1) year to Two (2) years, mark the space 7. A B C D E

d. Two (2) years to Three (3) years, mark the space 7. A B C D E

e. Over Three (3) years, mark the space 7. A B C D E

8. CAREER ORIENTATION. Do you intend to make the Marine Corps your career? If you (Mark one) :

a. Decided yes to make the Marine Corps your career, mark the space 8. A B C

b. Decided not to make the Marine Corps your career, mark the space 8. A B C

c. Undecided whether or not to make the Marine Corps your career, mark the space 8. A B C

9. END OF ACTIVE SERVICE (EAS) DATE. When does your present enlistment contract terminate? If your EAS date is (Mark one) :

a. Less than One (1) year, mark the space 9. A B C D

b. One (1) to Two (2) years from now, mark the space 9. A B C D

c. Two (2) to Four (4) years from now, mark the space 9. A B C D

d. More than Four (4) years from now, mark the space 9. A B C D

10. ETHNIC GROUP. What ethnic group(s) do you feel you belong to? If you decide you belong to more than one ethnic category, then mark those groups which best identify you. If you are:

a. White American, mark the space . 10. A B C D E

b. Black American, mark the space . 10. A B C D E

c. Puerto Rican, mark the space . 10. A B C D E

d. Mexican American, mark the space. 10. A B C D E

e. Spanish American, mark the space. 10. A B C D E

f. Cuban, mark the space 10. F G H I J

g. American Indian, mark the space . 10. F G H I J

h. Chinese American, mark the space. 10. F G H I J

i. Filipino, mark the space 10. F G H I J

j. Japanese, mark the space 10. F G H I J

k. Korean, mark the space 10. K L M N O

l. Eskimo, mark the space 10. K L M N O

m. Asian American, mark the space . 10. K L M N O

n. Aleutian, mark the space 10. K L M N O

o. Other, mark the space 10. K L M N O

p. None or unknown, mark the space . 10. P

F. RESPONSE TO STATEMENTS. The remaining part of the Inventory contains statements about your command, the Marine Corps, and leadership training programs. Read each statement carefully and decide how you feel about the statement. Take your time in responding. There is no time limit, and there are no trick questions, only direct statements. If you have difficulty understanding or reading the statements, ask the Inventory Administrator for assistance. Answer each statement in the following manner:
If you:

STRONGLY AGREE with the statement,
mark the space A B C D E

AGREE with the statement, mark
the space A B C D E

NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE with the
statement, mark the space A B C D E

DISAGREE with the statement, mark
the space A B C D E

STRONGLY DISAGREE with the state-
ment, mark the space A B C D E

Make only one mark under one letter for each statement. Be sure the number on the Answer Form corresponds with the statement number. If you make a mistake or change your answer, ERASE COMPLETELY the previous mark.

In order to cover as much information as possible, the statements which follow are stated in general terms and require only the several possible answers given. If you desire to explain further or qualify any of your answers, please feel free to use the Comment section on the reverse side of your Answer Form for this purpose.

NOW BEGIN WITH STATEMENT NUMBER 11 ON THE ANSWER FORM.

II. COMMAND PERCEPTIONS. Statements 11 through 52 are about the conditions and concerns in your command as you see them. Please respond to all the statements. Regardless of how long you have been assigned to this command, you have an opinion which is useful to the commander.

NO.	STATEMENT					
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
11.	This command encourages educational development.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
12.	Most of the troops in this command are dissatisfied with their job.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
13.	The troops in this command are well informed.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
14.	Staff NCO's do not take the time to help the junior men in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
15.	This command is efficient.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
16.	A good example is set for the troops to follow in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
17.	The troops of this command have no respect for authority.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
18.	The troops in this command are confused much of the time.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
19.	The troops in this command get a lot of help with their personal problems.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
20.	The troops in this command are not well trained.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
21.	Morale and spirit are high in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
22.	There is a lot of respect between all Marines in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
23.	Most of the troops would rather serve in another command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
24.	Staff NCO's have a good understanding of the troops in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
25.	Most of the Marines are proud to be in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E

NO.	STATEMENT	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
26.	The troops of this command have confidence in their leaders.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
27.	The troops in this command are not motivated.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
28.	This command is well organized.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
29.	The leaders of this command are responsive to the needs of the troops.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
30.	The troops of this command are not encouraged to do their best.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
31.	There are many complaints about discrimination and prejudice in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
32.	In this command minority personnel get better treatment than majority troops.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
33.	Race relations in this command are very good.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
34.	Minority troops have less chance of getting good training opportunities in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
35.	Work details are <u>equally</u> distributed in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
36.	Justice is administered <u>equally</u> in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
37.	Minority troops get special privileges in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
38.	Minority and majority Marines get along well in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
39.	Most minority troops stick to themselves in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
40.	The troops in this command are judged by their character, not by their color or background.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
41.	Minority troops are not treated fairly in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E

NO.	STATEMENT	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
42.	Promotions are based on an individual's ability in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
43.	In this command minority troops get punished more severely than others for the same offense.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
44.	Complaints about discrimination are treated <u>fairly</u> in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
45.	All Marines are treated as <u>equals</u> in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
46.	In this command minority troops get the worst jobs and details.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
47.	Everyone in this command has an <u>equal</u> opportunity for a training assignment.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
48.	Majority troops are discriminated against in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
49.	In this command minority troops get away with breaking rules others are punished for.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
50.	There is a lot of tension between racial/ethnic groups in this command.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
51.	Punishment and discipline in this command are handled <u>fairly</u> .	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
52.	After duty hours, the troops in this command stick together in groups of their own race and ethnic background.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E

NOW TURN THE PAGE AND CONTINUE WITH NUMBER 53 ON THE ANSWER SHEET.

III. GENERAL ATTITUDES. Statements 53 to 62 are about your attitudes towards certain general issues and conditions.

NO.	STATEMENT	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
53.	Military/civilian relations in this community are good.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
54.	In order to stay out of trouble it is best to avoid those with different backgrounds and values from my own	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
55.	Integration or mixing between racial and ethnic groups does more harm than good.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
56.	People should show pride in their race and ethnic background.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
57.	Civilians in this area dislike Marines.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
58.	It's better when racial groups don't mix.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
59.	Racial and ethnic symbols make people proud of their background.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
60.	There is more racial discrimination in the military than in civilian life.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
61.	Groups who use symbols to show off their race are really trying to start trouble.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
62.	It is better for minority and majority troops to hang around together after duty hours.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E

NOW TURN THE PAGE AND CONTINUE WITH NUMBER 63 ON THE ANSWER FORM.

IV. PROGRAM EVALUATION. This section of the Interaction Inventory contains statements about a training program that is required for Marines. The statements below allow Marines to evaluate or judge any program designed to improve the capability of those who participate, for example, the Leadership Program. Since these statements can be used to evaluate any program of training, discussion exercise, or similar involvement, the title or name of the program has been left blank. It is very important for you to know which program you are responding to. The Inventory Administrator will designate which program these statements pertain to. When he does, write the name of the program in the appropriate space on the Answer Form.

NO.	STATEMENT	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
63.	Morale and spirit in this command have improved because of the _____ Program.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
64.	The _____ Program does <u>not</u> change behavior.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
65.	The _____ Program makes Marines better leaders.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
66.	The _____ Program is a waste of time.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
67.	Training helps Marines perform their duties better.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
68.	How would you rate the _____ Program?	Very Good <input type="checkbox"/> A	Good <input type="checkbox"/> B	Aver- age <input type="checkbox"/> C	Poor <input type="checkbox"/> D	Very Poor <input type="checkbox"/> E
69.	How many times have you completed a course in the _____ Program?	0 <input type="checkbox"/> A	1 <input type="checkbox"/> B	2 <input type="checkbox"/> C	3 <input type="checkbox"/> D	4 <input type="checkbox"/> E or more
70.	How many times have you completed a _____ Program course while assigned to this command?	0 <input type="checkbox"/> A	1 <input type="checkbox"/> B	2 <input type="checkbox"/> C	3 <input type="checkbox"/> D	4 <input type="checkbox"/> E or more

PLEASE CHECK ALL YOUR ANSWERS AND BE SURE THE DATE IS RECORDED ON THE ANSWER FORM.

END

V. WOMAN MARINE. Statements 71 through 76 represent issues about women in the Marine Corps. Whether or not you have direct experience with Women Marines, you may still hold certain opinions which are important to study. So please respond to these statements to the best of your knowledge.

No.	STATEMENT	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
71.	Women Marines make poor leaders.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
72.	Women officers deserve the same respect as male officers.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
73.	Women Marines should not be put in charge of male Marines.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
74.	Women Marines can lead troops just as well as male Marines.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
75.	Women Marines are entitled to the same privileges as male Marines.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E
76.	Women have no place in the Marine Corps.	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> B	<input type="checkbox"/> C	<input type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> E

LEAP INTERACTION INVENTORY
Manual/Keypunch Answer Form

Date: _____

Part I Demographic Data

	A	B	C	D	E
1.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A B				
2.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
	A B C D E				
3.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A B C D				
4.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	A B C D E F G H I J				
5.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A B C D E F G H				
6.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A B C D E				
7.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	A B C				
8.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
	A B C D				
9.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P				
10.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Part III General Attitudes

	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
53.	<input type="checkbox"/>	58.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
54.	<input type="checkbox"/>	59.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
55.	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
56.	<input type="checkbox"/>	61.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
57.	<input type="checkbox"/>	62.	<input type="checkbox"/>								

Part IV Program Evaluation

Title of Program: _____

	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
63.	<input type="checkbox"/>	67.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
64.	<input type="checkbox"/>	68.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
65.	<input type="checkbox"/>	69.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
66.	<input type="checkbox"/>	70.	<input type="checkbox"/>								

Part II Command Perceptions

	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
11.	<input type="checkbox"/>	16.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
12.	<input type="checkbox"/>	17.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
13.	<input type="checkbox"/>	18.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
14.	<input type="checkbox"/>	19.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
15.	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
21.	<input type="checkbox"/>	26.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
22.	<input type="checkbox"/>	27.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
23.	<input type="checkbox"/>	28.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
24.	<input type="checkbox"/>	29.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
30.	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>								

	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
31.	<input type="checkbox"/>	36.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
32.	<input type="checkbox"/>	37.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
33.	<input type="checkbox"/>	38.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
34.	<input type="checkbox"/>	39.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
40.	<input type="checkbox"/>	45.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
41.	<input type="checkbox"/>	46.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
42.	<input type="checkbox"/>	47.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
43.	<input type="checkbox"/>	48.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
44.	<input type="checkbox"/>	49.	<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
50.	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
51.	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>								
	A B C D E						A B C D E				
52.	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>								

For Official
Use Only

Part V Women Marines (Optional)

A	B	C	D	E
71	■	■	■	■
A	B	C	D	E
72	■	■	■	■
A	B	C	D	E
73	■	■	■	■

A	B	C	D	E
74	■	■	■	■
A	B	C	D	E
75	■	■	■	■
A	B	C	D	E
76	■	■	■	■

1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■

1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■
1	2	3	4	5
■	■	■	■	■

COMMENTS

Additional comments about any of the statements in the LEAP Interaction Inventory or any Marine Corps issue considered important to your command are welcomed. If your comment pertains to a particular item in the questionnaire, please indicate the number of the item.

Item No.

Comment